COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS: BOOK I, 11
(For the nature of the sections see the “General Introduction”, here.)
Abbreviations: Ar. = Aristotle, AQ= Aquinas, NE = Nicomachean Ethics, EE= Eudemian Ethics
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
BOOK I
CHAPTER ELEVEN
“But that the fortunes of a person’s descendants and all his friends contribute nothing whatsoever [to his happiness] appears to be excessively opposed to what is dear and contrary to the opinion held. And because the things that may befall us are many and differ in various respects — some hitting closer to home, others less so— thoroughly distinguishing each appears to be a long and even endless task. But perhaps for the matter to be stated generally and in outline would be adequate.
Just as some of the misfortunes that concerns a person himself have a certain gravity, and weight as regards his life but others seems lighter, so also the misfortunes that concern all his friends are similar; and if, concerning each thing suffered, it makes a difference whether the friends are alive or have met their end, far more than if the unlawful and terrible things in tragic plays occur before the action of the play or during it, then one must indeed take this difference into account —and even more, perhaps, when it comes to the perplexity raised concerning those who have passed away, that is, whether they share in something good or in the opposite. For it seems, on the basis of these points, that even if anything at all does get through to them, whether good or its contrary, it is something faint and small, either simply or to them. And if this is not so, then what gets through to them is, at any rate, of such a degree and kind that it does not make happy those who are not such or deprive those who are happy of their blessedness. The friends faring well, then, appears to make some contribution to the condition of those who have passed away, as does, similarly, their faring ill — but a contribution of such a kind and degree as not to make the happy unhappy or anything else of that sort.”
(NE, 1101a22-1101b9; Aristotle´s Nicomachean Ethics, Bartlett, Robert, and Collins, Susan; University of Chicago, Chicago, 2011)
I. PRIVATE PUZZLES
1) Isn’t the most fundamental puzzle for this subsection hard to see at first sight? For shouldn’t we ask, why does Ar. dedicate ANOTHER, a totally separate subsection, to the already addressed question of the relation between happiness, the vulnerability of those we love (particularly family relatives up to a certain “reasonable” degree), and the end of our own temporal finitude in death? However, doesn´t Ar. now in this new subsection place the emphasis clearly on the effects that such fortunes/misfortunes may have on the happiness of the ALREADY dead? And to be honest, doesn’t he really stress the myriad misfortunes rather than the fortunes in keeping with the tenor of subsection 10? For, who would complain about too many good fortunes in one’s life (!)? And , aren´t we MORTALS? Is it that life has a tendency towards the tragic and thus we are not surprised to actually see the very first mention of tragedy in THIS subsection? Is there something about our view of life as tragic that runs counter to an ethics of eudaimonia? Will/Can the NE transform this initial contrast as it proceeds deploying its argument (see below)? Moreover, isn’t it odd that Ar. apparently “repeats” the topics of a subsection precisely at the point in which we are reaching the END of the first and Introductory book to the whole NE? Now, isn’t any “Introduction” of absolute relevance to the whole of what it is an “introduction” to? Didn’t Ar. himself tell us in a previous subsection that the beginning is half the whole? So, why lead us in THIS strange direction and no other? And even more dramatically, we know that in the EE, there exists NO parallel passage dealing with these topics, don’t we? What are we to make of this? Wouldn’t this omission clearly aid us in identifying better the different TONES found in both ethics? And wouldn’t this tonality be part of an argument for the maturity of the NE over the EE (pace Kenny)? Wouldn’t the tone of the EE, with what could be called its overconfidence in understanding, be rather more akin to OUR overconfident modern/current “philosophical” approach to life and its perplexities? In this regard, as we shall see below, wouldn’t OUR looking to the NE —–as moderns living a secular age in which the spirit has radically stifled— become even more fundamental to awaken us from the troubling slumber we have fallen into as modern Western democracies? Or put in the words of professor Taylor, who in some regards is a kind of neo-Aristotelian: “we have read so many goods out of our official story, we have buried their power so deep beneath layers of philosophical rationale, that they are in danger of stiffing. Or rather, since they are our goods, human goods, WE are stifling….“(Sources of the Self, Conclusion, p. 520) Doesn’t Ar.’s striking reference to these kinds of issues in subsection 10 and 11 move us, thus moderating us, in the opposite direction?
But leaving these issues aside, what more concretely are the differences revealed between the similar subsections 10 and 11? For, don’t we see how SHORT subsection 11 is, in contrast to 10? Why not just simply add one to the other? I mean, the resulting subsection would NOT end up being that much longer, right? How to even begin to try to account for this puzzle? Could it be that Ar. is letting us know how LITTLE philosophical argumentation can actually be developed in the more speculative areas touched upon by this much shorter subsection? Besides, isn’t the need for brevity emphasized by Ar. himself when we listen to him saying, as he had already done in another subsection: “But perhaps for the matter to be stated generally and in outline would be adequate”? Put bluntly, doesn’t Ar. lead us to wonder whether philosophy kind of “dies” when it reaches these more “speculative” horizons dealing with “life after death” and the “immortality of the soul”? And yet, why does Ar. still emphasize the need NOT to remain wholly silent about such topics? In contrast, don’t neo-Aristotelians —specially of the analytical tradition—- have a tough time squaring Ar.’s concerns in THESE topics with theirs? Isn’t the whole thing kind of embarrassing, from a modern philosopher’s perspective? Or can you imagine presenting your PhD thesis director with the topic “Life after death in Ar.”? Or is it, that Ar. is here reminding us of the rhetorical arguments presented previously which distinguished the mathematician and the rhetorician? Is Ar. HERE being a rhetorician? To what avail? Is he simply teaching us to bow to tradition once again? Is it so that —using terminology from previous subsections already commented— we can save the THAT by not asking too much of the WHY, so that the independence of the practical sphere and ITS beliefs, and ITS concerns with the nature of the soul, are left unperturbed to a large extent? But then, what of philosophy and those of us intent on THAT kind of life which cannot simply let it go at the THAT, but must inquire, even if prudently, about the WHY’s of the way we actually lead our lives AS philosophers? For isn’t the whole point of the NE not to be self-deceived in the essentials; to learn about the truest self-love (see below)? But, aren’t we here confronting the CENTRAL animating human aspects that MAY lead one to deceive oneself most decisively? Isn’t the LONGING, specially given the abundant misfortunes of life, that which may animate us to guide our lives beyond our rational capacities? Doesn’t fortune lead us to misology like few other “human” realities can? And, if Ar.’s presentation is indeed purely rhetorical in character, then, wouldn’t WE —-in order to get the real REVELATORY power of these types of “otherworldly” concerns—– just rather read the passages of the Bible that allow us to really FEEL such, in the end, non-philosophical connections? For instance, isn’t the whole story of Lazarus, really much more striking and less filled with rhetorical indecisions? Doesn´t resurrection really hit the heart of these kind of concerns like Ar.´s ambivalences cannot? For, according to the text, Lazarus DID come back, didn’t he (pace Hobbes/Locke, for instance)? But, of course, Ar. obviously sees the need NOT to proceed in THAT direction, does he?
