

ESCRITOS COLOMBIA 2019

REPUBLICANISMO:

MARCHANDO HACE 2500 AÑOS SOBRE PIES DE GIGANTES

(SEGUNDO APÉNDICE AL LIBRO

“Escritos sobre Colombia: la “paz” en su laberinto, 2016 – 2018.”)

<https://andresmelocousineau.com/colombia/>.

Si bien indicamos en el anterior apéndice de 2019 titulado, “La mala “paz”, la PEOR droga” –luego de defender el republicanismo colombiano ante su asalto estratégico por los arrogantes defensores de una mala paz fundada en la corrupción material y espiritual-- que no escribiríamos sobre Colombia en el año 2019, los eventos destructivos que ha vivido Colombia hacia finales de este año, nos hicieron ya por segunda vez, romper con este silencio.

En especial, lo hacemos dada la radicalización de una protesta con objetivos siempre cambiantes, gelatinosos, y poco claros, y en gran medida malintencionada (por ejemplo, ahora que dizque el objetivo era dialogar con el ELN!), por parte de una minoría ciudadana, aparentemente pacifista. Pero esa postura, de supuesta superioridad moral, con dificultad reconoce que su proceder es A LA VEZ la gasolina que permite todo tipo de violencias, no sólo contra las fuerzas constitucionales del Estado (ESMAD, Policía Nacional), sino además contra la mayoría de ciudadanos que deciden no marchar y que piden que quienes marchan respeten sus derechos, en especial --pero no exclusivamente--- el derecho a la movilidad y por ende al trabajo. Marchar, engeuece y quiere engeuecer. Dilan ya no verá. Walfrén ya no ve.

En otras palabras, mientras los marchantes “pacifistas” marchan, se hacen y hacen creer a los demás –sobretudo a y por medio de los medios informativos-- que la violencia atizada por sofistas populistas demagogos como Petro y las desagradecidas farc (que no han reparado a nadie ni han pasado por justicia alguna), no tiene nada que ver con ellos. Su supuesta superioridad moral engendra la violencia para imponer esa superioridad a como de lugar. Y al ser invitados a la mesa de diálogo, como lo ha hecho el Presidente Duque, se levantan marchando sin aportar, dejando claro que sus motivaciones tienen un origen enfermizo y patológico sobre el cual hemos escrito anteriormente. Pero además, para comprender los verdaderos orígenes de semejante realidad, que en países como Chile llevó a niveles de destrucción totalmente irracionales y sin precedentes, mientras tanto los verdaderos creadores de esta situación de persistente inestabilidad por la firma secreta, formalista y autoritaria de una mala “paz” elevada a carta constitucional, a saber –el poco querido Santos y el poco ganador de la Calle, entre otros-- se ufanan y autofelicitan como no han dejado de hacerlo desde hace ya casi una década. Por y para ellos el título

de nuestro anterior apéndice: “La mala “paz”, la PEOR droga”. Su arrogancia engendra violencia, violencia en la ciudad y violencia en el campo. Se sienten orgullosos de ello. Sorprendente.

Pero nada más lejano a la verdad histórica, teórica y práctica. Generalizando, en su conjunto estas fuerzas antirrepublicanas se acostumbraron, como dice nuestro Presidente Duque, **“a ganar con la violencia lo que no pudieron ganar democráticamente en las urnas”**. Son, *de facto*, malos perdedores y hacia futuro el origen de los peores dictadores como en Venezuela y en Nicaragua. Por cierto, y a manera de contraste, gracias Presidente Bukele; infinitas gracias por hacernos orgullosos del republicanismo una vez más en nuestro continente. Y como lo hemos enfatizado anteriormente, una y otra vez, Colombia es una República, antes que cualquier otra cosa. El republicanismo representa uno de los más altos logros políticos de Occidente. Si bien ha sufrido modificaciones en la historia, sigue siendo su orgullo fundacional desde la Grecia Antigua. Y cualesquiera hayan sido sus modificaciones, como las realizadas por el sabio Montesquieu, están lejos de las pretensiones de cualquier izquierda. Pero los marchantes minoritarios, y sobretodo los violentos, quieren convencernos con su “progresismo” y sus intimidaciones, de que no es así. Incluso se podría llegar a decir que la violencia más fundamental de los “progres” es su incapacidad para mirar atrás, como lo indicamos en nuestros anteriores escritos haciendo alusión a la conexión entre relativismo e historicismo. “Progress or Return”, se pregunta Strauss en uno de sus más importantes artículos.

Nosotros sí, en cambio, como puros cangrejos. Marchando para atrás. LOL. Marchando hacia los sabios republicanos, hacia Aristóteles y Cicerón. Y a mucho orgullo. De manera general, el republicanismo representa el uso del poder político para transformar la sociedad desde dentro. Es el poder usado para la transformación virtuosa de los ciudadanos y ciudadanas encaminados hacia el bien común. Las virtudes éticas y políticas son su alimento, no los “derechos humanos” con los que se cubren los “progres”. Y además, a diferencia de los excesos e incapacidad auto-crítica de la izquierda y del centro izquierda, el republicanismo, en cambio, en sí mismo, lleva las condiciones para revelar sus muy serias limitaciones, limitaciones constantemente reveladas por los fines mismos más allá del uso del poder, como lo revelan los gigantes que conforman su nacimiento (Aristóteles, Cicerón). En particular, las limitaciones presentadas por la naturaleza de la vida filosófica tal y como ha sido ejemplificada por Sócrates.

Republicanismo: marchando desde hace 2,500 años sobre la visión y los pies de gigantes. Republicanismo, lo sagrado de lo **público**. Quienes destruyen las estaciones **públicas** de Transmilenio, destruyen el republicanismo. Quienes bloquean las avenidas **públicas**, destruyen el republicanismo. Quienes atacan las fuerzas legítimas **públicas** del Estado, destruyen el republicanismo. No quieren ESMAD porque quieren debilitar el republicanismo que es la piedra en su camino, es la gigantesca piedra en su marcha. Acá no tiramos piedras, pero esta piedra que es el republicanismo la haremos tan gigante que no podrán destruirla.

Y eso sí, quienes marchan en alegría protestando para y por el bien común --con ideas innovadoras y propuestas éticas serias y consolidadas-- esos, defienden un republicanismo sano y fuerte. A defenderlos y escucharlos. Los que no, que se “hagan a un ladito”, como alguien, cuyo apellido comienza con “U”, dijo por ahí. Porque nada más alejado del republicanismo que el silenciar por silenciar. El republicanismo, la creación de condiciones basados en la ley para que el dialogo fraternal tenga objetivos comunes. Juéguele, y juéguele con altura, como el adulto que es, no como el adolescente que nunca maduró. Y en Venezuela, marche, ayer, hoy y mañana hasta que el republicanismo regrese como directriz de su país en contraposición a la burda tiranía actual.

La podredumbre del “modelo progre” de la izquierda radical y del centro izquierda, la total inversión del republicanismo. El “modelo progre”, el poder, no para transformarse desde dentro, es decir, desde el autocuestionamiento. No. Por el contrario, el poder para transformarlo todo desde fuera sin primero haber pasado por la dura confrontación personal, esa que pregunta “¿por qué el poder del régimen?” (Aristóteles), “¿qué es la justicia?” (Platón) y “¿para qué la ley?” (Jenofonte). Por eso, dentro del modelo “progre”, unos negocian **en secreto**; por eso otros, **no ponen la cara** cuando los citan por Odebrecht; por eso otras más **crusan la frontera** cuando les conviene, como los cobardes asesinos que son. Los progres, marcharán, incapaces de permanecer estáticos. Marcharán toda su vida, marchan porque la paz que no tienen dentro de sí desean imponérsela al “otro”,

a su conciudadano. Deben marchar porque de mirarse en un espejo, lo que verían, los haría, no ya marchar, sino correr, correr lejos de sí mismos. Los progres marchan en gran medida por su inconformidad consigo mismos, por su falta de autoestima. Y en casos como Chile, esa violencia cobra vida hasta contra las cosas! Y por ESO “Epa Colombia” destruye Transmilenio. La llena de satisfacción el poder exteriorizar su rabia sin encontrar el origen de su rabia en su pobreza espiritual, intelectual y emocional. Y al enfrentarse a la ley, se escuda en “sus derechos”. Insólito.

Para ponerlo en el lenguaje de los “progres”, que deben aniquilar el republicanismo para acceder al poder que es la droga que los hace marchar día a día, es decir, en un lenguaje sencillo que puedan entender, les decimos:

“Mira ‘progre’, el republicanismo es tu papá.”

Y repitiendo exactamente lo escrito en el anterior apéndice. ¿El antídoto? El republicanismo clásico inspirado en Sócrates tal y como es recogido en las obras de Jenofonte, Aristóteles y Platón. El amor a la sabiduría, mil veces más poderoso --ahora y siempre-- que el amor a la droga, el dinero mal habido, y el poder tiránico. El republicanismo tiene la fuerza moral, el poder legal y el DEBER histórico de defenderse, hasta y sobretodo militarmente, y hacer de Colombia una gran nación.

(Nota: Como en la anterior recopilación, los escritos aquí compartidos no se han modificado casi así hubiesen sido escritos en corto tiempo para ser compartidos en privado con algunos a través de Facebook. Además, en este caso no tienen un orden particular. Igualmente, todos, o casi todos, tienen el enlace digital que lleva directamente al lector a la columna (u otro) que está siendo presentado o comentado. Claro, ayuda mucho haber leído los escritos del libro mencionado, y del primer apéndice mencionado, para entender la postura republicana que subyace a todos los que constituyen esta nueva recopilación. De la misma manera es importante haber leído los anteriores para entender los comentarios acerca de los diversos personajes que aparecen en la presentación y que se asume han sido encontrados anteriormente. Por ejemplo, acá volvemos a hablar de: “el que se cree Lincoln”, y “el visionario”, y el “carita de yo no fui”. Lo hacemos para no nombrarlos y confrontar su exagerada arrogancia, dizque hasta divina en ciertos casos! La introducción a este se puede leer en: <https://andresmelocousineau.com/colombia/>, el primer en apéndice en su totalidad, acá: <https://andresmelocousineau.com/2019/08/24/reflections-apendice-escritos-sobre-colombia-2019-la-mala-paz-la-peor-droga/>

Finalmente, con seguridad no escribiremos más sobre Colombia en el 2019, y probablemente tampoco en el 2020.)

ESCRITOS COLOMBIA 2019

REPUBLICANISMO:

MARCHANDO HACE 2500 AÑOS SOBRE PIES DE GIGANTES

“No van a pretender los pirómanos ganar con la violencia
lo que no ganaron en las urnas.”

Presidente Duque, República de Colombia



El Expediente
@ElExpedienteCol

"Que quede claro aquí no van a pretender los pirómanos lograr con la violencia lo que no lograron en las urnas" @IvanDuque CC @petrogustavo

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0*

Republicanism: marchando desde hace 2,500 años sobre la visión y los pies de gigantes.

1*

Último, y no escribiré sobre Colombia hasta el 2020 (o más).

Como para no generar tantos dolores de cabeza! LOL

(con excepción DE PRONTO de Proyecto de Educación REPUBLICANA MUY básico para el Conversatorio del Presidente Duque. Dependiendo de lo que pase en los próximos meses).

PERO, para concluir.

Lo sorprendente NO es que la izquierda y el liberalismo progre mundial hayan tenido éxito en muchos países en el siglo XX y XXI.

LO ABSOLUTAMENTE SORPRENDENTE es que tradiciones milenarias que son totalmente opuestas a dicho progresismo ---progresismo QUE SE DEFINE históricamente CONTRA ellas---- no sólo no han sido destruidas por dicho progresismo aunque cada día lo INTENTA, SINO AL CONTRARIO ESTÁN CADA DÍA MÁS FUERTES 2500 años después!!!!

No joda, Eso sí es una tradición poderosa.

Únete a ella. No vivas confundido toda tu vida. La encuentras en gran medida la obra ético-política de Aristóteles.

Progre, hablando en su lenguaje, "Aristóteles es tu papá". LOL



2*

Sin comentar el artículo. Se equivocan. La polarización es MUNDIAL, en Canadá, en USA, en Chile, en ...,

La polarización es una lucha entre dos modelos generales, que también contienen versiones extremas y tiránicas de cada uno (Venezuela), pero dentro de un horizonte en donde lo que se considera como "centro" YA NO ES CENTRO sino es desbalanceado hacia la izquierda.

La lucha es entre REPUBLICANISMO (clásico y moderno) CONTRA progresismo internacionalista social-demócrata (incluyendo sobretodo a la ONU).

Y consideramos que no hay canales de comunicación reales entre el uno y el otro. Son de muchas maneras su OPUESTO. Y la realidad es que se definirá en cada elección cuál y por cuánto tiempo tendrá el poder. El que pierda usará lo que en sus medios pueda para entorpecer al que ganó. Y así década tras década.

Los progresistas creen que podrán eliminar al republicanismo, PERO DADA LA NATURALEZA HUMANA, ESO JAMÁS OCURRIRÁ. Es más probable lo contrario.