In addition, don’t we find it striking that the previous subsection, which deals with similar issues —albeit in this world—- BEGINS and ENDS with puzzling questions, while in contrast we find not even the smallest reference to any direct questioning by Ar. in this new subsection? Besides, what about the answers provided? Don’t they truly seem aporetic in the Socratic sense of the word? For don’t the answers sound a bit like “well, yes, but really no, but we´ll say yes, but actually it is very small, but we can’t say that it isn’t for that would be too rude, though we really really think that it is not, but …”? Is Ar. trying to “confuse” us once again? Don’t we tend to forget, precisely because of this intentional rhetorical ambivalence, that Ar. is THE originator of philosophical logic and the discoverer even of the famous principle of non-contradiction? I mean, doesn’t Ar. seem rather clumsily to be contradicting himself with every line he adds to this subsection? Just go ahead and listen:
“For it seems, on the basis of these points, that even if anything at all does get through to them, whether good or its contrary, it is something faint and small, either simply or to them. And if this is not so, then what gets through to them is, at any rate, of such a degree and kind that it does not make happy those who are not such or deprive those who are happy of their blessedness. The friends faring well, then, appears …” (my emphasis)
To put it bluntly, has Ar. lost his rational mind (!)? Absurdly we ask: was it that he wrote the logical treatises only after he wrote the NE as a kind of cure(!)? More seriously, isn’t the whole thing not only ODD in the subject matter, but perhaps even weirder in Ar.’s selected approach? But, is he truly self-contradicting himself? Doesn’t our looking elsewhere aid us in understanding such Aristotelian maneuvers? Because we know that this is not the only place in his corpus that Ar. proceeds thus, is it? For if we read the introduction to the ALSO strange and also kind of “spooky” On Divination and Sleep (once again, if you do not believe it is a spooky topic, just try selling it as a philosophical PhD thesis!), we find Ar. arguing that:
“As to the divination which takes place in sleep, and it is said to be based on dreams, we cannot lightly either dismiss it with contempt or give it confidence. The fact that all persons, or many suppose dreams to possess a special significance, tends to inspire us with belief in it, as founded on the testimony of experience; and indeed that divination in dreams should, as regards some subjects be genuine, is not incredible, for it has a show of reason; from which one might form a like opinion also respecting other dreams. Yet the fact of our seeing no reasonable cause to account for such divination tends to inspire us with distrust….” (my emphasis: On Divination and Sleep; 462b13-462b18; on other “spooky” writings of a non-modern character by Plato, see the Thaeges and the Euthyphro)
Is Ar.´s initial ambivalent tone simply preparing the ground for our taking sides once the argument develops further along truly philosophical, that is to say, classical rational lines? But then, by thus proceeding, won’t the beginning be so transformed so that what was considered to be, can no longer be as it was; at least for those serious intent on understanding the way we lead our lives as human beings who long for a certain kind of truthful completion before death? As we said, won’t we inevitably end up upsetting the THAT by asking for its WHY? What then, is the point of delaying the “inevitable” through these rhetorical “tricks”? Wouldn’t this strategy of, do forgive me, “hide-and-seek”, rather than safeguard the philosophers and their questions, truly not make them even more suspicious as they would seem to actually be two-faced (I mean, “well, yes you have a point, but really your point is really a bad one, but we´ll suppose it is a little valid, but …”)? Or is it that the desire to BELIEVE is of such a nature, that against it rational inquiry truly cannot but from the start appear ambivalent NO MATTER what strategy the philosopher takes recourse to? Isn’t this why there IS a need to understand the permanent and persistent relation between persecution and writing? And of ALL the possibilities, isn’t Ar.´s the single MOST prudent available to us? But then, if this is true, wouldn’t this radically transform the way we see the relationship that can arise between philosophy and society at large? Didn’t we mention precisely this debate in alluding to the references silently made by Ar. in subsection 10 in our previous commentary? Put directly, what is the philosopher to DO, if these longings are of such a nature that they override understanding, specially if they end up actually conforming the CORE structure/the HEART of the law and our appeals to justice (even divine)? And, moving even further beyond, wouldn’t this realization, in particular, actually transform the nature of the modern University to its core in the direction of liberal education? But how would one implement such foundational change if the University turned out to be essentially misguided in its role as a socially transforming entity? But reaching back, isn’t it altogether striking that in his other text On Dreams, Ar. has no qualms whatsoever to speak about the REAL considerations regarding dreams as the biologist and philosopher that he is? For instance, don’t we read in THAT text, things that sound utterly “modern”, for instance; “What happens in these cases may be compared with what happens in the case of projectiles moving in space…. (Princeton,OD; 459a28, p. 730) Exaggerating: I mean, one would swear it was Galileo speaking (!), wouldn’t one?
How then to account for such striking differences between these two TYPES of texts and approaches, namely those found in this subsection as well as in On Divination and Sleep, and other texts such as the EE and On Dreams? ? Shouldn’t we truly take to heart the hypothesis that Ar. clearly differentiates between the kinds of writings that are more public in nature, and those that are more private because more upsetting of the traditions of a social life form? Isn’t this, at least in part, what Straussians have come to call the difference between exoteric and esoteric writings in Aristotle (albeit, not only in him; see Pangle on Montesquieu and Locke)? And, furthermore, doesn’t Professor Bolotin help us immensely in seeing more clearly how these rhetorical strategies come to life in Ar.’s own Physics? Or to put it yet another way, as we argued in our previous subsection, isn’t Ar. here as well bowing to tradition continuing to provide certain bridges that connect the political and the philosophical in order to restore the dignity of the former and provide a certain kind of security for the latter? Isn’t this why Ar. has told us that the whole aim of the NE, whose “Introductory” book we are ending, is a KIND of —but not exactly— political inquiry? Isn’t this why POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, just as we mentioned regarding Solon in our previous subsection, stands as a leading yet middling power that grants a certain healthy political moderation to the socio-historical network/context in which it appears? For don’t we know also that Ar. lived at a time in which Athens had suffered intensely and immensely because of war and the negative role played in this regard by some of Socrates’s worst “disciples”? But still, even if all this turns out to have a certain plausibility, then, what are we to make of Ar.’s having to leave Athens in SPITE of such cares? Should we follow his rhetorical example, which appears to be in many respects truly unsuccessful? Isn’t an ethical inquiry guided by the question of happiness, truly to be assessed by its ACTUAL ability to generate said happiness for the inquirer? Or is it that, in the end, happiness may flourish even beyond the boundaries of the city? And finally, in OUR current age in which the question of the spirit has truly become secondary —so much so that we kind of kind of roll our eyes at this Aristotelian subsection— what is the POINT of our being so drastically careful if OUR spiritual “THAT” has already been so eroded away by way of its materialism, so that it is harder to see the “protective” necessity of such prudential approaches? Put another way, in an age of rampant materialism, mustn’t Aristotelianism focus much less on its moderating rhetorical position in defense of a spiritual tradition, and instead really “turn up the heat” (in the mind) and come on the offensive against the leveling and deadening materialistic excesses that surround us (specially in universities(!)? Are we perhaps more in need of Socratic irony and its effects, rather than Ar.’s prudence and its effects? Or must we try to restrain ourselves, recall Ar.’s moderating wisdom and his prudential political advise, and serenely yet realistically ask whether Ar. could have foreseen such lowering of the spirit as early moderns theorists achieved and whether —–because he could not foresee such troubling conditions—– his Ethics can, in the end, indeed help us pull ourselves out of the abysses in which we have made our abode? For wouldn’t the early modern political thinkers (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu) counterargue: aren’t these abysses ONLY abysses if seen from the perspective of Aristotelianism itself and its convoluted, even dangerous, high-flown and unreachable goals/ends? Wouldn’t we rather, such early modern thinkers might argue, a little secure happiness for all (or most, allegedly), rather than no happiness, or worse yet, just the happiness of a few elitists?
2) But besides the brevity and the lack of direct questions, don’t we come to see that THE single most important difference between both subsections 10 and 11, is the fact that that now we have added to the question of the relation between descendants and the happiness pertaining to the family, the issue of the happiness pertaining to friendship and the death of our friends? But why would THAT make a difference in terms of the way we remember those who are gone, and the way we connect to those who are gone? For couldn’t it perhaps be that, in contrast to the issues of longing and immortality presented in our previous commentary, friends generate a permanence that moves beyond mere desire for recognition in public memory (Montaigne thought so)? For didn´t Ar. truly come down hard on the life of honor and recognition just a few subsections ago? And that Ar. HIMSELF signals to puzzles of this kind further on in his NE, can be seen if we recall here that Ar. ALSO divides the question of friendship into two separate books, Books VIII and IX? And strikingly, don’t we find a parallel relation in THEIR separation as well: Ar. primarily treating the concerns of the family and of political concord and philia in the diverse political regimes mainly in BOOK VIII; and leaving the issue of personal and perhaps even philosophical friendship to BOOK IX? Moreover, won’t we come to see then how Ar. brings to light the question of self-love, which is only faintly alluded to here? As a matter of fact, is Ar. not truly seeking to safeguard the happiness of the best of humans by not letting it become so dependant (or at all) on what happens to those who conform their immediate circle of family and/or friends? For, in the worst case scenario, why should/would the “best” suffer because of the “worst”? But, why on earth would we be moving so ahead of ourselves in the argument if we are simply looking at subsection 11 and its special strangeness? Well, fundamentally in part because won’t the tragic and dramatic (not to say deadly) TONE of subsections 10 and 11 actually be transformed drastically in those specific sections of the arguments regarding self-love that ASTONISHINGLY read thus:
“But if living is good and pleasant —as it seems to be also from the fact that all people, and specially the decent and blessed, long for it, since to such people life is most choiceworthy and their life is most blessed; and if he who sees perceives that he sees, he who hears that he hears, he who walks that he walks (and similarly in other cases), then there is something that perceives that we are active. ….. Moreover perceiving that one lives belongs among the things pleasant in themselves, for life is by nature a good thing, and to perceive the good present in oneself is pleasant; and living is a choiceworthy thing, especially to those who are good, because existing is good for them and pleasant, for in simultaneously perceiving what is good in itself, they feel pleasure” … (my emphasis; Book 9, chapter 9, 1170a25-1170b10)
And so that we may be believed, one need recall the way Ar. expressed himself just a few lines before in subsection 10:
“Now, many things occur by chance, and they differ in how great or small they are … But those fortunes that turn out in the contrary way restrict and even ruin one´s blessedness, for they both inflict pain and impede many activities. Nevertheless, even in the midst of these, nobility shines through, whenever someone bears up calmly under many misfortunes, not because of any insensitivity to pain but because he is well-born and great souled.”(my emphasis)
To put it provocatively, doesn’t the difference between subsections 10 and 11 start to point towards a kind of being, a kind of relating oneself to existence in which the tragedies of fortune truly lose their ominous presence opening for us, in ourselves, the conditions for a kind of erotic love whose presence seeks to understand and to come to an understanding of oneself and the possibility of happiness with certain exclusive others? Or to move even further beyond Ar.´s own text, don’t we hear Xenophon speaking of Socrates not only in terms of his radical self-sufficiency (Memorabilia I 6, Xenophon, Translated by Amy L. Bonnette; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), but ALSO in terms of the concrete living benefits, the joyful benefits of interacting with one such as Socrates: “there was nothing more beneficial than being a companion o Socrates and spending time with him anywhere at all and in any matter whatsoever, once even remembering him when he was not present was of no small benefit to those who were accustomed to being in his company and who were receptive (Memorabilia, “apodechesthai” see fn. 47, p. 154) to him!”. For isn’t the whole issue that WE ALL remember Socrates for who he WAS? Don’t we ALL, miss Socrates? Or, at the risk of even going further from the Ar. text itself —– allowing ourselves a HUGE interpretative leeway—– don’t we here recall in stark contrast to subsections 10 and 11 and their tone, the actual death of a wise human such as Plato himself? For doesn´t Cicero famously tell us On Old Age: “But there is another sort of old age too; the tranquil and serene evening of a life spent in peaceful, blameless enlightened pursuits. Such, we are told, were the last years of Plato, who died in his eighty-first year while still actively engaged in writing?” And allowing ourselves even further exploratory avenues, which we think nonetheless keep within the spirit of Ar. later movements in the NE, don’t we recall Voegelin´s imaginary words as regard the death of Plato, recovered by Schall in his beautiful essay: “Plato died at the age of eighty-one. On the evening of his death he had a Thracian girl plat the flute to him. The girl could not find the beat of the nomos. With the movement of his finger, Plato indicated to her the Measure” (Schall, “The Death of Plato”)
For if anything, what if it turned out that Ar.´s constant ambivalence in this subsection, which surely seems not to find the measure, may perhaps, continuing our friendly approach to his text, bring about a new measure and a new beat –a more serene and joyful beat—that not only may come to appear for us, but even become part of us? Wouldn’t even our fingers become others?
3) And to conclude, perhaps the greatest puzzle regarding this subsection lies in the way that it has been interpreted by Aristotelians, doesn´t it? For truly, don’t certain “Aristotelians” seem kind of embarrassed by the whole thing? As we asked above, how can a biologist and a logician end up speaking like this? Is he simply being patronizing and we, we moderns, simply smile when we think of those who hear these “consoling” messages? Or put another way, for those of us who have taken many seminars on Aristotle, isn’t it striking that this section is overlooked and truly (silently, of course) held as an example of how disconnected these “lecture notes” truly are? But, haven’t we, in our previous commentaries (and other writings) emphasized once and again how we ALSO see how modern interpreters tend to do away with the books dealing concretely with the moral virtues (that is to say Books III and IV)? But shouldn’t we be worried that following these ERASING procedures we will end up with an anorexic Ar. that truly fits us rather than with the Ar. as he proceeds in HIS own text and who questions us precisely BECAUSE of his strangeness? Or are we to hold once again that, as Ar. was duped into simply mentioning the GREEK virtues as he was inevitably caught within the horizon of their cage-like presence, so also here Ar. is duped into believing similar, though much more “esoteric” and “illogical” things?
But so that we may be believed; don’t we find Ostwald’s commentary to subsection 10 to the point in this regard? For doesn’t he allude to Burnett´s interpretation in fn. 44 in order to, seemingly excuse Ar., kind of saving Ar. him from himself (!)? As he puts it quoting Burnett:
“There is no question here as to the departed (???; our addition) being aware of what goes on in this world. On the contrary, the point is that what happens after a mans death may affect our estimate of his life … Neither makes any difference to the man himself.” (my emphasis)
Now, of course we will be immediately told that this is absolutely true of subsection 10 wherein there is no such mention of “another life”, won’t we? However, isn’t it true that astonishingly Ostwald provides NOT a single explanatory footnote to subsection 11, which clearly contradicts —without any doubt whatsoever—– Burnett’s own interpretive considerations? And so that, once again we may be taken seriously, it is not just US who are astonished at such interpretative blindness. For, don’t we find, for example in Joachim, this specific struggle with the weirdness of Ar.`s words and his approach? Doesn’t Joachim, contra Burnett/Ostwald actually tell us that:
”but the present passage seems (???; our addition) to imply that Ar. was unwilling to state dogmatically that the dead cannot feel at all. The present problem assumes that the dead somehow continue to exist, live on in another word in a state of suspended animation, with greatly dimmed, but not extinct, feelings …” (my emphasis: Joachim, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 60)
For, whatever our quality as interpreters of Ar., it is clear that one really just needs to READ what Ar. actually says, to have no doubt that Joachim´s position is the only tenable one, isn’t it? And surely reading Broadie and Rowe seems to make things even worse, doesn’t it? For they conclude in a very strange manner: “We are now logically prepared (???; our addition) for the thought that even if (???; our addition) it is true to say, once X is dead, that a good or bad turn in the life of a loved one is a good or bad thing for X; still nothing follows about X’s happiness? (my emphasis: p. 288-289)
Words which stand in astonishing conflict with the very tone of Ar.´s own non-logical use of language (and we KNOW he could have CHOSEN to be logical) which include such touching and memorable words as “ it appears to be excessively opposed to what is dear and contrary to the opinion held”. Giving ourselves permission for an imprudent remark: is it any wonder, hardly anyone outside academia is interested in Aristotle? But, haven’t we argued at length previously, that Ar. sought an audience beyond the borders of academic professionalism?
But to get to the real power of Ar.´s procedure and the reason why many interpreters might feel embarrassed with their teacher, we just need to recollect some the more modern writings dealing with the very same issues, don’t we? So, for instance, don’t we see the striking difference when referring to an “Unpublished Essay” on the “Immortality of the Soul” by Hume which reads (its being unpublished being quite revealing):
“When it is asked whether Agamemnon, …. Hannibal… and every stupid clown, that ever existed in Italy, Scythia … are now alive; can any man think, that a scrutiny of nature will furnish arguments so strong enough to answer so strange a question in the affirmative? The want of argument without revelation, sufficiently establishes the negative.” (my emphasis; Hume “On the immortality of the soul”, p. 96 )
Could one move further in tone from Ar.’s own words and concerns? But, dramatically, isn’t Hume truly fully understandable to us now? And thus, isn’t Ar. a stranger to us in the essentials? Furthermore, so that the overall consequences of such directness and certainty —in a totally un-Aristotelian spirit— can be seen, one simply needs to contrast as well what Hume thinks about suicide in another unpublished essay in which writes:
“But suppose that it is no longer in my paper to promote the interest of the public; suppose that I am a burthen to it; suppose that my life hinders some person from being much more useful to the public. In such cases my resignation of life must not only be innocent but laudable…” (my emphasis: unpublished essay “Of Suicide.”)
Leaving aside the essential question of the unpublished character of these essays, which today are EASILY publishable in fact as a kind of democratically unquestioned and unquestionable NORM, what strikes one is once again the different tone defended by Ar. in his writings and his prudential, yet questioning DEFENSE, of the life of nobility and the necessity for courage in light of the misfortunes of life, doesn’t it? Don’t we hear the abysmal difference in both subsections 10 and 11?
“But those fortunes that turn out in the contrary way restrict and even ruin one´s blessedness, for they both inflict pain and impede many activities. Nevertheless, even in the midst of these, nobility shines through, whenever someone bears up calmly under many misfortunes, not because of any insensitivity to pain but because he is well-born and great souled.”