Y nosotros estamos seguros, después de mucho estudio, que EL REPUBLICANISMO, en especial el clásico tal y como ha sido expresado por Sócrates, Jenofonte, y Aristóteles es el camino que genera las mejores condiciones para que la humanidad deleve su grandeza.

Claro, hay otras opciones como la China, que tiene su historia dentro del progresismo con horribles catástrofes humanas, y con una estructura cuasi-imperial que los mismos clásicos mencionados conocieron y hasta admiraron. (Ver obra de Jenofonte sobre el Imperio Persa). Pero sus costos son tan altos, que el Republicanismo lo ve como un modelo aún más peligroso que la socialdemocracia radical.

En ese sentido gente como Duque es LA EXCEPCIÓN. Busca canales entre los dos. Creemos que hace inestable su posición, PERO ES NUESTRO Presidente, tanto de los unos como de los otros. Y hacerle imposible gobernar HARÁ imposible gobernar al que sigue y al que sigue y al que sigue y así hasta e colapso unilateral.

Y el que sigue, LES ASEGURÓ, NO SERÁ como Duque. Será mucho más extremo y si es progresista MUY PROBABLEMENTE TIRÁNICO.

Pero ahí estaremos para derrocarlo desde el republicanismo como estamos acá para derrocar a los que se parecen a Maduro, por las buenas, o por las malas.

https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/la-polarizacion-que-explica-las-protestas-contr-el-presidente-ivan-duque-HC12013895?fbclid=IwAR011hgTlh73ujTqfOFR_V-jLLsZXAM4tmbL7av_U_h5vZEjq02LlyOZYZo

3*

Dijimos que no escribiríamos más sobre Colombia hasta el 2020 (o más). Pero haremos un excepción. Lo haremos lo más brevemente posible sobre una situación de altísima complejidad. Lo que escribimos, tal vez, requiera de revisiones posteriores. La vida nos lo dirá.

Lo hago porque la familia de Dilan, en a carta que han hecho pública , muestra que es más magnánima que

todos nosotros y que dentro de todo su dolor intenta serenar a sus conciudadanos que carecemos de esa magnanimidad. No les llegamos ni a los tobillos. Igual, lo que escribiremos a continuación, no será fácil para ellos.

De nada sirve SUFRIR la muerte de Dilan si no hay UNA COMPRENSIÓN del por qué de su muerte. En lo humano hay mucho de incomprensible. Pero igual, debemos intentar comprender.

Y ahí radica el problema. Hay diversos campos que dan una respuesta TOTALMENTE opuesta a esa pregunta. De manera sencilla y simplista. Unos dicen que “murió”, otros dicen que fue “asesinado”. Es decir, surge la pregunta por la “responsabilidad”. PERO CADA CAMPO tiene una visión OPUESTA de lo que ES la responsabilidad! Para unos el ESMAD ---y, para ellos, por ende el ESTADO---- es el responsable de lo ocurrido (así el disparo haya sido hecho desde una distancia que parece transformar la pregunta de “responsabilidad” por la de “accidentalidad”). Para otros, Dilan actuó irresponsablemente al enfrentarse a quienes CONSTITUCIONALMENTE tienen el deber de defender a otros ciudadanos y sus derechos en una república.

Y aquí surge el problema. Los unos repetirán lo uno y los otros repetirán lo otro, PORQUE SE CREE QUE NO HAY MANERA DE LLEGAR A UNA RESPUESTA que indique que una respuesta ES MEJOR que la otra. El relativismo teórico y práctico lleva a estos sin salidas peligrosas que en la práctica, en países como Colombia, implican e implicarán muertos. Muchos más.

Pero no es así. Sí hay manera de ver qué paradigma tiene las mejores respuestas para nuestra condición humana. Y no es el de la izquierda radical y centro izquierda.

Nosotros decimos con ABSOLUTA claridad. Lo más difícil de la muerte de Dilan es que murió engañado. Todos vamos a morir PERO DEBEMOS HACER TODO LO POSIBLE PARA QUE NOSOTROS MISMOS -- --Y LOS CERCANOS A NOSOTROS----JAMÁS, PERO JAMÁS, Y EN LO POSIBLE DE NUESTRAS CAPACIDADES MENTALES, MUERAN ENGAÑADOS.

Dilan murió engañado por que entre las diversas respuestas a la pregunta por su muerte (realmente dos, tal vez tres en Colombia) una de ellas ---la de la izquierda radical y centro izquierda---- no sólo esta confundida, sino que confunde.

Y ahí radica el problema. Para poder entender por qué Dilan murió engañado tendría que poder salirse del paradigma que lo llevó a la muerte, pero para ello, se necesita tiempo y lecturas y estar acompañado de verdaderos profesores. Y a los que ayudaron a engañarlo, nunca les importó darle el tiempo para NO DEJARSE ENGAÑAR. Dilan, muy joven, PERO POR ELLO MISMO más impresionable por discursos sofistas. Por eso los llaman al frente.

Claro, nos dirán que probemos lo que decimos. Nosotros lo hemos hecho para nosotros mismos, PARA NO MORIR ENGAÑADOS, no para dirigir este país u otro. Pero primero tiene uno que haber leído y analizado los diversos paradigmas de comprensión de lo político. Nosotros lo hemos hecho durante décadas ya.

Por eso decimos.

Lo más triste para nosotros de la muerte de Dilan es que murió engañado.

Y de manera concreta ----como no le gusta a los del paradigma sofista que engaña a muchos jóvenes por medio de abstracciones peligrosas ----- Colombia es una república y tiene leyes que hacen OBLIGATORIA una investigación, y UNA DECISIÓN, respecto a la responsabilidad de los hechos en que UN MIEMBRO DEL ESMAD HIRIÓ ---NO EL ESMAD NI EL ESTADO----, con o sin responsabilidad, a un joven, ya mayor de edad, que decidió arriesgar su vida sin importarle las mismas leyes de la comunidad en la que él, y su familia decidió vivir.

En concreto, esperemos los resultados. Pero ya SABEMOS que apenas haya resultados, NO SERÁN ACEPTADOS, porque se dirá que los ha hecho "EL ESTADO". Por eso su afán de blindar instituciones como la JEP, como si eso garantizará "la verdad".

En general, Dilan murió engañado, Y SI YO FUERA SU PADRE O SU MADRE, buscaría CON TODAS LAS FUERZAS DE MI SER claridad acerca de por qué algunos, como nosotros, decimos que su hijo murió engañado, y que ellos y sus amigos y su colegio pudieron haber hecho mucho más para que nunca hubiera arriesgado su vida de esa manera en la Colombia actual. Y que si el agente del ESMAD es declarado responsable, traten de entender, lo mejor posible, el dilema en que ese otro muchacho se encontrará el resto de su vida.

4*

Para Petro Peligro Perdedor. PPP.

Tweet

Manuel Salazar
@manolitosalazar

Comunicado de la Familia de Dilan

[Translate Tweet](#)

recuperación y todo lo que cada persona ha hecho para ayudar Queremos informar que Dilan sigue luchando aunque todavía está muy grave. Estamos a la espera de su evolución médica y les iremos informando sobre su estado de salud. Como familia, requerimos privacidad. Les agradecemos que nos respeten nuestro espacio y que no nos pidan declaraciones por ahora. Deseamos que no haya más violencia en la calle, venga de dónde venga, queremos que la gente esté tranquila y en paz. Aquí nosotros no estamos buscando culpables. Lo único que deseamos en	espacio y que no nos pidan declaraciones por ahora. Deseamos que no haya más violencia en la calle, venga de dónde venga, queremos que la gente esté tranquila y en paz. Aquí nosotros no estamos buscando culpables. Lo único que deseamos en este momento es que Dilan se recupere. Si les agradecemos seguir orando. No más violencia ni víctimas. No queremos que Dilan se convierta en un motivo de más agresividad de ninguna parte.
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1:12 PM · Nov 24, 2019 · Twitter for iPhone

<https://twitter.com/manolitosalazar/status/1198665648307625989?s=12&fbclid=IwAR1GZaE6mZDIC8KFOzJPnKKpp-yJbv6OOkgFjOdeuhaHmaZTNgjHLoQ9-0w>

5*

La razón por la que yo jamás marcharía con los marchantes actuales de Colombia, sobretodo los pacíficos, es SENCILLA.

Nos parece que son muy hipócritas, o para ser más pacífico como ellos (!), muy limitados en su conocimiento, es decir, su AUTO-conocimiento.

¿Por qué?

Por lo siguiente. Ellos dicen representar la "Sociedad Civil" que se enfrenta a un "Estado" que no los escucha y que promueve medidas que los hiere de alguna manera. Lo que ellos llaman "sus derechos".

Entonces, la presuposición es que hay dos entidades, "Estado" y "Sociedad Civil" que son separadas y DEBEN ser separadas. Ya hemos escrito al respecto anteriormente.

Todo bien, no? NO. No, porque la pregunta fundamental es:

Esa sociedad civil que marcha, y que es SEPARADA del Estado y que DEBE ser separada del Estado, preguntamos, ¿QUÉ BUSCA AL MARCHAR? ¿Acaso no busca que quien lidera el Estado, en últimas, sea REEMPLAZADO por alguien que sea de los SUYOS?

Y si es así, entonces: ¿La sociedad civil es un fin en sí mismo que no busca el poder, O POR EL CONTRARIO es UN MEDIO DISFRAZADO PARA OBTENER EL PODER, y así dejar de marchar? Por eso NO PARAN Y NO PARAN el PARO y sus marchas.

Por ejemplo, SUPONGAMOS QUE TUMBAN a quien lidera el Estado que no cumple con sus requisitos ----- aquí ya surgen infinidad de preguntas acerca de lo que es un VERDADERO líder, pero dejemos eso a un lado--- - y surge alguien que SÍ LOS REPRESENTA, ENTONCES YA LAS MARCHAS DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL SE CONVIERTEN EN ATENTADO CONTRA ELLOS? (O sino mire cómo tratan las protestas de la sociedad Civil en Venezuela, para sólo hablar de Occidente).

Repitiendo. ¿La sociedad civil es un medio, o es un fin en sí mismo? Si es un fin en sí mismo, por qué desea el poder? Y si consigue el poder, entonces ya hay una ecuación de identidad entre "sociedad civil" y "estado" que hace que toda otra PROTESTA Pacífica posterior sea vista como de hecho violenta?

Para ni mencionar, el hecho de que esas marchas ABREN EL CAMINO A LOS VIOLENTOS. Pero dejemos eso TAMBIÉN A UN LADO. Estos pacifistas necesitan que uno deje TANTO a un lado!!! LOL

Por eso no marchamos ni marcharemos nunca con los pacíficos de Colombia. Para ni mencionar que DE ENTRADA la incoherencia radica en CREER que uno puede separar "Estado" y "Sociedad Civil". ESA SEPARACIÓN NO ES UNA VERDAD. Es más, puede ser una FALSEDAD ABSOLUTA, pero conveniente.


Por eso en Occidente existe UNA PODEROSA VISIÓN OPUESTA. Es la del REPUBLICANISMO que ni se puede imaginar semejantes separaciones ARTIFICIALES como las de "Estado" y "Sociedad Civil", ya que para el REPUBLICANISMO, por el contrario, DE ENTRADA, el ser humano ES POR NATURALEZA UN SER POLÍTICO (famosísima frase de Aristóteles). Esas separaciones artificiales son sólo el producto de imaginaciones modernas con OBJETIVOS claros, como lo hemos dicho.

Y para quien quiera ver un ejemplo en Colombia sólo necesita contrastar a Medellín como ciudad con otras.

(Nota: Pero claro, nosotros marchamos, y marcharíamos de muchas maneras, si el objetivo de los pacíficos es posibilitar el establecimiento de una tiranía anti-republicana. Y marcharíamos de TODAS las maneras posibles, hasta eliminar al tirano.)

6*

Vamos Presidente Duque.



7*



Oiga he estado demasiado tiempo fuera de Colombia.


De cuándo acá ---en las propagandas de Café de Colombia que invitan a conversar con un tinto sabroso nuestro---

EL QUE HABLA ES LA MULA.

<https://twitter.com/petrogustavo/status/1198982250169286659?fbclid=IwAR3952dqfGtRDPsoTaewB60IBsnZjKUv8CSCju1JcgKpUSJdcGhm- WKZc>

8*

Tweet

 **Hassan Nassar**
@HassNassar

Hombre, no sea ridículo. Aquí el único con sainete propio y definido es usted. El suyo incluye generar caos, promover el odio, alentar el vandalismo y luego como buen ex miembro de grupo terrorista victimizarse. Menos mal somos millones que no caemos en ese juego.

[Translate Tweet](#)

 **Gustavo Petro**  @petrogustavo · 12m

Esto es exactamente lo que querían los que organizaron la campaña de terror con ayuda policial anoche en Bogotá y durante el toque de queda de Peñalosa.