For it is evident that the question of suicide is NOWHERE to be found in the NE ethics, is it? Likewise, there is no single mention of Socrates memorable act, is there? But to continue hearing the different tonality that conforms the organs of our modern mind, one could ALSO hear how Hobbes speaks of these “spooky” topics which Ar. has tried to deal with using complex rhetorical maneuvers. Isn’t one astonished at hearing Hobbes´s very open words against the possible messengers who might connect the departed and the living:
“To mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name angel messengers, would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once I say, there is not exert in that part of the Old testament .. form which we can conclude , there is, or hath been decorated, any permanent thing, understood by the name of angel of r spirit, that hath nor quantity. And theta may not be by the understanding divided; that is to say consisted by parts ,.. Though we in Daniels tow names of angels, Gabriel and Michael; yet it is clear our of the text itself (Dan, xii. ) that by Michael is meant Christ, not as an angel, but as a prince; and that Gabriel, as the like apparitions made to the other holy men in their sleep, was nothing but a supernatural phantom, by which it seemed to Daniel , in his dream, . that …..” (Leviathan, Chapter xxxiv “On the signification of spirit, angel, and inspiration on the books of Holy Scripture; see also Elements of Philosophy Concerning Body, Part Fourth, chapter XXV “Of sense and animal motion”, subsection 7 “on imagination”, and subsection 9 “on dreams”, p. 121, 126; see also Montesquieu in section IV below)
And even in Rousseau´s Social Contract ——who not only emphasizes the need for a recovery of a Civil Religion against Hobbes and Locke, and is also attuned to the Ancients like few moderns are—– don’t we find a similar tone which stands in stark contrast to that of Aristotelianism in general? Not only does Rousseau agree with Hobbes in his consideration on this new Civil Religion which presumes the separation of State and Church (p. 22), but also is radically critical of any such religious concerns (interference) in terms of a real ethical understanding of our human condition and its health (see in particular his view of marriage in fn. 20; BOOK IV Chapter VIII).
To conclude, don’t we have to wait till the reappearance of a true neo-Aristotelian, namely Tocqueville, to come to see how much early modern political theorists have truly transformed the way we understand ourselves with regards to such “spiritual” matters? For doesn’t Tocqueville, following Aristotle, stand as a corrective counterbalance to the stifling of our spirit which any Aristotelian must regard as deeply troubling and in need of urgent corrective measures? Can Ar.´s prudence provide such URGENT counterbalance? For aren’t we startled to hear how Tocqueville wakes us up from such deep penetrating slumber in his Democracy in America with these memorable words:
“In the United States, when the seventh day of each week arrives, the commercial and industrial life of the nation seems suspended; all noise ceases. A deep repose, or rather a sort of solemn meditation, follows; the soul finally comes back into possession of itself and contemplates itself. During this day, places devoted to commerce are deserted; each citizen, surrounded by his children, goes to a church; there strange discourses are held for him that seem hardly made for his ears. He is informed of the innumerable evils caused by pride and covetousness He is told of the necessity of regulating his desires, of the delicate enjoyments attached to virtue alone, and of the true happiness that accompanies it. Once back in his dwelling, one does not see him run to his business accounts. He opens the book of the Holy Scriptures; in it he finds sublime or moving depictions of the greatness and the goodness of the Creator, of the infinite magnificence of the works of God, of the lofty destiny reserved for men, of their duties, and of their rights to immortality. Thus at times the American in a way steals away from himself, and as he is torn away for a moment from the small passions that agitate his life and the passing interests that fill it, he at once enters into an ideal world in which all is great, pure, eternal.” (my emphasis: Democracy in America, Mansfield, Volume 2 Part II, Chapter XV “How Religious Beliefs At Times Turn The Souls Of Americans Toward Immaterial Enjoyments”)
Now, leaving aside that Tocqueville is describing ANOTHER America, we conclude: doesn’t the NE, read carefully —–and specially this less important subsection 11 which we have tried to comment, however inadequately—- allow such kinds of ennobling reencounters (even if they, WE MUST EMPHASIZE, are not altogether identical)?
II. COMMENTARY
1)
2)
3)
Conclusion
____________________________
APPENDIX
III. PUZZLES REGARDING COMMENTARY BY AQUINAS
1) Wouldn’t one argue as regards the commentary of this section by Aquinas, why the question of friendship is not truly seen as radically transforming the argument from subsection 10? Could it be that the lack of any specific discussion friendship in the Bible affects AQ.´s interpretative powers so that this issue is not emphasized so much? ( 204)
2) What are we to say of (211) where AQ. argues that it seems that Ar. intends that the things said here are to be understood of the dead not as they are in themselves but as they live on the memories of men?
3) And finally, in (212) AQ. tells us that Ar. is NOT here treating the question of the immortality of the souls “since the philosopher is here treating of the happiness of the present life”; however, it is clear he at least IMPLIES it, right?
4) On the way God communicates to Abraham see the nature of his Covenant:
“After this things he word of the Lord came to Abram in a vision, saying.
Do not fear Abram.
I am a shield to you,
Your reward shall be very great” (Genesis 15: 1)
5) For God’s mysterious ways see:
i) “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the LORD.
For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts”. (Isaiah 55: 8-9; “Salvation through Gods Grace”; King James Version)
and,
ii) [Jesus said,] “The wind blows where it chooses, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know where it comes from or where it goes. So it is with everyone who is born of the Spirit.” (John 3:8)
6) For the question of friendship in the Bible see Pangle, Political Philosophy and the God of Abraham.
IV. FLEXIBLE SECTION
1) Bolotin’s words on the Physics read:
“Indeed Aristotle´s political situation, win which the study of nature itself was thought to be incompatible with the authoritative beliefs of the community, may even have made it easier for him t keep this fact in mind . And since he could not therefore ignore the questions of the ultimate origins, he thought it prudent, to the extent compatible with this s primary aim as a teacher, to tailor his presentation of these and related matters so as to mitigate the hostility of the authorities” (Intro, p)
2) Professor Taylor argues in his Social Imaginaries and elsewhere that humans are dialogical creatures, and that this is clearly argued for by Bakhtin in his book on Dostoyevsky’s poetics. However, Taylor seems to believe, as Aquinas and others, that Ar. COULD NOT be actually speaking of a real connection. However Ar. says: “that even if anything at all does get through to them, whether good or its contrary, it is something faint and small, either simply or to them.” Taylor’s words are:
“The background understanding which makes this act possible for us is complex, but part of what makes sense of it is some picture of ourselves as speaking to others, to which we are related in a certain way – say, compatriots, or the human race. There is a speech act here, addresser and addressees, and some understanding of how they can stand in this relation to each other. There are public spaces; we are already in some kind of conversation with each other. Like all speech acts, it is addressed to a previously spoken word, in the prospect of a to-be-spoken word.”
(Bakhtin touches on the issue of the dialogical character of Dostoyevsky’s work in “Discourse In Dostoyevsky” , Section IV entitle “Dialogue in Dostoyevsky”, from his Book Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics, p. 251 ff.)
The same issue can be seen in discussing Hamlet´s dialogue with the ghost of his assassinated father.
3) Some of Montesquieu´s considerations on religion: “That it is less the truth or falsity of a dogma that make sit useful or pernicious to men in the civil state that the use or abuse made of it; “The religion of Confucius denies the immorality of the soul.. Who would say it? From their bad principles these two sects drew consequent that were not just, but were admirable for society. The religion of Tao and Foe believes in the immortality of the soul, but from such saintly dogma they have draws frightful consequences. Alstom everywhere in the world, and in all times, the opinion that the soul is immortal, wrongly taken, has engaged women, slaves, subjects and friends to kill themselves in order to go to the next world and serve the objects of their respect or their love” (The Spirit of the Laws, Book 19, p. 459; Cambridge)
4) The strangeness of Greek irrationality can be seen in Dodd’s famous The Greeks and the Irrational.
V. IMPORTANT GREEK TERMS IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE
τῶν φίλων
friends
παράνομα
lawless
ἀτυχημάτων
misfortune
τραγῳδίαις
tragedies
ἀφαυρόν
Feeble, powerless
μακάριον
Blessed, happy
εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων
Friends faring well
αἱ δυσπραξίαι
Ill sucess
εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας
Make unhappy the happy
VI. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, GREEK, BOOK I, 11; text at Perseus (based on Bywater)
τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἁπάντων τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον: πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων τῶν δ᾽ ἧττον, καθ᾽ ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ᾽ ἂν ἱκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δή, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὑτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ δ᾽ ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφοράν, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων. ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διικνεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁτιοῦν, εἴτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοὐναντίον, ἀφαυρόν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμβάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ᾽ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0053%3Abekker+page%3D1101b%3Abekker+line%3D20
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Rarefactions: by Andrés Melo Cousineau 
Reflections: Commentary on Aristotle’s NICOMACHEAN ETHICS; BOOK I, 11
September 28, 2012 by amelo14
COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS: BOOK I, 11
(For the nature of the sections see the “General Introduction”, here.)
Abbreviations: Ar. = Aristotle, AQ= Aquinas, NE = Nicomachean Ethics, EE= Eudemian Ethics
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
BOOK I
CHAPTER ELEVEN
“But that the fortunes of a person’s descendants and all his friends contribute nothing whatsoever [to his happiness] appears to be excessively opposed to what is dear and contrary to the opinion held. And because the things that may befall us are many and differ in various respects — some hitting closer to home, others less so— thoroughly distinguishing each appears to be a long and even endless task. But perhaps for the matter to be stated generally and in outline would be adequate.
Just as some of the misfortunes that concerns a person himself have a certain gravity, and weight as regards his life but others seems lighter, so also the misfortunes that concern all his friends are similar; and if, concerning each thing suffered, it makes a difference whether the friends are alive or have met their end, far more than if the unlawful and terrible things in tragic plays occur before the action of the play or during it, then one must indeed take this difference into account —and even more, perhaps, when it comes to the perplexity raised concerning those who have passed away, that is, whether they share in something good or in the opposite. For it seems, on the basis of these points, that even if anything at all does get through to them, whether good or its contrary, it is something faint and small, either simply or to them. And if this is not so, then what gets through to them is, at any rate, of such a degree and kind that it does not make happy those who are not such or deprive those who are happy of their blessedness. The friends faring well, then, appears to make some contribution to the condition of those who have passed away, as does, similarly, their faring ill — but a contribution of such a kind and degree as not to make the happy unhappy or anything else of that sort.”
(NE, 1101a22-1101b9; Aristotle´s Nicomachean Ethics, Bartlett, Robert, and Collins, Susan; University of Chicago, Chicago, 2011)
I. PRIVATE PUZZLES
1) Isn’t the most fundamental puzzle for this subsection hard to see at first sight? For shouldn’t we ask, why does Ar. dedicate ANOTHER, a totally separate subsection, to the already addressed question of the relation between happiness, the vulnerability of those we love (particularly family relatives up to a certain “reasonable” degree), and the end of our own temporal finitude in death? However, doesn´t Ar. now in this new subsection place the emphasis clearly on the effects that such fortunes/misfortunes may have on the happiness of the ALREADY dead? And to be honest, doesn’t he really stress the myriad misfortunes rather than the fortunes in keeping with the tenor of subsection 10? For, who would complain about too many good fortunes in one’s life (!)? And , aren´t we MORTALS? Is it that life has a tendency towards the tragic and thus we are not surprised to actually see the very first mention of tragedy in THIS subsection? Is there something about our view of life as tragic that runs counter to an ethics of eudaimonia? Will/Can the NE transform this initial contrast as it proceeds deploying its argument (see below)? Moreover, isn’t it odd that Ar. apparently “repeats” the topics of a subsection precisely at the point in which we are reaching the END of the first and Introductory book to the whole NE? Now, isn’t any “Introduction” of absolute relevance to the whole of what it is an “introduction” to? Didn’t Ar. himself tell us in a previous subsection that the beginning is half the whole? So, why lead us in THIS strange direction and no other? And even more dramatically, we know that in the EE, there exists NO parallel passage dealing with these topics, don’t we? What are we to make of this? Wouldn’t this omission clearly aid us in identifying better the different TONES found in both ethics? And wouldn’t this tonality be part of an argument for the maturity of the NE over the EE (pace Kenny)? Wouldn’t the tone of the EE, with what could be called its overconfidence in understanding, be rather more akin to OUR overconfident modern/current “philosophical” approach to life and its perplexities? In this regard, as we shall see below, wouldn’t OUR looking to the NE —–as moderns living a secular age in which the spirit has radically stifled— become even more fundamental to awaken us from the troubling slumber we have fallen into as modern Western democracies? Or put in the words of professor Taylor, who in some regards is a kind of neo-Aristotelian: “we have read so many goods out of our official story, we have buried their power so deep beneath layers of philosophical rationale, that they are in danger of stiffing. Or rather, since they are our goods, human goods, WE are stifling….“(Sources of the Self, Conclusion, p. 520) Doesn’t Ar.’s striking reference to these kinds of issues in subsection 10 and 11 move us, thus moderating us, in the opposite direction?
But leaving these issues aside, what more concretely are the differences revealed between the similar subsections 10 and 11? For, don’t we see how SHORT subsection 11 is, in contrast to 10? Why not just simply add one to the other? I mean, the resulting subsection would NOT end up being that much longer, right? How to even begin to try to account for this puzzle? Could it be that Ar. is letting us know how LITTLE philosophical argumentation can actually be developed in the more speculative areas touched upon by this much shorter subsection? Besides, isn’t the need for brevity emphasized by Ar. himself when we listen to him saying, as he had already done in another subsection: “But perhaps for the matter to be stated generally and in outline would be adequate”? Put bluntly, doesn’t Ar. lead us to wonder whether philosophy kind of “dies” when it reaches these more “speculative” horizons dealing with “life after death” and the “immortality of the soul”? And yet, why does Ar. still emphasize the need NOT to remain wholly silent about such topics? In contrast, don’t neo-Aristotelians —specially of the analytical tradition—- have a tough time squaring Ar.’s concerns in THESE topics with theirs? Isn’t the whole thing kind of embarrassing, from a modern philosopher’s perspective? Or can you imagine presenting your PhD thesis director with the topic “Life after death in Ar.”? Or is it, that Ar. is here reminding us of the rhetorical arguments presented previously which distinguished the mathematician and the rhetorician? Is Ar. HERE being a rhetorician? To what avail? Is he simply teaching us to bow to tradition once again? Is it so that —using terminology from previous subsections already commented— we can save the THAT by not asking too much of the WHY, so that the independence of the practical sphere and ITS beliefs, and ITS concerns with the nature of the soul, are left unperturbed to a large extent? But then, what of philosophy and those of us intent on THAT kind of life which cannot simply let it go at the THAT, but must inquire, even if prudently, about the WHY’s of the way we actually lead our lives AS philosophers? For isn’t the whole point of the NE not to be self-deceived in the essentials; to learn about the truest self-love (see below)? But, aren’t we here confronting the CENTRAL animating human aspects that MAY lead one to deceive oneself most decisively? Isn’t the LONGING, specially given the abundant misfortunes of life, that which may animate us to guide our lives beyond our rational capacities? Doesn’t fortune lead us to misology like few other “human” realities can? And, if Ar.’s presentation is indeed purely rhetorical in character, then, wouldn’t WE —-in order to get the real REVELATORY power of these types of “otherworldly” concerns—– just rather read the passages of the Bible that allow us to really FEEL such, in the end, non-philosophical connections? For instance, isn’t the whole story of Lazarus, really much more striking and less filled with rhetorical indecisions? Doesn´t resurrection really hit the heart of these kind of concerns like Ar.´s ambivalences cannot? For, according to the text, Lazarus DID come back, didn’t he (pace Hobbes/Locke, for instance)? But, of course, Ar. obviously sees the need NOT to proceed in THAT direction, does he?