Al menos Peñalosa se salió del sainete. [twitter.com/HassNassar/sta...](https://twitter.com/HassNassar/status/1191111111)

10:05 AM · Nov 23, 2019 · [Twitter for Android](#)

9*

 **B. Henao** @brodgut1 · 1d

Sres cartel de la toga CorteSuprema "Justicia" cuando llaman a indagatoria y de una meten preso al siniestro @petrogustavo por recibir bolsas con Pacas de billetes ... ???



4,399 views · From Luis Ramirez Duque

10*

Tweet

 **Ana Maria**
@chiquipatriota

Tal parece que el Alcalde electo de Medellín está confundido y cree que el presidente es @petrogustavo y no @IvanDuque. Dice que el paro no ha terminado y exige una Constituyente. Apague y vámonos! Me voy a estudiar a otro país porque aquí no me graduaré nunca a punta de paros!

[Translate Tweet](#)



0:27 · 10.9K views

9:25 PM · Nov 24, 2019 · [Twitter for Android](#)

El alcalde electo progre ----ni siquiera posesionado aún'--- , llega a la reunión convocada por SU Presidente Duque como base de un Conversatorio Nacional que busca soluciones PARA COLOMBIA.

Acto seguido el progre arrogante le pasa una cartica. Una cartica que pide una Asamblea Constituyente.

Imagina uno las palabras de Duque.

"Muchas gracias alcalde. Tome asiento con los otros 32 gobernadores y "40000000" alcaldes que no trajeron carticas sino que vinieron a trabajar de buena fe por COLOMBIA."

Ojalá le hayan dado el asiento del fondo. Y que alguien le haya puesto un tache por si acaso.

https://twitter.com/chiquipatriota/status/1198789860850642945?fbclid=IwAR0vmqrIxl82CUk80nKtl2Kvk_Co1mt4zEfRu4rhoBEE0-o9H0UZQ2nRMuY

11*

Alcalde electo de Medellín Quintero. DE QUINTA!

12*

A veces uno escribe unas cosas sobre la situación de Colombia, que es mejor no hacer públicas. LOL.

Si lo que escribí NO LO SABE YA DUQUE, PUES APAGUE Y VÁMONOS.

Pero es de esas cosas que no se hacen públicas.

Sigan cuidándose y no se dejen confundir, SOBRETUDO por aquellos que repiten como loros "no se deje confundir" pero que están más confundidos que CONFUCIO!!! LOL

Y hablando de Confucio, aquí dejo de su Analectos I.2. ES DECIR ES LA SEGUNDA COSA QUE DICE CONFUCIO. Pero no, sigan como siguen!


LOL Igualito a Colombia!!!!

Master You said, "A young person who is filial and respectful of his elders rarely becomes the kind of person who is inclined to defy his superiors, and there has never been a case of one who is disinclined to defy his superiors stirring up rebellion. "The gentleman applies himself to the roots. 'Once the roots are firmly established, the Way will grow.' Might we not say that filial piety and respect

CONFUCIUS. Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries (Translated & Annotated) (Hackett Classics) (p. 1). Hackett Publishing. Kindle Edition.

13*

#NoMasPetro



14*

#NoMasPetro

Tweet

Gustavo Petro @petrogustavo

El policía herido en Neiva al parecer, según el video, lo es porque un artefacto explosivo que uno de sus compañeros lanzó se estrelló con una valla y se devolvió.

¿Por qué el jefe de la policía a nivel nacional sigue permitiendo el uso de esas armas contra manifestantes?

Translate Tweet
8:07 AM · Nov 27, 2019 · Twitter for Android

3K Retweets 9.1K Likes

Colombia Libre @Elegidos18Carlo · 2h
Replying to @petrogustavo

Mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, Mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, Mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, Mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, Mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, Mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, mentiroso, Mentiroso!

15*

#NoMasPetro

Petro va de retro.

16*

#NoMasPetro

Petro quiere metro subterráneo. Espejo su alma subterránea.

17*

#NoMasPetro

“Se vive se siente, Petro delincuente.”

18*

#NoMasPetro

Petro Peligro Perdedor. PPP.

19*

¿Se imagina ser un cuchito o cuchita de izquierda ---y de centro izquierda disfrazada--- y SABER que no ha tenido el poder en sus manos en Colombia y que OTROS países sí, y que se le está acabando la vida? ¿Se imagina esa frustración? Se imagina esa energía dirigida EXCLUSIVAMENTE A OBTENER EL PODER? ¿Se imagina lo que estaría dispuesto a hacer? ¿Se imagina la narrativa o el cuento que se echaría a usted mismo PARA PODER MANEJAR SEMEJANTE FRUSTRACIÓN? En concreto, ¿Se imagina el cuento que se echa para liberar a Santrich? Y SOBRETUDO, ¿Se imagina su explosión?

Eso es lo que está en juego el 21.

Pero también luego el 2022.

A mostrar, basados en el republicanismo Y SU GIGANTESCO PODER ESPIRITUAL Y MATERIAL, que el frustrado es el peor líder. Que mueran frustrados con sus manos vacías de poder.

Haga su parte el 21 y luego en el 2022.

Defienda su republicanismo.

20*

Una hora de participación activa e inteligente en la entrevista de Dávila a Petro Peligro Perdedor. Bien Andrés. Nov 22, 2019.

#NoMasPetro

21*



#NoMasPetro

22*



“Y Jesús dijo que el Apóstol Gustavo hizo saber a Dios que le enseñaría cómo corregir su creación en dos días y una noche y que ya ni Jesús tendría que morir por los tiempos de los tiempos, amén”

Y en el pueblo escogido, llamado Colombia, dicen que el Apóstol Gustavo casi es elegido como nuevo Emperador por los más sabios y sabias, y que pidió a todos los niños marchar en su nombre y así ganar la vida eterna por los tiempos de los tiempos, amén.”

Suerte Colombia, LA VAN A NECESITAR más que a Dios.

23*

Republicanism: marching since 2,500 years on the vision and the feet of giants.

24*

El 21 en Colombia, #NO21



Y GRACIAS A GENTE como este visionario que no ha ganado nada USARÉ TODO MI SABER POLÍTICO PARA ESCRIBIR EN CONTRA DE LA MARCHA y de gente como el visionario que no ha ganado nada.

Es decir, no hemos avanzado UN SOLO paso desde el plebiscito.

Por qué? PORQUE prefirieron una mala paz a una buena paz.

La mala "paz", la PEOR DROGA.

Nota: no pertenezco al Centro Democrático, pero impacta la felicidad del visionario "pacifista", de querer destruirlo.

25*

El 21 en Colombia,

NO MARCHO, YO CONSTRUYO.

26*

El 21 en Colombia,

NO MARCHO, YO REPIENSO.

27*

El 21 en Colombia,

NO MARCHO, YO PREPARO.

28*

El 21 en Colombia,

NO MARCHO, YO ACOMPAÑO.

29*

El 21 en Colombia,

NO MARCHO, YO RETROCEDO.

(Y NO ME AVERGÜENZO.)

30*

El 21 en Colombia,

NO MARCHO, YO "PERIPATEO".

Para los que no lo saben, Aristóteles fundó la escuela "peripatética", que quiere decir que Aristóteles CAMINABA de aquí para allá y de regreso, FILOSOFANDO, pero NADA TIENE QUE VER CON MARCHAR. Para NI HABLAR DE LO QUE PIENSA ARISTÓTELES DE LOS PROGRESISTAS. Pero en realidad sólo se usa el adjetivo "peripatético". pero igual me inventé el verbo. Y sino, pues lo, Peri-PATEO. LOL.

Es decir,

NO MARCHO, YO PERIPATEO.

Para los del San Carlos, recuerden al padre Sebastián y sus charlas caminando. Aunque de otra índole.

[Tweet](#)

Peripatetic USAGE

Peripatetic is a word that many find confusing. We will examine the definition of *peripatetic*, where it came from and some examples of its use in sentences.

Peripatetic means itinerant, traveling from place to place, never staying somewhere very long. Someone who is *peripatetic* works in many places for short periods of time. For instance, many people who work in the military are *peripatetic*. Aristotle founded the Peripatetic school of philosophy in Ancient Greece. The word *peripatetic* is taken from the Greek word *peripatētikós* which means tends to walk around. The idea is derived from Aristotle's habit of teaching while he walked through the Lyceum in Athens. *Peripatetic* is usually used as an adjective, though it may be used as a noun to describe the students of Aristotle, or to describe someone who works by traveling from place to place. The adverb form is *peripatetically*.

Advertisement

31*

El 21 en Colombia,

NO MARCHO, YO VOTÉ Y GANÉ.


32*

El 21 en Colombia,

YO CAMINO HACIA, NO MARCHO CONTRA.


33*

El 21 en Colombia,



Jenofonte ENSEÑA qué es marchar en su Anábasis. Las marchas colombianas no le llegan al TOBILLO.

Léalo.



En la famosa Perseus, gratis.

https://www.amazon.com/Anabasis-Cyrus-Xenophon/dp/0801489997/ref=pd_sbs_14_t_2/135-5662747-6544130?encoding=UTF8&pd_rd_j=0801489997&pd_rd_r=edd60be6-94be-42ee-93cb-d9d63eacfc93&pd_rd_w=Xs7FO&pd_rd_wg=eixWF&pf_rd_p=5cfcfe89-300f-47d2-b1ad-84e27203a02a&pf_rd_r=GPO04D3NEKB205AF5ZSA&psc=1&refRID=GPO04D3NEKB205AF5ZSA&fbclid=IwAR1R4DaMBDc2vIRYNRj3rOR0mqAIUMJ5v-15dNhiJwL0xaNpM55s14irNY

34* (del Apéndice anterior)

El 21 en Colombia,

Terminando de leer por segunda vez uno de los textos más importantes para comenzar a entender lo que es un líder por naturaleza, "La Anábasis de Ciro" escrito por Jenofonte.

La historia es IMPRESIONANTE. Luego de que el comandante persa asesina a todos los generales griegos de manera traicionera invitándolos a una ceremonia de paz, el pequeño ejército griego queda sin sus comandantes en una región desconocida en medio de lo que hoy es Iraq. Están lejos de su tierra, totalmente desorientados y sin provisiones.

En ese momento surge entre ellos Jenofonte, de apenas unos 30 para guiarlos de nuevo a su tierra por entre tierras desconocidas, un muy largo viaje de 2 años.

En lo que se refiere al por qué leer estos libros. El paralelo con el proceso de paz en Colombia es IMPACTANTE, sobretodo en el caso de cómo actuaron muchos frente a la barata telenovela de Santrich.

Por eso les dejo aquí el comentario acerca de los 4 tipos de líderes griegos, y qué tipo de líder era Jenofonte. ES POR ESO QUE DECIMOS QUE HAY MUCHO ATEMBADO en Colombia, sobre todo en sus 500 Altas


cortes.

DEBERÍAN LEER, NO PERDÓN MEMORIZAR "LA ANÁBASIS DE CIRO". Ser más como Jenofonte, menos como ellos y ellas son.

ESTAS CUATRO PAGINITAS TODO CIUDADANO SERIO DEBE LEER.

La introducción y apartes del texto están GRATIS en google Books, pero en inglés:

https://books.google.ca/books?id=Q-fK3AJu3EoC&source=gs_similarbooks



of Persia and surrounded by hordes of non-Greeks, the Greeks most need to stick together. Not surprisingly, we soon hear of a heated dispute in the Greek camp between Menon's soldiers and those of Clearchus, which turns into a riot that almost causes the implosion of the Greek army (1.5.11–17). By putting his own interest, as well as that of his soldiers, above the common safety, Menon jeopardizes not only these soldiers' well-being but even his own.

As Cyrus's army approaches Babylon, deserters from the Great King report that the latter's army is 1.2 million strong to Cyrus's 110,000 (of which 10,400 are Greek hoplites), and the king's personal cavalry is said to outnumber Cyrus's by 10 to 1 (1.7.10–13; 1.8.6; cf., however, 1.8.5). Nevertheless, the Great King retreats hurriedly before Cyrus, who concludes that his brother will not fight for his throne. Cyrus's advance becomes careless and disorderly. But then the unexpected happens: around midday on the third day after the men cross a massive (and hastily abandoned) defensive ditch, a scout gallops into the van of the army at full speed and bellows that the king is sighted approaching in full battle array. For a moment, there is great confusion in Cyrus's army. Soon, a speck of dust on the horizon turns into a massive and gleaming body of men, advancing in order and in silence: the fateful battle of Cunaxa (as it is later known) is about to be fought. The Greeks hold Cyrus's right, and after singing the paean they engage the king's troops and put them to flight easily, without loss of life. Meanwhile, however, on the left, Cyrus holds his cavalry back, on the lookout for his brother. When he sees him, Cyrus is overpowered by the sight, and he charges rashly in his direction. After a valiant fight, Cyrus is killed, pierced through the head by a javelin. Almost all his closest Persian loyalists die with him, fighting over his body. The *Anabasis*, the ascent, of Cyrus has come to a premature end.

~ VARIETIES OF GREEK RULERSHIP ~

Where is Xenophon during all of this? He makes a single brief appearance in Book 1 of the *Anabasis*. As the battle is about to begin, and Cyrus is riding along the line surveying the two opposite armies, Xenophon sees him from the Greek side, rides up to him, and asks,

"Do you have any order?" Cyrus halts his horse and says—and orders Xenophon to say to everyone—that the sacrifices and the entrails of the victims are favorable (1.8.14–15). That is the extent of Xenophon's appearance in Book 1.²⁰ The episode is insignificant, it seems, yet it is singled out for emphasis. Indeed, Xenophon seems to go out of his way to ensure that he comes to sight in the *Anabasis* as a sycophant. But this will appear intolerable. In the very next chapter, in the heart of Xenophon's eulogy of the deceased Cyrus, it is said that Cyrus never let anyone's eagerness to obey his orders go without its reward (1.9.18). We shall say, therefore, that Xenophon contrives to come to sight in the *Anabasis* as a seeker of reward or, more generally, as a seeker or lover of gain.²¹

The victorious Greeks learn of Cyrus's death only the next morning, and the news is understandably shattering. Soon, heralds from the king arrive and, addressing the generals, deliver an ultimatum: "Give up your weapons, and go to the gates of the king, to obtain what good you may" (2.1.8). The ultimatum is answered by four of the Greek generals in a scene that illuminates the character of the Greek rulership (2.1.9–14). First, Clearchus, who is now the *de facto* leader of all the Greeks, replies that it is not for the victors to give up their weapons; however, no sooner has he said this than he just leaves the scene to go examine the sacrifices that he had been performing—"I'll be right back" (2.1.9)—and asks the three remaining generals to give the best and noblest reply they can. The eldest of the generals, Cleonor, then declares with firmness and moving simplicity that the Greeks would sooner die than give up their weapons. Next to speak is Proxenus, the friend of Xenophon and Gorgias's pupil. Proxenus wonders aloud whether the king is asking for the Greeks' weapons on the grounds that he is stronger than they, or because he is their friend, asking for the weapons as gifts. If it is because he is stronger, why need he ask? Why not advance and *take* the weapons? If the king wishes to obtain the weapons by persuasion, however, let him say what the soldiers will obtain in return if they gratify him in this. The urbane and sophisticated Proxenus is thus open to negotiation and even to laying down his weapons. The fourth and final reply is by a young Athenian named "Theopompus," who says: "As you see, [herald], we now have nothing good except our weapons and our virtue. We believe that, with our weapons, we would make use

of our virtue; but were we to give up our weapons, we would be deprived even of our lives. So, don't believe that we will give up to you the only good things left to us, but, with them, we shall fight over your good things as well." The herald of the king, a Greek named Phalinus, laughs at Theopompus's uncompromising defiance: "You look like a philosopher, young man," he says, "and you speak not unpleasantly, but know that you are a fool, if you suppose that your virtue can prevail over the power of the king" (2.1.12–13).

The text of the *Anabasis* leaves no serious doubt that "Theopompus" is a pseudonym for "Xenophon," as shown by the reference to Theopompus's looking like a philosopher and to his being a young Athenian, among other textual details.²² Xenophon appears under a pseudonym because, as a private member of the army, he was not actually present when the leaders of the Greeks received the king's ultimatum.²³ Theopompus is a fictitious character who says what Xenophon would have said, had he been in attendance. In other words, Xenophon would have rejected any negotiation with the Persians, and he would have challenged them to a fight over their possessions: Xenophon is the emphatic nonappeaser. His uncompromising defiance contrasts starkly with the stance of Proxenus, who indicates that he is open to negotiation. Xenophon, the disciple of Socrates, would refuse negotiation; Proxenus, the disciple of Gorgias, would consider it. Is this difference somehow a consequence of their respective education? Xenophon intimates as much, most clearly in the case of Proxenus. For a little later in the book he writes that Proxenus, though a gentleman, who was unwilling to use unjust means to acquire a name, power, or money for himself, was a deficient ruler because he could not instill respect for or fear of himself in his soldiers. Proxenus thought it sufficient to use praise (and the withholding of praise) to get the soldiers to act nobly or justly, and never (corporal) punishments; as a result, the soldiers who were themselves gentlemen had goodwill for Proxenus, but the unjust ones plotted against him as someone easily handled. Xenophon suggests, then, that Proxenus overestimated what speech alone could accomplish in moving the general run of mankind. This overestimation already characterized his mentor Gorgias, moreover, as an analysis of the first section of Plato's *Gorgias* would demonstrate.²⁴ Now, to overestimate speech's power can mean different

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(if related) things: it can mean to rule by speech or by praise alone, as Proxenus attempted to do; but it can also mean the assumption that talk, or negotiation, is always a possibility to achieve the resolution of political conflicts. These two errors often stem from a common root: they underestimate the strength of the concern for self-interest (on the part, at least, of the general run of mankind), and they overestimate the strength of the concern for the noble and the just, and of the concern for the praise bestowed on the noble and the just (on the part, at least, of the general run of mankind).²⁵ If Xenophon-Theopompus adopts an uncompromising stance here, it is not because he is a lover of war or because he hates the Persians: he shows repeatedly, throughout the *Anabasis*, that he prefers peace to war whenever possible.²⁶ Instead, the reason is that there is (as he sees) no common interest sufficient to sustain a stable agreement: the survival of the Greeks would create, inescapably, a mortal threat to the king; hence any negotiation, any purported agreement, would almost certainly be but preparation for Persian deception or entrapment. The disciple of Socrates, in short, does not share in the high-minded but ultimately misguided overestimation of the power of speech which characterizes Proxenus. In this respect, Xenophon stands at a distance from Proxenus and somewhat closer to the strict disciplinarian Clearchus.²⁷

Let us add a few remarks. "Theopompus" means "God-sent": clearly, if Xenophon displays a taste for graceful self-deprecation, in the *Anabasis* and elsewhere, he is nevertheless aware of his worth (cf. 3.2.7). Moreover, Theopompus's view of virtue is noteworthy: he claims that virtue is powerless without weapons; one should not rely on unarmed virtue to achieve safety, but weapons—*this-worldly* weapons—are its necessary support. Are we to understand, then, that other-worldly weapons lend no assistance to virtue? This is certainly a premature conclusion: after all, the scene of the ultimatum begins, so to speak, with Clearchus going off to the sacrifices to seek guidance and help from the gods. His prayer is answered, Xenophon apparently suggests, although not in the manner that Clearchus likely expected: it is answered by the presence of an Athenian "God-sent" among the soldiers. Yet recall that Xenophon had taken it upon himself to answer the call of Proxenus. He was never the emissary of Apollo.

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Clearchus returns from the sacrifices, and after a misguided and abortive attempt to manipulate the royal herald Phalinus (2.1.15–23), he rejects the Persian ultimatum. Gathering the Greek leadership, he says that the sacrifices are not favorable for marching against the king. They are, however, very favorable for joining up with Cyrus's Persian troops, who had been turned on the day of the battle and had fled to the previous day's station.²⁸ The two armies are soon reunited, and after concluding a sworn alliance, they decide to retreat as fast as possible.

Xenophon speaks in no uncertain terms of the adopted strategy: It "was capable of accomplishing nothing, except secret flight or escape." But, he adds, "chance proved a more noble general" (2.2.13). Indeed, on the first day of the retreat, the Greeks chance to run into the van of the king's army. Mistaking their appearance for a sign that the Greeks are resolved to fight, the king immediately sues for peace—after ordering them to surrender but twenty-four hours earlier! Clearchus agrees to a truce in exchange for provisions, and a sworn peace is soon concluded between the Greeks and the king's emissary, the satrap Tissaphernes. The terms of the peace are undoubtedly advantageous to the Greeks: the king's country is to be friendly to them, and Tissaphernes must guide them back to Hellas without deception. The Greeks are also to be provided with a market. In exchange, they must march without harming the king's country, taking their provisions from the land only where no market is provided. Given the Greeks' predicament, this peace agreement must have seemed like a blessing to many: stuck in the heart of Mesopotamia, near a very large imperial army, surrounded by the Euphrates and the Tigris, beyond which lie expansive deserts, high mountains, and numerous hostile tribes, they are unfamiliar with the country and without provisions or cavalry. Indeed, compared with the Greeks, the king was obtaining relatively little under the agreement; above all, he was promising not to exact retribution. But precisely because of this imbalance of advantages (and a series of suspicious incidents: 2.4.1–2; 2.4.15–24; 2.4.25), many Greeks distrust the Persians and do not believe that the king intends to abide by the peace: "He deceives us into staying here now because his army is scattered; when it is reassembled, there is no way that he will not attack us; perhaps he is digging a ditch somewhere or

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building a wall to make the road impassable" (2.4.1–4). Moreover, the agreement has the additional disadvantage of enabling a reconciliation between Cyrus's Persian troops and the king's troops. When the retreat begins, after a delay of over twenty days, the two Persian armies march and encamp together, while the Greeks keep their distance. Even Clearchus is uneasy with the situation created by the peace agreement. He emphasizes, however, that the Greeks would now be facing great difficulties if they broke the peace. "And given how many things the king has as allies," Clearchus reasons, "if he desired eagerly to destroy us, I do not know why he needed to swear an oath, and to give us his right hand, and thus perjure himself before gods and make his word distrusted by Greeks and Barbarians" (2.4.7).

The common retreat lasts less than three weeks in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and growing enmity. Finally, in a bid to prevent the resumption of war, Clearchus requests a meeting with Tissaphernes. After an exchange of conciliatory speeches, they depart from each other, the former being convinced of the latter's truthfulness and friendship. Strikingly, Clearchus even agrees to return to Tissaphernes' tent the next day with the entire Greek leadership. For, Clearchus reasons, since the two sides have so many good grounds of friendship, as the speeches have shown, there must be calumniators fostering distrust and trying to make the two sides enemies, and these must suffer the last penalty. Tissaphernes agrees and he says that he will reveal the identity of those who calumniate the Greeks to him the next day, in a kind of public trial. Clearchus promises to do the same at his end: he was suspecting that Menon was the calumniator in question.

Not surprisingly, Clearchus's plan encounters opposition. After insisting vehemently, however, Clearchus gets most of his way: five generals, including Menon, Proxenus, and Clearchus, go to the Persian camp, accompanied by twenty captains and about two hundred soldiers.²⁹ The generals are invited into Tissaphernes' tent but soon, on a prearranged signal, are arrested. The captains, who had remained outside, are surprised and massacred, and so are the soldiers. The treachery is reported to the Greeks by an Arcadian captain named Nicarchus, who escaped, though gravely cut through the belly and holding his innards with his own hands.³⁰ Stunned, the

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Greeks run to arms, expecting the Persians to attack them on the spot. But the Persians remain quiet on that day.

It is not easy to understand why Clearchus was deceived and taken in by Tissaphernes' rather heavy-handed plot. Clearchus was not only a seasoned and hard-boiled soldier, and himself a practitioner of the art of deception,³¹ but he had tasted Tissaphernes' deceptiveness a few years earlier.³² Yet Clearchus gets tricked like a Boy Scout! According to a well-known historian of Greece, George Grote, the explanation is that Clearchus suspected that Menon was secretly trying to detach the Greek army from *his* authority to lead it to Tissaphernes in order to ingratiate himself with the Persian satrap; "jealous in the extreme of his own military authority," Clearchus "tried to defeat [this] scheme by bidding still higher himself for the favor of Tissaphernes."³³ This suggestion is helpful, and Menon's challenge to Clearchus's authority probably did blunt the latter's prudence. Yet Clearchus's speech to Tissaphernes, during their first meeting, suggests more important causes: fear and, above all, hope. Clearchus stresses in that speech that the oaths and pledges exchanged earlier have been honored by the Greeks, and that they are not even thinking of doing harm to Tissaphernes or plotting against him. This conviction that he and the Greeks have acted with unimpeachable piety and justice, coupled with his fear that the gods will wage irresistible war on oath-breakers, fills Clearchus with hope that he will be safe, for he appears to believe that he *deserves* to be safe: that is, he deserves the friendship of the all-powerful Tissaphernes. (Clearchus's attitude toward Tissaphernes, whom he addresses in this context with striking humility, much like a suppliant beseeching the deity, is meant to shed light on his stance toward the divine.) It is this mixture of hope and fear, born of the conviction in question, which apparently overrules the misgivings that Clearchus must have harbored toward the Persian. The reader cannot help but be reminded of Theopompus's earlier claim that unarmed virtue is powerless to achieve safety; in retrospect, that claim reads like a prophetic warning against the rash hopefulness of Clearchus,³⁴ who, trusting solely to his virtue, simply hands himself over unarmed to his (former) enemy.³⁵ Surely, that Theopompus was *not* among the soldiers who accompanied the generals to their death, as he could easily have been, was no coincidence.³⁶

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~ THE ANABASIS OF XENOPHON AND THE MARCH TO THE SEA ~

The Greeks are at a loss and discouraged when they learn of the fate of their generals, captains, and fellow soldiers. That evening, few of them have a stomach for food; few of them light a fire, and they go to bed haphazardly, lying down unguardedly wherever they chance to. Yet they are unable to sleep, pained and yearning for their fatherlands, parents, wives and children, whom they believed they would never again see. Xenophon, who had accompanied Cyrus, he writes, "neither as a general, nor a captain, nor a soldier," is pained along with the rest (3.1.4). Managing to catch a little sleep, he has a dream, in which it seems to him that a thunderbolt from Zeus the King has struck his father's house and set it ablaze, starting a fire all around it. He immediately awakes, very frightened, but he then judges that the dream is partly good, although partly fearsome as well.³⁷ He then says to himself that given the impending peril, it is no time to be lying on the ground. He gets up, gathers the captains of Proxenus, and delivers to them the first of three remarkable speeches by which he restores a degree of order and confidence to the army and in the course of which, from being a nonentity, he is elected general.