In addition, don’t we find it striking that the previous subsection, which deals with similar issues —albeit in this world—- BEGINS and ENDS with puzzling questions, while in contrast we find not even the smallest reference to any direct questioning by Ar. in this new subsection? Besides, what about the answers provided? Don’t they truly seem aporetic in the Socratic sense of the word? For don’t the answers sound a bit like “well, yes, but really no, but we´ll say yes, but actually it is very small, but we can’t say that it isn’t for that would be too rude, though we really really think that it is not, but …”? Is Ar. trying to “confuse” us once again? Don’t we tend to forget, precisely because of this intentional rhetorical ambivalence, that Ar. is THE originator of philosophical logic and the discoverer even of the famous principle of non-contradiction? I mean, doesn’t Ar. seem rather clumsily to be contradicting himself with every line he adds to this subsection? Just go ahead and listen:
“For it seems, on the basis of these points, that even if anything at all does get through to them, whether good or its contrary, it is something faint and small, either simply or to them. And if this is not so, then what gets through to them is, at any rate, of such a degree and kind that it does not make happy those who are not such or deprive those who are happy of their blessedness. The friends faring well, then, appears …” (my emphasis)
To put it bluntly, has Ar. lost his rational mind (!)? Absurdly we ask: was it that he wrote the logical treatises only after he wrote the NE as a kind of cure(!)? More seriously, isn’t the whole thing not only ODD in the subject matter, but perhaps even weirder in Ar.’s selected approach? But, is he truly self-contradicting himself? Doesn’t our looking elsewhere aid us in understanding such Aristotelian maneuvers? Because we know that this is not the only place in his corpus that Ar. proceeds thus, is it? For if we read the introduction to the ALSO strange and also kind of “spooky” On Divination and Sleep (once again, if you do not believe it is a spooky topic, just try selling it as a philosophical PhD thesis!), we find Ar. arguing that:
“As to the divination which takes place in sleep, and it is said to be based on dreams, we cannot lightly either dismiss it with contempt or give it confidence. The fact that all persons, or many suppose dreams to possess a special significance, tends to inspire us with belief in it, as founded on the testimony of experience; and indeed that divination in dreams should, as regards some subjects be genuine, is not incredible, for it has a show of reason; from which one might form a like opinion also respecting other dreams. Yet the fact of our seeing no reasonable cause to account for such divination tends to inspire us with distrust….” (my emphasis: On Divination and Sleep; 462b13-462b18; on other “spooky” writings of a non-modern character by Plato, see the Thaeges and the Euthyphro)
Is Ar.´s initial ambivalent tone simply preparing the ground for our taking sides once the argument develops further along truly philosophical, that is to say, classical rational lines? But then, by thus proceeding, won’t the beginning be so transformed so that what was considered to be, can no longer be as it was; at least for those serious intent on understanding the way we lead our lives as human beings who long for a certain kind of truthful completion before death? As we said, won’t we inevitably end up upsetting the THAT by asking for its WHY? What then, is the point of delaying the “inevitable” through these rhetorical “tricks”? Wouldn’t this strategy of, do forgive me, “hide-and-seek”, rather than safeguard the philosophers and their questions, truly not make them even more suspicious as they would seem to actually be two-faced (I mean, “well, yes you have a point, but really your point is really a bad one, but we´ll suppose it is a little valid, but …”)? Or is it that the desire to BELIEVE is of such a nature, that against it rational inquiry truly cannot but from the start appear ambivalent NO MATTER what strategy the philosopher takes recourse to? Isn’t this why there IS a need to understand the permanent and persistent relation between persecution and writing? And of ALL the possibilities, isn’t Ar.´s the single MOST prudent available to us? But then, if this is true, wouldn’t this radically transform the way we see the relationship that can arise between philosophy and society at large? Didn’t we mention precisely this debate in alluding to the references silently made by Ar. in subsection 10 in our previous commentary? Put directly, what is the philosopher to DO, if these longings are of such a nature that they override understanding, specially if they end up actually conforming the CORE structure/the HEART of the law and our appeals to justice (even divine)? And, moving even further beyond, wouldn’t this realization, in particular, actually transform the nature of the modern University to its core in the direction of liberal education? But how would one implement such foundational change if the University turned out to be essentially misguided in its role as a socially transforming entity? But reaching back, isn’t it altogether striking that in his other text On Dreams, Ar. has no qualms whatsoever to speak about the REAL considerations regarding dreams as the biologist and philosopher that he is? For instance, don’t we read in THAT text, things that sound utterly “modern”, for instance; “What happens in these cases may be compared with what happens in the case of projectiles moving in space…. (Princeton,OD; 459a28, p. 730) Exaggerating: I mean, one would swear it was Galileo speaking (!), wouldn’t one?
How then to account for such striking differences between these two TYPES of texts and approaches, namely those found in this subsection as well as in On Divination and Sleep, and other texts such as the EE and On Dreams? ? Shouldn’t we truly take to heart the hypothesis that Ar. clearly differentiates between the kinds of writings that are more public in nature, and those that are more private because more upsetting of the traditions of a social life form? Isn’t this, at least in part, what Straussians have come to call the difference between exoteric and esoteric writings in Aristotle (albeit, not only in him; see Pangle on Montesquieu and Locke)? And, furthermore, doesn’t Professor Bolotin help us immensely in seeing more clearly how these rhetorical strategies come to life in Ar.’s own Physics? Or to put it yet another way, as we argued in our previous subsection, isn’t Ar. here as well bowing to tradition continuing to provide certain bridges that connect the political and the philosophical in order to restore the dignity of the former and provide a certain kind of security for the latter? Isn’t this why Ar. has told us that the whole aim of the NE, whose “Introductory” book we are ending, is a KIND of —but not exactly— political inquiry? Isn’t this why POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, just as we mentioned regarding Solon in our previous subsection, stands as a leading yet middling power that grants a certain healthy political moderation to the socio-historical network/context in which it appears? For don’t we know also that Ar. lived at a time in which Athens had suffered intensely and immensely because of war and the negative role played in this regard by some of Socrates’s worst “disciples”? But still, even if all this turns out to have a certain plausibility, then, what are we to make of Ar.’s having to leave Athens in SPITE of such cares? Should we follow his rhetorical example, which appears to be in many respects truly unsuccessful? Isn’t an ethical inquiry guided by the question of happiness, truly to be assessed by its ACTUAL ability to generate said happiness for the inquirer? Or is it that, in the end, happiness may flourish even beyond the boundaries of the city? And finally, in OUR current age in which the question of the spirit has truly become secondary —so much so that we kind of kind of roll our eyes at this Aristotelian subsection— what is the POINT of our being so drastically careful if OUR spiritual “THAT” has already been so eroded away by way of its materialism, so that it is harder to see the “protective” necessity of such prudential approaches? Put another way, in an age of rampant materialism, mustn’t Aristotelianism focus much less on its moderating rhetorical position in defense of a spiritual tradition, and instead really “turn up the heat” (in the mind) and come on the offensive against the leveling and deadening materialistic excesses that surround us (specially in universities(!)? Are we perhaps more in need of Socratic irony and its effects, rather than Ar.’s prudence and its effects? Or must we try to restrain ourselves, recall Ar.’s moderating wisdom and his prudential political advise, and serenely yet realistically ask whether Ar. could have foreseen such lowering of the spirit as early moderns theorists achieved and whether —–because he could not foresee such troubling conditions—– his Ethics can, in the end, indeed help us pull ourselves out of the abysses in which we have made our abode? For wouldn’t the early modern political thinkers (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu) counterargue: aren’t these abysses ONLY abysses if seen from the perspective of Aristotelianism itself and its convoluted, even dangerous, high-flown and unreachable goals/ends? Wouldn’t we rather, such early modern thinkers might argue, a little secure happiness for all (or most, allegedly), rather than no happiness, or worse yet, just the happiness of a few elitists?