To be sure, the prospects for common safety are, at this juncture, pretty dim: the Greeks' situation has deteriorated since Cyrus's death.³⁸ Moreover, Xenophon's prospective rule is hindered by many obstacles: he is at most thirty, is a citizen of Athens—whereas the bulk of the army is Peloponnesian (6.2.9–12)—and has little basis of support among the troops since he joined Cyrus without mercenaries of his own. Two factors, however, work in his favor. First, the very gravity of the situation makes the soldiers more willing to listen to a youth who seems to know what to say and what to do. Second, the wholesale destruction of the Greek command has created a vacuum of power, which can now be filled with a firmer leadership, and a more united one.³⁹

Xenophon's three speeches are notably different from one another, since they are addressed to different audiences and have slightly different aims. Taken together, they show that Xenophon is a very skilled orator. More specifically, he knows how to reassure, encourage, and,

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35*

EL ESPECTADOR Viernes 20 De Noviembre

Noticias · Opinión · Economía · Deportes · Entretenimiento · Cultura · Cromos

OPINIÓN

Inicio / Opinión / Sera que les quedan fuerzas columna 891355

17 Nov 2019 - 12:00 AM
Por: Mauricio Botero Caicedo

¿Será que les quedan fuerzas?

En relación con el paro del jueves 21 de noviembre, el autor de esta columna se hace varias preguntas:

¿Será que después de culpar de manera totalmente equivocada al Gobierno por las matanzas de los líderes indígenas, a los manifestantes les quedan fuerzas para exigir la implacable persecución de los culpables de esos crímenes: los carteles de Sinaloa y los Zetas? Las bandas de

NO MARCHO.

<https://www.elespectador.com/opinion/sera-que-les-quedan-fuerzas-columna-891355?fbclid=IwAR1UUV7VSluXS6s7GsV6UbbG6w8x2RhUFvCRxiQnMb9cGqyx-5xQRtdwIA9s>

36*

En Venezuela,

MARCHO, MARCHO, MARCHO.

MARCHO POR EL REPUBLICANISMO.

Y si vivo por fuera exiliado.

REGRESO, REGRESO, REGRESO.

37*

← Tweet

 **Luis Carlos Vélez**  
@lcvelez

#NoMarcho y tengo todo el derecho a decirlo - Mi columna @elespectador

Translate Tweet

<p>@lcvelez</p> <p>Permítame salirme del redil: no marcho este jueves. Simplemente no lo hago por que no tengo claro de qué se trata. Hay tanto interés metido, tanta rabia junta, tanto oportunista y tanta sospecha de mano foránea que realmente hace rato le perdí el norte al asunto. Uños dicen que la marcha es contra la</p>	<p>país los que pensamos realmente de manera independiente y no tenemos credos dictados por caudillos. Soy de la mayoría colombiana que cree firmemente que nuestra nación es más que dos posturas radicales y polarizadoras que hacen tanta bulla y tienen secuestrado el diálogo nacional.</p>
<p>incendiar el país.</p>	<p>Antes de que empiecen con los insultos, esto privado en la mayoría de los casos en este país, es resultado de trabajo honesto. En Colombia somos más los buenos que los malos, suponer lo contrario es un craso error.</p>

Los que no estamos de acuerdo con las

3:02 PM · Nov 16, 2019 · Twitter for iPhone

2.6K Retweets 5.9K Likes

No marcho.

<https://twitter.com/lcvelez/status/1195794338233622528?s=12&fbclid=IwAR1xhItwoTGordJyFzvfyAe4Crd7Samdd2qDMooNkbsWDAHkt7MByFa75Vk>

38*

← Tweet

 **Álvaro Uribe Vélez** 
@AlvaroUribeVel

No marcho el 21 de noviembre de 2019 porque, columna de Vicky Dávila, por Vicky Dávila

Translate Tweet



No marcho porque...
Me niego a cohabitar con los intereses maquiavélicos de los que áupan la protesta, pero viven como reyes. ¡Hipócritas!
 semana.com


4:49 PM · Nov 16, 2019 · Twitter for iPhone

1.8K Retweets 4.1K Likes

No marcho.

<https://twitter.com/alvarouribevel/status/1195821321764134912?s=12&fbclid=IwAR2eENrAkQJt0I09kRZmz63sHyUxaHHhUIJouK2kVem8PquEDodHCO5yr0g>

39*



Y MENOS MARCHO CON ESTOS. Que dizque El “Trueno de Zeus!” Hijuetantas!!! Pura comedia Colombia! Y de la mala.

LOL LOL LOL REQUETE LOL

40*



Conectado a los anteriores.

"Yo tengo derecho a ser un hijueputa". LOL (perdón los angelitos)

NO MARCHO con semejantes manes. Y ES PROFE!! LOL

COLOMBIA CERO FUTURO.

<https://twitter.com/FabianSanabriaS/status/1196112709961605120?s=20&fbclid=IwAR3dho2CTfr1LWUnhhg60LzSvZFAcupZW11q7rDlhnHH-by5rPymMilUfAg>

40*

Y ya casi comienza el partido del 21. Republicanismo vs progres.

Como los "progres" tratan lo político como partido de fútbol de cancha de barrio, pues hagámosle.

La ventaja la tiene el republicanismo PORQUE JUEGA DE LOCAL. Los progres juegan de visitante.

El republicanismo EMPATANDO GANA. Los progres para ganar deben golear.

Para ganar o empatar, el REPUBLICANISMO debe hacer una cosa bien, "no hacer nada", en el caso de que el juego progre sea sin cochinas. Y gana o empata "utilizando sus mejores defensores" si algunos progres juegan cochino.

El Republicanismo la tiene amplia para ganar o empatar. La forma en que puede perder es la siguiente. Si uno de los defensores le da por dar patada limpia y hasta lesionar gravemente a un progre. Pero como los defensores del republicanismo ENTRENAN DÍA A DÍA PARA ESO, pues está en sus entrenadores (léase, coroneles, capitanes y sargentos) el que sus jugadores jueguen como saben Y SE DEFIENDEN COMO SABEN. Y claro, como no hay replay, cada jugador republicano debe CARGAR CON SU CÁMARA Y TENERLA ACTIVADA CASI CONSTANTEMENTE. Y claro, esas cositas que usan para defenderse, que sea de esas que tiene salvas y de caucho primero.

El árbitro es claro, se llama Constitución, y a diferencia del merequetenge venezolano, COLOMBIA TODAVÍA ES UNA REPÚBLICA. Por eso en cada partido entre países LES DAMOS DURO!!!

Por eso los progres juegan siempre de visitantes, y por ello quieren tumbar al equipo líder, tumbar el estadio y cambiar toda la constitución.

Que el Republicanismo gane o empate mañana. Un 0-0 le sirve, y un 1-0 le sirve más.

Lo difícil es que muy probablemente habrá lesionados, pero el tipo de lesionados es la clave. Como en el fútbol, hay faltas y hay faltas. El republicanismo necesita que sus faltas sea las que se guían por las reglas, así sean faltas fuertes Y GRAVES O GRAVÍSIMAS..

Disculparán la ordinariez, pero es que toca ser medio "progre" para narrar el clásico del 21.

Y CUÍDENSE, CUÍDENSE HARTO porque hooligans va haber en las calles, NO TENGA DUDA!!

Chaitos.

41*

EL alma del republicanismo, la constitución. El alma de la izquierda progre, la constipación.

42*



Ya están diciendo que hoy ganó Colombia. Incluso nuestro admirado Hassan.

Miré: Perdóneme. De verdad verdad, por más del final narrado de nuestro partido en que el republicanismo goleó a los "progres", 3-0, COLOMBIA NO GANÓ.

Ganó Medellín , ESO SÍ. Pero Medellín, venga le enseñe un poco de geografía, NO ES NI DE CERCA COLOMBIA.

Ganó el Republicanismo, SIN DUDA ALGUNA. Pero COLOMBIA no ganó. GANAR ES CUANDO NO HAY NI UN SOLO ACTO DE VIOLENCIA. El caso de Bogotá es el peor. Bueno, no, el peor es el de Cali. SE LA PELEAN. GANAR es cuando tú marchas y yo voy al trabajo SIN PROBLEMAS Y SIN MIEDO.

Y ganaron el ejército, el ESMAD y la policía. ESOS SÍ GANARON, SIN LUGAR A DUDA. Ganaron porque enfrentaron a los perdedores principales progres, los VIOLENTOS atizados por gente como el peligro perdedor y el liberador de narcos Cepeda.

Para ni mencionar las violencias que están planeando el ELN y las disidencias de las farc, INCLUYENDO a los escapados de la justicia como el que ya sabemos. POR ESO COLOMBIA NO GANA, porque esperan el mismo premio que les dieron a las farc.

Mire, de verdad verdad, GANÓ EL REPUBLICANISMO 3-0.

LOL

43*



Ya Hassan está corrigiendo un poco. LOL.

Pobre Colombia. Viviendo de sueños progres sin ver progreso.

44*



Gracias Hassan.

45*



Y sigue el partido Y MIENTRAS TANTO LA PSEUDO-FIFA, tan corrupta como la real, creando nuevas leyes mientras que no pueden ni salvaguardar las que existen. LAS HACEN PARA PROTEGERSE ELLOS MISMOS cuando los partidos salen mal y para que ellos no sean responsables. COMO CON LAS 200000 hectáreas de canchas de fútbol CON DOPING!!!! SE IMAGINA UN REFERÍ ASÍ!!!

"Daño Moral", pelotudos, hoy en Bogotá. Pero ESE CONO QUE NO LES AFECTA tanto PORQUE QUIEREN CAMBIAR LAS REGLAS para que suban lo que ELLOS quieren al poder ejecutivo.

46*



Gracias María Isabel Rueda. De Bedout, el aguatero de los progres. Y es el aguatero suplente.

<https://twitter.com/elrepublicano09/status/1197161790402105345?s=12&fbclid=IwAR0ZJibAkatGvhDnBWOU4mu0gYXxW110s5sHN3fU7G2NmN44b-91kLziUyU>

47*



Hace unos minutos, "El aguatero suplente" con su humor de AGUATERO Y SUPLENTE:

Y DESPUÉS NO ME CREEN!!!!

48*

Hoy al parecer un miembro del ESMAD hirió gravemente a un joven. Los miembros del ESMAD ----así como TODOS los ciudadanos incluyendo los que protestan siguiendo las reglas de juego---- también TIENEN SUS REGLAS. Ese miembro del ESMAD será investigado y sancionado sí rompió las reglas que gobiernan a su institución. Y si lo hizo, lo castigarán.

PERO NI FUE EL "ESMAD", NI EL "ESMAD" ES VIOLENTO, NI EL ESMAD SERÁ COBIJADO POR LA JEP con otras reglas nuevas, etc, etc etc....

Pero los que no juegan con las reglas dicen, ES QUE NO HAY REGLAS PORQUE LAS QUE HAY NO VALEN y deben ser destruidas..

49*



Y siguiendo con lo dicho hoy.

ESMAD AQUÍ, AHORA Y SIEMPRE.

50*



Los progres:

“Ganamos ganamos ganamos El ESMAD nos daño todo.”

Bostezo. Cuando no ganan es que lis hicieron perder.

Bostezo. Peligrosos los manes y manas.

https://twitter.com/cathyjuvinao/status/1197634000384380928?s=12&fbclid=IwAR33nDHwqAEUbZXxLNduOnoIJ_a7wDJTn2faKVH-ncqnwuJEtFdRqgVWQt0

51*



Y el otro jugador que incita a jugar COCHINO y hasta saco de la cárcel al JUGADOR MAS COCHINO DE LA HISTORIA, ARRANCA CONTRA EL REPUBLICANISMO y escudándose en eso de que es él un ENTRENADOR DE DERECHOS HUMANOS. Si claro, los derechos humanos que se le da la gana de defender!!! LOL.

Y mientras la pseudo-FIFA ya mencionada hablando de daño moral.

TRABAJANDO EN CONJUNTO PARA REDEFINIR LO QUE ES MORAL PARA QUE GANEN LOS QUE LES CONVIENEN.

BIEN ESMAD. DURO CON ELLOS. NO PERDÓN, DURÍSIMO.

https://twitter.com/IvanCepedaCast/status/1197505817244786688?fbclid=IwAR0EwKxkuStMjFT8Xbpw3FgnyXGtZPFfcMW_ejODg4rrME6wtfUNgXkOaV8

52*



No sabía esto. No pues, EXCELENTE ESTE MANUAL! EL ESMAD EL MALO DE LA PELÍCULA. Y pensar que uno se graduó con honores de semejante Universidad.

Para ni hablar del contraste entre Universidades colombianas y canadienses a las que he ido, en todas con resultados sobresalientes.

NO HAY COMPARACIÓN.

53*



Universidad de los Andes. No me sorprende. Ahí hay profesores que tuve, que estarían muy de acuerdo. PERO DENLES MÁS PLATA QUE LA PANCARTA VA A SER EL TRIPLE DE GRANDE.

Qué oso de Universidad. Y me imagino ciertos profes, PERO NO DIRÉ SUS NOMBRES. Unos son de los “sabios” de Colombia.


54*



Respuesta a rector de Universidad de Los Andes.

55*

Los Andes. Páguenos para adoctrinarle a sus hijos/as.



Andrés Carmona Villegas
@acarmonav10

Todo el semestre nos sentimos
amedrentados por nuestros
compañeros de universidad.

Hoy nos damos cuenta de que
somos la mayoría silenciosa.

[@Uniandes](#) [@Santiago_Perez9](#)
[@Tfvelasquezv](#) [@lasillavacia](#)



Twittea tu respuesta

ROGERS LTE 4:28 PM 84%

Tweet



Salud Hernández-Mora
@saludhernandezm

Que el ex ministro santista Alejandro
Gaviria, que dejó el sistema de salud
vuelto nada, incapaz ese gobierno
de solucionar en 8 años el desastre,
convoque más paros, muestra que
es un tema político, no social.

[Translate Tweet](#)

6:43 AM · 2019-11-28 · [Twitter for iPhone](#)

3,149 Retweets 5,277 Likes



John Milton Jr @jbagbam74 · 6h
Replvino to @saludhernandezm

Tweet your reply



56*

La superioridad moral de las farc. La mala “paz”, le PEOR droga.



57*

Los progres. A confundir pa: “pescar en río revuelto”.



58*



La razón por la que piden vía el alcalde electo de Medellín --que ni siquiera se ha posesionado--- una Asamblea Constituyente. Para tomarse el poder que no pudieron legítimamente en unas elecciones.

Acá lo pone clarito el dictador Chávez, que siquiera ya no está con nosotros.

Y conectado a lo que dijimos ayer sobre la separación artificial moderna a entre "Estado" y ""Sociedad Civil", se puede añadir.

La izquierda radical y el centro izquierda usan la "sociedad civil", para obtener el poder del "Estado" que mientras ELLOS eran "sociedad civil" era MALO MALO MALO, y que si hacía CUMPLIR LA LEY, era fascista y demás.

PERO, una vez ELLOS son el "ESTADO", la "SOCIEDAD CIVIL" es MALA MALA MALA. Debe ir a prisión SI NO CUMPLE LAS NUEVAS LEYES QUE SE DAN A TRAVÉS DE UNA ASAMBLEA CONSTITUYENTE.

Peligrosos de principio a fin. Y casi los eligen en Colombia. Atenerse a las consecuencias.

<https://twitter.com/cguzman67/status/1198717607475634183?fbclid=IwAR2LEbUM4IU4k4Bv95jBo53txzARoSin80PHn9iO30PGJPMu0RT33pAxLF0>

NOTA: CRUCIAL VER VIDEO DEL DICTADOR CHÁVEZ, “modelo” de los progres.

59*

La razón por la que yo jamás marcharía con los marchantes actuales de Colombia, sobretodo los pacíficos, es SENCILLA.

Nos parece que son muy hipócritas, o para ser más pacífico como ellos (!), muy limitados en su conocimiento,

es decir, su AUTO-conocimiento.

¿Por qué?

Por lo siguiente. Ellos dicen representar la "Sociedad Civil" que se enfrenta a un "Estado" que no los escucha y que promueve medidas que los hiere de alguna manera. Lo que ellos llaman "sus derechos".

Entonces, la presuposición es que hay dos entidades, "Estado" y "Sociedad Civil" que son separadas y DEBEN ser separadas. Ya hemos escrito al respecto anteriormente.

Todo bien, no? NO. No, porque la pregunta fundamental es:

Esa sociedad civil que marcha, y que es SEPARADA del Estado y que DEBE ser separada del Estado, preguntamos, ¿QUÉ BUSCA AL MARCHAR? ¿Acaso no busca que quien lidera el Estado, en últimas, sea REEMPLAZADO por alguien que sea de los SUYOS?

Y si es así, entonces: ¿La sociedad civil es un fin en sí mismo que no busca el poder, O POR EL CONTRARIO es UN MEDIO DISFRAZADO PARA OBTENER EL PODER, y así dejar de marchar? Por eso NO PARAN Y NO PARAN el PARO y sus marchas.

Por ejemplo, SUPONGAMOS QUE TUMBAN a quien lidera el Estado que no cumple con sus requisitos ----- aquí ya surgen infinidad de preguntas acerca de lo que es un VERDADERO líder, pero dejemos eso a un lado--- - y surge alguien que SÍ LOS REPRESENTA, ENTONCES YA LAS MARCHAS DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL SE CONVIERTEN EN ATENTADO CONTRA ELLOS? (O sino mire cómo tratan las protestas de la sociedad Civil en Venezuela, para sólo hablar de Occidente).

Repitiendo. ¿La sociedad civil es un medio, o es un fin en sí mismo? Si es un fin en sí mismo, por qué desea el poder? Y si consigue el poder, entonces ya hay una ecuación de identidad entre "sociedad civil" y "estado" que hace que toda otra PROTESTA Pacífica posterior sea vista como de hecho violenta?

Para ni mencionar, el hecho de que esas marchas ABREN EL CAMINO A LOS VIOLENTOS. Pero dejemos eso TAMBIÉN A UN LADO. Estos pacifistas necesitan que uno deje TANTO a un lado!!! LOL

Por eso no marchamos ni marcharemos nunca con los pacíficos de Colombia. Para ni mencionar que DE ENTRADA la incoherencia radica en CREER que uno puede separar "Estado" y "Sociedad Civil". ESA SEPARACIÓN NO ES UNA VERDAD. Es más, puede ser una FALSEDAD ABSOLUTA, pero conveniente.

Por eso en Occidente existe UNA PODEROSA VISIÓN OPUESTA. Es la del REPUBLICANISMO que ni se puede imaginar semejantes separaciones ARTIFICIALES como las de "Estado" y "Sociedad Civil", ya que para el REPUBLICANISMO, por el contrario, DE ENTRADA, el ser humano ES POR NATURALEZA UN SER POLÍTICO (famosísima frase de Aristóteles). Esas separaciones artificiales son sólo el producto de imaginaciones modernas con OBJETIVOS claros, como lo hemos dicho.

Y para quien quiera ver un ejemplo en Colombia sólo necesita contrastar a Medellín como ciudad con otras.

(Nota: Pero claro, nosotros marchamos, y marcharíamos de muchas maneras, si el objetivo de los pacíficos es posibilitar el establecimiento de una tiranía anti-republicana. Y marcharíamos de TODAS las maneras posibles, hasta eliminar al tirano.)

60*



Si tu dices que eres Dilan y callas sobre los demás. Entonces yo digo que #YOSOYZAHARA

<https://twitter.com/herbinhoyos/status/1199095704796483584?fbclid=IwAR3Gm5sAksfab0-IN0BY2aTss-Pvy9yN4F5kPSdneofkXYizGnateRKWCU>

61*

Gracias ESMAD. Por la defensa de lo público. En Navidad regalemos su muñequitos/as.



62*



Así es. TODO EL APOYO INCONDICIONADO A LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS REPUBLICANAS COLOMBIANAS.

En Venezuela cómo Chávez era soldado, se apropiaron de esas fuerzas, igual que en Cuba, para blindar su tiranía.

No los dejen en Colombia. Bueno, no los deje si usted es republicano. Sino pues ya le dijeron que hacer para atacarlas en teoría y en la práctica.

https://twitter.com/primeropatriaco/status/1198672473170034694?s=12&fbclid=IwAR3OOWyMWb4grWmJaOeCNthoMA1UOd39wEJFAmfqxWjVJp2TMsy0_yItss

63*

POR TERCERA VEZ. Pero es que NO IMPORTA!!! Puede decir por 200 veces!!

GRACIAS Policía. Gracias por su espíritu republicano.



<https://twitter.com/JORENGE2002/status/1198372695110492160?s=20&fbclid=IwAR0gKNWzlmN70oR88B7HD3-ca8gmAaE1CkODH7VoBqAMinClxuOoVyNHmfs>

64*

Petro Peligro Perdedor aludiendo a Allende esta noche.

Colombia en pleno siglo XXI, PERO EN VERDAD, en 1973. Es decir en reversa, CORTESÍA irónicamente de un Supuesto "progre" que incita a la violencia legal y, por ende, real!

65*




Otro ejemplo de lo que hemos dicho hoy y antes y mañana.

El Republicanismo pidiendo explicaciones DONDE JAMÁS SE LAS VAN A DAR porque El Tiempo cree en la separación fundamental de “Estado” vs “Sociedad Civil.”

Hay dos modelos. Hay que ESCOGER.

66*



Por eso lo quieren sacar del CMH. Porque NECESITAN QUE SOLO EXISTA LA HISTORIA Y LA VERDAD PROGRE. El Republicanismo es la piedra en su camino que desean destruir.

67*



Respuesta a acusación de Petro al alcalde Peñalosa.

68*



Las fuerzas armadas explicando la "teoría del pánico" contra Petro Peligro Perdedor que la usa para ganar incautos.

https://twitter.com/SophyCh_E/status/119826594595129090?s=20&fbclid=IwAR0BMH3h1viRvIReUUovINjXBj1qGHIFudPOOnMqy51xHqZX7OPL62Bgz1E

12 mandamientos: el mensaje de la alianza Mockus, Petro y Claudia López

12 mandamientos: el mensaje de la alianza Mockus, Petro y Claudia López

Los compromisos que el candidato firmó en mármol buscan disipar los miedos que despierta. La Asamblea Constituyente, la expropiación y el debilitamiento del Estado social de derecho. ¿Puede darle el impulso para ganar?



SEAMOS MÁS HONESTOS. Oxigenan a los pirómanos, pero luego son los mismos que se creen los mejores bomberos. Y Bogotá eligió ese modelo. Por esto es que está Colombia como está hoy.

<https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/12-mandamientos-de-la-alianza-de-mockus-petro-y-claudia-lopez/570590>

Es fácil, en Canadá la violencia física es uno de los peores crímenes posibles. Ni un solo tipo de violencia física es aceptada. Ni contra una persona ni contra un edificio. No importa si usted cree esto o lo otro. Punto. Y es así porque se entiende que, le guste o no, las fuerzas armadas del estado tienen el monopolio de la fuerza. Punto.

Pero en Colombia cada uno se inventa otra teoría para aceptar y generar violencia contra esas presuposiciones básicas. Pero como casi eligen a Petro y crearon cosas como la JEP, pues las presuposiciones básicas ya no son válidas.

Hay 300 mujeres aborígenes desaparecidas en Canadá. Ninguna organización va a incendiar, violentar o cualquier otra cosa a nadie o a ningún lugar PORQUE DE HACERLO IRÁ A LA CÁRCEL.

Pero en Colombia dirán, “es que no somos Canadá”, sin saber siquiera qué es Canadá, ni saber de esas 300 mujeres desaparecidas y muertas Y SALDRÁN A QUEMAR, VIOLENTAR DESPUÉS DE INCITAR A TRAVÉS DE UN MARCO TEÓRICO —que acá se en Canadá se puede estudiar— PERO QUE SI USTED BUSCA APLICARLO EN PÚBLICO SE VA PARA LA CÁRCEL, Y SU HOJA DE VIDA QUEDARÁ PARA SIEMPRE MANCHADA.

Pero en Colombia, por las decisiones que se han dejado imponer, pues LO OBVIO ES TODO MENOS OBVIO.

La izquierda violenta en Colombia SE CREE CON DERECHO A LA VIOLENCIA. En Canadá ni la izquierda se cree con ese derecho.

Y responden...

Pero....

Pero....

Pero.....

Y es que

Pero...

Y así sin fin.

Es decir quieren ser como Canadá, pero para llegar a ser como Canadá primero quieren destruir cualquier proto-Canadá.

Y siguen...

Pero....

Pero....

Pero.....

Y es que

Pero...

Y así sin fin.

(NOTA: Y alguien compartió este punto con su grupo de amigos y lo primero que ¡dijeron fue PERO... LOL)

71*



Y conectado al anterior! HIJUE. Hay momentos en la vida en que uno NO QUISIERA TENER RAZÓN!!!!

https://www.pulzo.com/amp/nacion/salud-herandez-dice-que-petro-quiere-ganar-calle-no-pudo-urnas-PP804605?__twitter_impression=true&fbclid=IwAR058SV-68eGzZZMrylr0CpCysHkq_HKZctIU0q_nRGZza7KYKQtRW20dk

71*

Farc malagradecidas. REPAREN, ricachones gordiflones y cobardes.