2) But besides the brevity and the lack of direct questions, don’t we come to see that THE single most important difference between both subsections 10 and 11, is the fact that that now we have added to the question of the relation between descendants and the happiness pertaining to the family, the issue of the happiness pertaining to friendship and the death of our friends? But why would THAT make a difference in terms of the way we remember those who are gone, and the way we connect to those who are gone? For couldn’t it perhaps be that, in contrast to the issues of longing and immortality presented in our previous commentary, friends generate a permanence that moves beyond mere desire for recognition in public memory (Montaigne thought so)? For didn´t Ar. truly come down hard on the life of honor and recognition just a few subsections ago? And that Ar. HIMSELF signals to puzzles of this kind further on in his NE, can be seen if we recall here that Ar. ALSO divides the question of friendship into two separate books, Books VIII and IX? And strikingly, don’t we find a parallel relation in THEIR separation as well: Ar. primarily treating the concerns of the family and of political concord and philia in the diverse political regimes mainly in BOOK VIII; and leaving the issue of personal and perhaps even philosophical friendship to BOOK IX? Moreover, won’t we come to see then how Ar. brings to light the question of self-love, which is only faintly alluded to here? As a matter of fact, is Ar. not truly seeking to safeguard the happiness of the best of humans by not letting it become so dependant (or at all) on what happens to those who conform their immediate circle of family and/or friends? For, in the worst case scenario, why should/would the “best” suffer because of the “worst”? But, why on earth would we be moving so ahead of ourselves in the argument if we are simply looking at subsection 11 and its special strangeness? Well, fundamentally in part because won’t the tragic and dramatic (not to say deadly) TONE of subsections 10 and 11 actually be transformed drastically in those specific sections of the arguments regarding self-love that ASTONISHINGLY read thus:
“But if living is good and pleasant —as it seems to be also from the fact that all people, and specially the decent and blessed, long for it, since to such people life is most choiceworthy and their life is most blessed; and if he who sees perceives that he sees, he who hears that he hears, he who walks that he walks (and similarly in other cases), then there is something that perceives that we are active. ….. Moreover perceiving that one lives belongs among the things pleasant in themselves, for life is by nature a good thing, and to perceive the good present in oneself is pleasant; and living is a choiceworthy thing, especially to those who are good, because existing is good for them and pleasant, for in simultaneously perceiving what is good in itself, they feel pleasure” … (my emphasis; Book 9, chapter 9, 1170a25-1170b10)
And so that we may be believed, one need recall the way Ar. expressed himself just a few lines before in subsection 10:
“Now, many things occur by chance, and they differ in how great or small they are … But those fortunes that turn out in the contrary way restrict and even ruin one´s blessedness, for they both inflict pain and impede many activities. Nevertheless, even in the midst of these, nobility shines through, whenever someone bears up calmly under many misfortunes, not because of any insensitivity to pain but because he is well-born and great souled.”(my emphasis)
To put it provocatively, doesn’t the difference between subsections 10 and 11 start to point towards a kind of being, a kind of relating oneself to existence in which the tragedies of fortune truly lose their ominous presence opening for us, in ourselves, the conditions for a kind of erotic love whose presence seeks to understand and to come to an understanding of oneself and the possibility of happiness with certain exclusive others? Or to move even further beyond Ar.´s own text, don’t we hear Xenophon speaking of Socrates not only in terms of his radical self-sufficiency (Memorabilia I 6, Xenophon, Translated by Amy L. Bonnette; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), but ALSO in terms of the concrete living benefits, the joyful benefits of interacting with one such as Socrates: “there was nothing more beneficial than being a companion o Socrates and spending time with him anywhere at all and in any matter whatsoever, once even remembering him when he was not present was of no small benefit to those who were accustomed to being in his company and who were receptive (Memorabilia, “apodechesthai” see fn. 47, p. 154) to him!”. For isn’t the whole issue that WE ALL remember Socrates for who he WAS? Don’t we ALL, miss Socrates? Or, at the risk of even going further from the Ar. text itself —– allowing ourselves a HUGE interpretative leeway—– don’t we here recall in stark contrast to subsections 10 and 11 and their tone, the actual death of a wise human such as Plato himself? For doesn´t Cicero famously tell us On Old Age: “But there is another sort of old age too; the tranquil and serene evening of a life spent in peaceful, blameless enlightened pursuits. Such, we are told, were the last years of Plato, who died in his eighty-first year while still actively engaged in writing?” And allowing ourselves even further exploratory avenues, which we think nonetheless keep within the spirit of Ar. later movements in the NE, don’t we recall Voegelin´s imaginary words as regard the death of Plato, recovered by Schall in his beautiful essay: “Plato died at the age of eighty-one. On the evening of his death he had a Thracian girl plat the flute to him. The girl could not find the beat of the nomos. With the movement of his finger, Plato indicated to her the Measure” (Schall, “The Death of Plato”)
For if anything, what if it turned out that Ar.´s constant ambivalence in this subsection, which surely seems not to find the measure, may perhaps, continuing our friendly approach to his text, bring about a new measure and a new beat –a more serene and joyful beat—that not only may come to appear for us, but even become part of us? Wouldn’t even our fingers become others?
3) And to conclude, perhaps the greatest puzzle regarding this subsection lies in the way that it has been interpreted by Aristotelians, doesn´t it? For truly, don’t certain “Aristotelians” seem kind of embarrassed by the whole thing? As we asked above, how can a biologist and a logician end up speaking like this? Is he simply being patronizing and we, we moderns, simply smile when we think of those who hear these “consoling” messages? Or put another way, for those of us who have taken many seminars on Aristotle, isn’t it striking that this section is overlooked and truly (silently, of course) held as an example of how disconnected these “lecture notes” truly are? But, haven’t we, in our previous commentaries (and other writings) emphasized once and again how we ALSO see how modern interpreters tend to do away with the books dealing concretely with the moral virtues (that is to say Books III and IV)? But shouldn’t we be worried that following these ERASING procedures we will end up with an anorexic Ar. that truly fits us rather than with the Ar. as he proceeds in HIS own text and who questions us precisely BECAUSE of his strangeness? Or are we to hold once again that, as Ar. was duped into simply mentioning the GREEK virtues as he was inevitably caught within the horizon of their cage-like presence, so also here Ar. is duped into believing similar, though much more “esoteric” and “illogical” things?
But so that we may be believed; don’t we find Ostwald’s commentary to subsection 10 to the point in this regard? For doesn’t he allude to Burnett´s interpretation in fn. 44 in order to, seemingly excuse Ar., kind of saving Ar. him from himself (!)? As he puts it quoting Burnett:
“There is no question here as to the departed (???; our addition) being aware of what goes on in this world. On the contrary, the point is that what happens after a mans death may affect our estimate of his life … Neither makes any difference to the man himself.” (my emphasis)
Now, of course we will be immediately told that this is absolutely true of subsection 10 wherein there is no such mention of “another life”, won’t we? However, isn’t it true that astonishingly Ostwald provides NOT a single explanatory footnote to subsection 11, which clearly contradicts —without any doubt whatsoever—– Burnett’s own interpretive considerations? And so that, once again we may be taken seriously, it is not just US who are astonished at such interpretative blindness. For, don’t we find, for example in Joachim, this specific struggle with the weirdness of Ar.`s words and his approach? Doesn’t Joachim, contra Burnett/Ostwald actually tell us that:
”but the present passage seems (???; our addition) to imply that Ar. was unwilling to state dogmatically that the dead cannot feel at all. The present problem assumes that the dead somehow continue to exist, live on in another word in a state of suspended animation, with greatly dimmed, but not extinct, feelings …” (my emphasis: Joachim, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 60)
For, whatever our quality as interpreters of Ar., it is clear that one really just needs to READ what Ar. actually says, to have no doubt that Joachim´s position is the only tenable one, isn’t it? And surely reading Broadie and Rowe seems to make things even worse, doesn’t it? For they conclude in a very strange manner: “We are now logically prepared (???; our addition) for the thought that even if (???; our addition) it is true to say, once X is dead, that a good or bad turn in the life of a loved one is a good or bad thing for X; still nothing follows about X’s happiness? (my emphasis: p. 288-289)
Words which stand in astonishing conflict with the very tone of Ar.´s own non-logical use of language (and we KNOW he could have CHOSEN to be logical) which include such touching and memorable words as “ it appears to be excessively opposed to what is dear and contrary to the opinion held”. Giving ourselves permission for an imprudent remark: is it any wonder, hardly anyone outside academia is interested in Aristotle? But, haven’t we argued at length previously, that Ar. sought an audience beyond the borders of academic professionalism?
But to get to the real power of Ar.´s procedure and the reason why many interpreters might feel embarrassed with their teacher, we just need to recollect some the more modern writings dealing with the very same issues, don’t we? So, for instance, don’t we see the striking difference when referring to an “Unpublished Essay” on the “Immortality of the Soul” by Hume which reads (its being unpublished being quite revealing):
“When it is asked whether Agamemnon, …. Hannibal… and every stupid clown, that ever existed in Italy, Scythia … are now alive; can any man think, that a scrutiny of nature will furnish arguments so strong enough to answer so strange a question in the affirmative? The want of argument without revelation, sufficiently establishes the negative.” (my emphasis; Hume “On the immortality of the soul”, p. 96 )
Could one move further in tone from Ar.’s own words and concerns? But, dramatically, isn’t Hume truly fully understandable to us now? And thus, isn’t Ar. a stranger to us in the essentials? Furthermore, so that the overall consequences of such directness and certainty —in a totally un-Aristotelian spirit— can be seen, one simply needs to contrast as well what Hume thinks about suicide in another unpublished essay in which writes:
“But suppose that it is no longer in my paper to promote the interest of the public; suppose that I am a burthen to it; suppose that my life hinders some person from being much more useful to the public. In such cases my resignation of life must not only be innocent but laudable…” (my emphasis: unpublished essay “Of Suicide.”)
Leaving aside the essential question of the unpublished character of these essays, which today are EASILY publishable in fact as a kind of democratically unquestioned and unquestionable NORM, what strikes one is once again the different tone defended by Ar. in his writings and his prudential, yet questioning DEFENSE, of the life of nobility and the necessity for courage in light of the misfortunes of life, doesn’t it? Don’t we hear the abysmal difference in both subsections 10 and 11?
“But those fortunes that turn out in the contrary way restrict and even ruin one´s blessedness, for they both inflict pain and impede many activities. Nevertheless, even in the midst of these, nobility shines through, whenever someone bears up calmly under many misfortunes, not because of any insensitivity to pain but because he is well-born and great souled.”