CON TODO CONTRA LA IZQUIERDA Y CENTRO IZQUIERDA DISFRAZADO.

CON TODO AHORA Y SIEMPRE.

https://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/columnistas/mauricio-vargas/el-conejo-de-las-farc-tiro-directo-columna-de-mauricio-vargas-393960?fbclid=IwAR1IKKugdTAkqLLCnXREnXQc80aTZeJrJf8vthw76sPNm_AyDkur1LvJry4

72*



Bien PRESIDENTE Duque.

EL PAÍS PRIMERO. Republicanismo. Corto y al punto. El republicanismo a ganar.

https://twitter.com/alvarouribevel/status/1197306925685317632?s=12&fbclid=IwAR2ygd2zSijY79zHgQ3meKTJ9F8XV6wx_vPmDW_UIH0PCAJjrMjE0xa6K0

73*



OTRO GOOOOOLLLLL DEL TINO!!!

Tino 7 — Petro peligro perdedor 0

74*




Gracias Tino. SON DE UN DESCARO LOS progres. Le apuesto que no pueden hacer 21!

<https://twitter.com/tinoasprillah/status/1197241396056481793?s=12&fbclid=IwAR3UwVO-Zi2d6P3SOkuDpvcPk6JgQ7m9cWv29zvlvnlEcJtEdXu0lSEfK>

75*

Colombia, sociedad de abusadores Ltda.



76*



Wasserman MUY PERO MUY CONFUNDIDO.

El republicanismo requiere de una cierta visión de unidad. La diferencia territorial indígena es casi incompatible, requiere de respetar que YO NO PERTENEZCO a esa unidad. Por eso SACAN a patadas al ejército, Y EL EJÉRCITO no se siente dispuesto a dar su vida por alguien que no entiende esa unidad.

De manera sencilla:

Primero está ser COLOMBIANO? O primero está ser indígena. WASSERMAN NO SE ATREVE A RESPONDER. Quiere ambas y se siente feliz de proponerlo.

Wasserman MUY PERO MUY CONFUNDIDO.

Un poco rápido. Pero ni modo.

77*



Bien Duque.

Pero a aplicar la ley el 21. El 21 es su prueba.

78*



Que el Magdalena no termine siendo otro Cauca.

https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/duque-inaugura-primera-sede-de-la-registraduria-en-la-sierra-nevada-AL11928109?fbclid=IwAR0QUAOKn8G16l4sgoP4F2V7rfMUcPxGL6twp_ZYHbDl8Ep_iFak9zdzO2M

79*

Cuando decimos que estamos con el Presidente Duque hasta agosto 6 de 2022, quiere decir que le somos leales como Presidente, pero TAMBIÉN que es muy probable que agosto 7 de 2022 seamos sus más severos críticos por años.

80*

Los que deseamos ver en Duque un timonazo, creo, nos vamos a quedar esperando. Ya lo hubiera hecho.

Pero los que desean destruir a Duque para que Colombia gane, ESOS SE VAN A MORIR DE VIEJOS en una Colombia Fracasada con una sonrisa delirante.

Felicitaciones.

81*



El caso Duque revela que el deseo de conciliación genera el deseo de destruir a los que concilian. No hemos avanzado un paso desde el plebiscito, excepto más radicales los supuestos pacifistas. Seguimos y seguiremos CON LOS DEL NO. Que no y no.

82*

Impresiona el irrespeto con Duque. Con Duque hasta el 6 de agosto de 2022. Y que su espíritu conciliador se CONCILIE CONSIGO MISMO y de un timonazo hacia sus posturas como candidato. Vamos Duque. Perdón, vamos PRESIDENTE Duque.

83*

Marchan hacia y desde la baja.



84*

Necesitamos ahora al Duque que se hizo elegir. ¿Será que estará por ahí?

O para ponerlo de otra manera:

¿Será que Duque cree en el fondo de su corazón que lo dejarán gobernar POR SER "UN BUEN MUCHACHO" ("kaloskagathos")?

Si fuese así, habría en él una confusión CASI QUE INSUPERABLE.

85*

Muy brevemente. Lo positivo de las elecciones regionales de Colombia ayer:

1. Una ciudadanía que PARECE muy dinámica y PARECE dispuesta a defender sus diversos puntos de vista en democracia.
 2. Unos líderes que representan sectores de la población que por primera vez tiene acceso al poder político. ESA NOVEDAD debiera hacerlos HUMILDES en vez de dictatoriales en poner en práctica sus diferencias. Aunque son LOS GANADORES.
 3. Las elecciones son de carácter LOCAL, ES DECIR, SI NO FUNCIONAN SUS ELEGIDOS ES LA CIUDADANÍA LA RESPONSABLE DE NO SABER ESCOGER. NO le echen la culpa a naidien más sino a su espejito.
 4. Líderes reconocidos rápidamente reconocieron su derrota general. EXCEPTO EL SIEMPRE PELIGROS Y FASTIDIOS Y ANTI-DEMOCRÁTICO Petro Peligro Perdedor. (Leas sus tuits de hoy!!!)
 5. Con el perdón del Presidente Duque, IMPACTAN los resultados bajo su mandato. Eso de ser naranja PARECE no ser muy republicano. Es decir existe ahí una confusión sobre la que hemos escrito anteriormente. Y esa confusión destruye el republicanismo. Presidente Duque, para eso lo elegimos? Se imagina el 2022 ahora?
 6. Un gobernador local que gobierne sin saber de las condiciones de América del Sur, hará que pronto haya estallidos de violencia en Colombia. Y COLOMBIA DEMOSTRÓ DE NUEVO AYER que no es ni Venezuela, ni Chile, ni Nicaragua, ni Argentina.
- y finalmente Y DE SUPREMA IMPORTANCIA,
7. Los líderes que defienden posturas de centro derecha y de derecha y de republicanismo DEBEN ENTENDER QUE LA MAREA MODERNA es liberal y progresiva Y QUE POR ENDE DEBEN INGENIARSE RÁPIDO Y USAR a quienes pueden defender la suprema importancia de valores republicanos de una manera que los ciudadanos ENTIENDAN QUE AUNQUE CREEN QUE HAN GANADO MUCHOS BIENES, TAL VEZ HAYAN PERDIDO LOS MÁS IMPORTANTES A NIVEL POLÍTICO Y HUMANO.
 8. Al respecto es CRUCIAL saber diferenciar entre republicanismo moderno y el antiguo y DEFENDER el

republicanismo MODERNO PRIMERO si es necesario al mismo tiempo que se le hacen los CORRECTIVOS NECESARIOS con el republicanismo clásico. Por ejemplo, ante el ataque a la noción de propiedad privada puede uno DEFENDER A LOCKE y al mismo tiempo buscar críticas NO SOCIALISTAS Y ANÁRQUICAS en el republicanismo clásico de Aristóteles y Jenofonte.

y ahora sí finalmente:

9. La Registraduría PARECE mostró su gran capacidad para ser neutral y no caer en los burdas trampas de países como Venezuela. PERO ESO PUEDE CAMBIAR Y CAMBIAR BIEN RAPIDITO.

PROGNOSIS: Bastante Pesimista, aunque PARECE todo lo contrario. Ojalá ESTEMOS MUY EQUIVOCADOS: PERO MUY MUY EQUIVOCADOS.

Breve, pero ni modo.

Chaitos.

86*



No tomo una clase con Mockus NI POR QUE ME LA PAGUEN.

Sólo en Colombia los académicos DESEAN EL PODER COMO NADIE. Muy diferente países como Canadá. Y LLEVAN AÑOS TRAS EL.

Dicen dudar. LO DUDAMOS CON TODA EL ALMA. Y lo hacemos porque hemos leído ACADÉMICOS QUE NO LES COMEN CUENTO A ESTOS ACADÉMICOS.

87*



Comenzó la “academia que va corregir el universo de una vez por todas”.

BORRAR TODO EL PIZARRÓN.

NO TOMO UNA CLASE CON MOCKUS ET AL. (FAJARDO Y LÓPEZ) NI PORQUE ME LA REGALEN!!!

88*

Se dirige el sabio matemático Mockus desde su recuperada curul en el Congreso, con los pantalones abajo y envalentonado ya mirando de frente y no de trasero, abrazado triunfante con de la Calle y su sabia sonrisa:

“Estimados compatriotas. Así como dejé el camino perfecto para la Bogotá actual; ahora voy por el país entero. Yo encarno la transparencia como lo revela esta mismísima curul. Y Habermas me ha autorizado.”

Aristófanés estaría encantado.

89*

Que capturaron a un PROFESOR DE MATEMÁTICAS por incendiar el metro en Chile.

PA LOS QUE NO NOS CREEN.

Oiga? Y sería alumno del matemático estrella Mockus? LOL

90*

3. La ciencia política no es una ciencia exacta

Nuestra exposición será suficientemente satisfactoria, si es presentada tan claramente como lo permite la materia; porque no se ha de buscar el mismo rigor en todos los razonamientos, como tampoco en todos los trabajos manuales. Las cosas nobles y justas que son objeto de la política presentan tantas diferencias y desviaciones, que parecen existir sólo por convención y no por naturaleza. Una inestabilidad así la tienen también los bienes a causa de los perjuicios que causan a muchos; pues algunos han perecido a causa de su riqueza, y otros por su coraje. Hablando, pues, de tales cosas y partiendo de tales premisas, hemos de contentarnos con mostrar la verdad de un modo tosco y esquemático. Y cuando tratamos de cosas que ocurren generalmente y se parte de tales premisas, es bastante con llegar a conclusiones semejantes. Del mismo modo se ha de aceptar cada uno

134

ÉTICA NICOMÁQUEA

de nuestros razonamientos; porque es propio del hombre instruido buscar la exactitud en cada materia en la medida en que la admite la naturaleza del asunto; evidentemente, tan absurdo sería aceptar que un matemático empleara la persuasión como exigir de un retórico demostraciones.

1095a Por otra parte, cada uno juzga bien aquello que conoce, y de estas cosas es un buen juez; pues, en cada materia, juzga bien el instruido en ella, y de una manera absoluta, el instruido en todo. Así, cuando se trata de la política, el joven no es un discípulo apropiado, ya que no tiene experiencia de las acciones de la vida, y los razonamientos parten de ellas y versan sobre ellas; además, siendo dócil a sus pasiones, aprenderá en vano y sin provecho, puesto que el fin de la política no es el conocimiento, sino la acción. Y poco importa si es joven en edad o de carácter juvenil; pues el defecto no radica en el tiempo, sino en vivir y procurar todas las cosas de acuerdo con la pasión. Para tales personas, el conocimiento resulta inútil, como para los incontinentes; en cambio, para los que orientan sus afanes y acciones según la razón, el saber acerca de estas cosas será muy provechoso.

Y baste esto como introducción sobre el discípulo, el modo de recibir las enseñanzas y el objeto de nuestra investigación.

4. Divergencias acerca de la naturaleza de la felicidad

Pa los que se aterran en su alma angelical acerca de nuestra burla a los matemáticos frente a lo político.

Es que cuando uno no lee y no sabe, COME CUENTOS TODOS LOS DÍAS A TODAS HORAS de los supuestos "sabios". Déjelos quemar su ciudad. Hágale pues.

Así indica Aristóteles en su IMPRESIONANTE Ética a Nicómaco:

91*



El principín hace unas semanas escribió esto.

SE EQUIVOCÓ, Pero lleva en los genes HACER DE CUENTA QUE NO.

No debió escribir BOOM. DEBIÓ ESCRIBIR "KABOOM".

Pero perdón, sí tenía razón. Se callaron muchas bocas, DE MANERA PERMANENTE.

92*



Según esta alma de Dios, uno es uno de los "destiladores de odio". LOL. Esta gente se cree la luz del universo. Ojalá uno fuera tan lleno de luz como ellos! LOL. A odiar pues! LOL.

93*



Petro dictando cátedra religiosa. LOL.

Cortesía de la Iglesia Católica Colombiana y sus posturas. Más confundidos que Confucio.

CON RAZÓN DIOS ESTÁ TAAAAAANNNNNNNNNN LEJOS DE AMÉRICA LATINA.

Pero, taaaaaanntnnn lejos.

94*

Ya leyeron el comunicado de la Iglesia Católica colombiana sobre el paro mesiánico del 21?


La Iglesia Católica colombiana, la ética hecha GELATINA que se desliza de aquí para allá como mejor conviene a sus majestades. La fe gelatinosa. Y SIN SABOR! LOL

Dios es gelatina? Lo dudamos!

NOTA. Luego del paro fracasado, la Iglesia hizo su comunicado. QUE EL GOBIERNO DEBE NEGOCIAR CON EL ELN. Como hemos dicho, la mala paz colombiana, el orgasmo espiritual de la Iglesia. “Pecadores, amad a tus torturadores. Amén”.

95*

La Iglesia contra el republicanismo. El republicanismo por la religión civil.



DIALOGO SOCIAL

Iglesia Católica pide reactivación de diálogo con el ELN

La petición se hizo en la Casa de Nariño en medio de la discusión sobre la paz con legalidad.