For it is evident that the question of suicide is NOWHERE to be found in the NE ethics, is it? Likewise, there is no single mention of Socrates memorable act, is there? But to continue hearing the different tonality that conforms the organs of our modern mind, one could ALSO hear how Hobbes speaks of these “spooky” topics which Ar. has tried to deal with using complex rhetorical maneuvers. Isn’t one astonished at hearing Hobbes´s very open words against the possible messengers who might connect the departed and the living:
“To mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name angel messengers, would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once I say, there is not exert in that part of the Old testament .. form which we can conclude , there is, or hath been decorated, any permanent thing, understood by the name of angel of r spirit, that hath nor quantity. And theta may not be by the understanding divided; that is to say consisted by parts ,.. Though we in Daniels tow names of angels, Gabriel and Michael; yet it is clear our of the text itself (Dan, xii. ) that by Michael is meant Christ, not as an angel, but as a prince; and that Gabriel, as the like apparitions made to the other holy men in their sleep, was nothing but a supernatural phantom, by which it seemed to Daniel , in his dream, . that …..” (Leviathan, Chapter xxxiv “On the signification of spirit, angel, and inspiration on the books of Holy Scripture; see also Elements of Philosophy Concerning Body, Part Fourth, chapter XXV “Of sense and animal motion”, subsection 7 “on imagination”, and subsection 9 “on dreams”, p. 121, 126; see also Montesquieu in section IV below)
And even in Rousseau´s Social Contract ——who not only emphasizes the need for a recovery of a Civil Religion against Hobbes and Locke, and is also attuned to the Ancients like few moderns are—– don’t we find a similar tone which stands in stark contrast to that of Aristotelianism in general? Not only does Rousseau agree with Hobbes in his consideration on this new Civil Religion which presumes the separation of State and Church (p. 22), but also is radically critical of any such religious concerns (interference) in terms of a real ethical understanding of our human condition and its health (see in particular his view of marriage in fn. 20; BOOK IV Chapter VIII).
To conclude, don’t we have to wait till the reappearance of a true neo-Aristotelian, namely Tocqueville, to come to see how much early modern political theorists have truly transformed the way we understand ourselves with regards to such “spiritual” matters? For doesn’t Tocqueville, following Aristotle, stand as a corrective counterbalance to the stifling of our spirit which any Aristotelian must regard as deeply troubling and in need of urgent corrective measures? Can Ar.´s prudence provide such URGENT counterbalance? For aren’t we startled to hear how Tocqueville wakes us up from such deep penetrating slumber in his Democracy in America with these memorable words:
“In the United States, when the seventh day of each week arrives, the commercial and industrial life of the nation seems suspended; all noise ceases. A deep repose, or rather a sort of solemn meditation, follows; the soul finally comes back into possession of itself and contemplates itself. During this day, places devoted to commerce are deserted; each citizen, surrounded by his children, goes to a church; there strange discourses are held for him that seem hardly made for his ears. He is informed of the innumerable evils caused by pride and covetousness He is told of the necessity of regulating his desires, of the delicate enjoyments attached to virtue alone, and of the true happiness that accompanies it. Once back in his dwelling, one does not see him run to his business accounts. He opens the book of the Holy Scriptures; in it he finds sublime or moving depictions of the greatness and the goodness of the Creator, of the infinite magnificence of the works of God, of the lofty destiny reserved for men, of their duties, and of their rights to immortality. Thus at times the American in a way steals away from himself, and as he is torn away for a moment from the small passions that agitate his life and the passing interests that fill it, he at once enters into an ideal world in which all is great, pure, eternal.” (my emphasis: Democracy in America, Mansfield, Volume 2 Part II, Chapter XV “How Religious Beliefs At Times Turn The Souls Of Americans Toward Immaterial Enjoyments”)
Now, leaving aside that Tocqueville is describing ANOTHER America, we conclude: doesn’t the NE, read carefully —–and specially this less important subsection 11 which we have tried to comment, however inadequately—- allow such kinds of ennobling reencounters (even if they, WE MUST EMPHASIZE, are not altogether identical)?
II. COMMENTARY
1)
2)
3)
Conclusion
____________________________
APPENDIX
III. PUZZLES REGARDING COMMENTARY BY AQUINAS
1) Wouldn’t one argue as regards the commentary of this section by Aquinas, why the question of friendship is not truly seen as radically transforming the argument from subsection 10? Could it be that the lack of any specific discussion friendship in the Bible affects AQ.´s interpretative powers so that this issue is not emphasized so much? ( 204)
2) What are we to say of (211) where AQ. argues that it seems that Ar. intends that the things said here are to be understood of the dead not as they are in themselves but as they live on the memories of men?
3) And finally, in (212) AQ. tells us that Ar. is NOT here treating the question of the immortality of the souls “since the philosopher is here treating of the happiness of the present life”; however, it is clear he at least IMPLIES it, right?
4) On the way God communicates to Abraham see the nature of his Covenant:
“After this things he word of the Lord came to Abram in a vision, saying.
Do not fear Abram.
I am a shield to you,
Your reward shall be very great” (Genesis 15: 1)
5) For God’s mysterious ways see:
i) “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the LORD.
For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts”. (Isaiah 55: 8-9; “Salvation through Gods Grace”; King James Version)
and,
ii) [Jesus said,] “The wind blows where it chooses, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know where it comes from or where it goes. So it is with everyone who is born of the Spirit.” (John 3:8)
6) For the question of friendship in the Bible see Pangle, Political Philosophy and the God of Abraham.
IV. FLEXIBLE SECTION
1) Bolotin’s words on the Physics read:
“Indeed Aristotle´s political situation, win which the study of nature itself was thought to be incompatible with the authoritative beliefs of the community, may even have made it easier for him t keep this fact in mind . And since he could not therefore ignore the questions of the ultimate origins, he thought it prudent, to the extent compatible with this s primary aim as a teacher, to tailor his presentation of these and related matters so as to mitigate the hostility of the authorities” (Intro, p)
2) Professor Taylor argues in his Social Imaginaries and elsewhere that humans are dialogical creatures, and that this is clearly argued for by Bakhtin in his book on Dostoyevsky’s poetics. However, Taylor seems to believe, as Aquinas and others, that Ar. COULD NOT be actually speaking of a real connection. However Ar. says: “that even if anything at all does get through to them, whether good or its contrary, it is something faint and small, either simply or to them.” Taylor’s words are:
“The background understanding which makes this act possible for us is complex, but part of what makes sense of it is some picture of ourselves as speaking to others, to which we are related in a certain way – say, compatriots, or the human race. There is a speech act here, addresser and addressees, and some understanding of how they can stand in this relation to each other. There are public spaces; we are already in some kind of conversation with each other. Like all speech acts, it is addressed to a previously spoken word, in the prospect of a to-be-spoken word.”
(Bakhtin touches on the issue of the dialogical character of Dostoyevsky’s work in “Discourse In Dostoyevsky” , Section IV entitle “Dialogue in Dostoyevsky”, from his Book Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics, p. 251 ff.)
The same issue can be seen in discussing Hamlet´s dialogue with the ghost of his assassinated father.
3) Some of Montesquieu´s considerations on religion: “That it is less the truth or falsity of a dogma that make sit useful or pernicious to men in the civil state that the use or abuse made of it; “The religion of Confucius denies the immorality of the soul.. Who would say it? From their bad principles these two sects drew consequent that were not just, but were admirable for society. The religion of Tao and Foe believes in the immortality of the soul, but from such saintly dogma they have draws frightful consequences. Alstom everywhere in the world, and in all times, the opinion that the soul is immortal, wrongly taken, has engaged women, slaves, subjects and friends to kill themselves in order to go to the next world and serve the objects of their respect or their love” (The Spirit of the Laws, Book 19, p. 459; Cambridge)
4) The strangeness of Greek irrationality can be seen in Dodd’s famous The Greeks and the Irrational.
V. IMPORTANT GREEK TERMS IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE
τῶν φίλων
friends
παράνομα
lawless
ἀτυχημάτων
misfortune
τραγῳδίαις
tragedies
ἀφαυρόν
Feeble, powerless
μακάριον
Blessed, happy
εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων
Friends faring well
αἱ δυσπραξίαι
Ill sucess
εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας
Make unhappy the happy
VI. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, GREEK, BOOK I, 11; text at Perseus (based on Bywater)
τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἁπάντων τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον: πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων τῶν δ᾽ ἧττον, καθ᾽ ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ᾽ ἂν ἱκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δή, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὑτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ δ᾽ ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφοράν, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων. ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διικνεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁτιοῦν, εἴτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοὐναντίον, ἀφαυρόν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμβάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ᾽ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0053%3Abekker+page%3D1101b%3Abekker+line%3D20
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