Monsieur Héctor Fabio Henao, Director del Secretariado Nacional de Pastoral Social. / Archivo (Colprensa)

96*

El Paro antirrepublicano. Más nada.

Tweet

gmarcos and MARIA C.U.C.PAISITA liked



Hernán Cadavid M. @hernancadavidma

Quedó develado el verdadero objetivo: Presionar acuerdo de Farc y sentar al Gobierno con los criminales del ELN.

Translate Tweet

7:35 PM · 2019-11-29 · Twitter for Android

97*

Tweet



Hassan Nassar @HassNassar

Análisis | El fin del neoliberalismo y el renacimiento de la historia; por Joseph E. Stiglitz elpais.com/economia/2019/... vía @elpais_economia sin duda una de las mejores lecturas del fin de semana.

Translate Tweet



EL PAÍS

Análisis | El fin del neoliberalismo y el renacimiento de la historia; por Joseph... ¿A quién se le ocurrió que la contención salarial y el menor gasto público podían contribuir a mejorar los niveles de vida? elpais.com

8:54 PM · Nov 17, 2019 · Twitter for Android

68 Retweets 139 Likes


Increíble ver a alguien como Hassan tan confundido. En Colombia no tienen las lecturas, los profes, y el deseo de romper con sus paradigmas, INCLUSO DESDE LA DERECHA MISMA!

Otros casos, el Profesor Wasserman que escribe columnas importantes, y SOBRETUDO el Profesor Acevedo Director del CMH, quien es un historiador. Para ni mencionar el AFÁN de Duque de que se "enseñe" historia en el curriculum.

Ya sobre historicismo escribí bastante con anterioridad.

https://twitter.com/hassnassar/status/1196245214085754880?s=12&fbclid=IwAR36p98LAldrPc_Mn-dzLKncZxwNi9gNDKpQRnu58xFWzSHhMQscfZivHQw

98*



Yo del Presidente Duque, de verdad verdad, estaría mirando con mucho cuidado lo que dice Aristóteles en su "Política", en los libros IV a VI acerca de cómo se preservan y cómo se destruyen los diversos regímenes, incluyendo pero no limitándose, a la democracia.

Y para entender las dinámicas ahí planteadas podrían usar el libro de Pangle, como guía, ya que ahí hay claves fundamentales:


https://www.amazon.com/Aristotles-Teaching-Politics-Thomas-Pangle/dp/022621365X/ref=sr_1_8?keywords=thomas+pangle&qid=1574523098&sr=8-8

Un poco tarde si no han hecho esas lecturas sus asesores, pero como dicen mejor eso a que haya más desastres que los burdos aplauden.

https://www.amazon.com/Aristotles-Teaching-Politics-Thomas-Pangle/dp/022621365X/ref=sr_1_8?keywords=thomas+pangle&qid=1574523098&sr=8-8&fbclid=IwAR24C6_ntvBXArTCpdxfgXJ_OvwP2bGPxUy0zZFCGADOU6fMn5DrE-wdvNE

99*






Participación directa desde Toronto ayer en preguntas a Centro Democrático y Uribe.

Y eso que no puse las fuertes contra los petristas salvajes! LOL (Ejemplo ante sus salvajismos. "Respete. Sálgase desgraciado! y otras más cómicas" LOL)

100*



Algunos de nuestros comentarios en vivo para Entrevista de Uribe. No salen los que le hicimos a los groseros y salvajes que escriben toda clase de barbaridades y les contestamos!!! LOL. Luego les doy ejemplos! LOL

101*

Bueno ya llevamos como 100 comentarios activos en las últimas intervenciones en vivo de Uribe desde diferentes pueblitos de Colombia. Como dos meses!! Uyyy toca recogerlos para poner acá!!! LOL

102*

Que dizque, “Petro = Uribe.”

Mi amor. Devuélvase a la primaria para aprender matemáticas QUE LE CUESTA MUCHO. Sí, mi vida. Ay, gracias mi corazón.

La Dávila. De los mismos matemáticos Mockusianos!

103*

La extrema derecha de Uribe. Bien Uribe.

<https://twitter.com/alvarouribevel/status/1191053347186282498?s=12&fbclid=IwAR0ofbADPVj47nbSsCLU2SDEjMUPdqFTFU7311ouTM7r5h-a34VJt7e7sas>

Nota, por ahora inaccesible por castigo a Uribe de parte de Twitter.

104*

Y ni hablar del Twitter de Uribe hoy.

SON DE UNA TRAMPA LOS PROGRES DEL UNIVERSO.

105*

Cuando cuadro la Constitución como me da la gana. Sofismo antirrepublicano.

Gustavo Petro @petrogustavo · Nov 26



Ciudadana, la Constitución establece el derecho fundamental a la reunión, a la a la libre expresión y a la huelga.

No se que Constitución leíste, pero la que leíste no pertenece a un país democrático

Y de paso Alejandra esos jóvenes que luchan, luchan por ti.

Alejandra Cifuentes @AlejaCif14 · Nov 25

Acción de tutela interpuesta al senador @petrogustavo por coartar el derecho al trabajo, el derecho a circular libremente por el territorio y utilizar menores como instrumento de protesta incentivandolos a la violencia y la agresión. Entre otros..

105*

Para el sofista antirrepublicano para quien la LEY es la piedra en su camino por el poder.



106*



Y entonces El Colombiano escribe sobre el proceso de paz en Sudáfrica. Y lo titulan como lo hace. Pero uno que es curioso se pone a leer. Bueno y aparte de que Mandela fue Mandela y NAIDIEN Le llega ni al tobillo en Colombia, la verdad es que el analista dice lo siguiente acerca del fracaso mayor en el caso de Sudáfrica. Y dice, y esto deben leerse el que se creen Lincoln y su parserito visionario que no ha ganado nada y quiere marchar el 21. LEA Y PERTÚRBESE.

"¿Hubo errores en el proceso de Sudáfrica?

“Sí. Teníamos el objetivo de buscar la amnistía y tomar represalias cuando fuese necesario, pero nunca las tomamos. El proceso de amnistía fue exitoso porque se presentaron varios perpetradores, gran parte lo culminó y a otros se les negó la amnistía. Pero fracasamos con los castigos. Ese fue el mayor fracaso”.

Pa que se lo pasen a los sobrados de las FARC y sus disidencias y al ELN y a Mockus y Claudita, y además a

<https://www.elcolombiano.com/internacional/huellas-del-apartheid-en-sudafrica-y-legado-en-la-construccion-de-paz-API1960918>


Pensamiento privado: "Se les está acabando la gasolina. Así es. Hacer TODO para acelerarles el CANSANCIO."

107*

El que se cree Lincoln SI QUE ES COBARDE. Todo será, MENOS UN LINCOLN.

“Odebrecht? What is that, mi chatico?”

108*




El sabio y calmado y feliz MASANOBU FUKUOKA vs la niña arrebatada "How dare you" y supremamente INFELIZ Greta.

Y eso que Fukuoka vivió la época de Bombas nucleares en Japón!

Por si no sabe quién es Fukuoka, lo más probable, puede leer acá.

Su libro sobre cultivo de arroz en Japón, crucial para definir lo que es permacultura.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masanobu_Fukuoka



109*



Greta en Colombia = Petra. TODOS MÁS CONFUNDIDOS QUE CONFUCIO, como dice uno en Colombia.

110*

La mala “paz”, la PEOR Droga. EL maquiavelismo del que se cree Lincoln.



111*

El cobarde ya dejó su cartica, que NI SIQUIERA escribió él. Desconoce lo que es “poner la cara”, pero usa el que “otros pongan la cara” para poder esconderse aún más.

Guácatelas de man.

Y ahora, recibiendo premios en México con el corrupto y tramposo Evo Sin Morales a su lado.


Ahora sí podríamos decir, aunque durante 3 años no estábamos dispuestos a afirmarlo. Su intención. No es Aristóteles, no es Aquino, no es Locke. Mucho menos Lincoln.

Su inspiración es, hasta el fondo de su ser, Maquiavelo. Strauss le ayudaría a entender.

113*

Ya metió la mano el que se cree Lincoln. Como siempre se auto-felicita. Guácatelas de man. Primero lávese las manos, QUE LAS TIENE COCHINAS. Gracias.

114*



Politics

Obama urges Democrats to avoid embracing policies that are 'too far left' in 2020

At a private donor meeting on Friday, the former US President warned candidates to "pay some attention to where voters actually are," spawning a discussion that included Democratic activists and conservatives. However, Obama's remarks were more nuanced than their initial framing suggested, as some reporters pointed out.

Un Nobel hablándole al que se ufana de su Nobel inmerecido. Pa los adoradores de Obama. Escuchen los del 21. Hasta sus líderes espirituales —no es nuestro líder, nuestro más bien Lincoln o Churchill— les dicen.

115*



Barreras, el hipócrita mayor. El peón servil del que se cree Lincoln. El más adicto, el más drogado por poder.

116*



Gracias al que se cree Lincoln, al visionario Eterno de la Calle y los ángeles luminosos del “sí”.

La mala “paz”, LA PEOR DROGA.

Vía Hassan.

https://www.semana.com/opinion/articulo/los-reyes-del-cinismo-columna-de-opinion-de-salud-hernandez/639639?fbclid=iwar1731ulxief7jia9uwach-sdzirh8r0a5ybf9oivexqi0d_ie0i7me2y

117*

Vuelve a su propio país luego de crear esas condiciones. Así si sabroso: me eligen presidente y luego sigo de supervisor! Lol. Como el que se cree Lincoln en Colombia y su parse el vidente. Cortesía de la ONU.

Es que son de un amañado y se creen LA LUZ DEL MUNDO!



118*

Ya vieron a Rafael Correa en Twitter decir que él salvaría a Ecuador sólo si no lo meten a la cárcel! Hijue!!!!

Es que no tiene vergüenza, ni en Ecuador, ni en Venezuela ni en Colombia. Sobretudo el que se cree Lincoln y que le da miedo ir a las PROPIAS CORTES QUE EL CUADRÓ!!!!

119*

Ecuador. La destrucción del republicanismo. Muchos aplauden. Sobretudo el que se cree Lincoln.

120*

ROGERS 8:03 PM 97%

Tweet

 **Humberto de la Calle** 
@DeLaCalleHum

Piensen por un momento en esto:
qué tal esta situación con las FARC
activas? Gracias señor Acuerdo!

[Translate Tweet](#)

6:07 PM · 2019-11-22 · [Twitter for iPhone](#)

1,524 Retweets 6,529 Likes

 **SUSANAARENAS** @croactibo · 24m
Replying to @DeLaCalleHum
Viejo Hpta ud se le arrodillo a las
FARC ...

El visionario. Agradézcanle bogotanos. Los salvó. LOL.

Arrogante como Edipo, pero se cree Tiresias. Terminará como ellos dos, pero sin la visión que siempre tuvo Tiresias.

121*

ROGERS 5:28 PM 89%

Tweet

 **Humberto de la Calle** 
@DeLaCalleHum

La ciudadanía tiene derecho a la
protesta pacífica. El gobierno a tomar
precauciones posible vandalismo.
Pero esto de crear la falsa idea de q
viene una hecatombe para frustrar la
protesta, es un juego peligroso.
Cuidado con la profecía
autocumplida q solo sirve a los
fanáticos.

El Eterno visionario de Colombia QUE NUNCA GANÓ NADA. La profecía autocumplida del “mejor acuerda posible QUE NUNCA FUE.”

La mala “paz”, la peor droga.

122*



SON DE UN MEZQUINO. NO MARCHO.

123*



Y siguiendo con lo VIVOS que son, pero no inteligentes. NO MARCHO.

124*

Bien Uribe. Gracias Uribe.



125*

¿EPA Colombia ya salió de su caleta preferida?



126*

Bueno hasta aquí llegó por ahora la narración que si no NO HAGO NADA!!! LOL

Yo sí, aprendiendo de Pelé a METER MÁS GOLES Y NI PUEL //(&//(&(DEJARSE METER GOLES por

contrincantes inferiores en todo el sentido de la palabra, ENTRENADOS COMO ANIMALES.

Suerte en el paro a COLOMBIA. COLOMBIA DEPENDE DE LA SUERTE. Con eso le digo todo.


127*



Si usted está de acuerdo con este Tiresias, DE VERDAD, le pido el favor, espiche el botoncito de "unfriend" que tiene Facebook. Gracias. Pero de verdad.

No lo sabe este, pero ya, como Edipo, perdió un ojo. Le falta el otro. Y ese que sea pronto. Pero para entender eso, hay que haber leído a Sófocles.

128*



Ven a Chile quemándose. Ven a Venezuela reprimida. Ven a Ecuador hace poquito. Y ven a Bolivia hace horas. Ven las marchas pasadas en Bogotá con suprema violencia. Ven el Cauca.

Y esta angelita de pura luz universal "que de seguro no tiene interés alguno'--- se pregunta lo siguiente,

PERO LO MEJOR ES QUE ACABA SU PREGUNTA CON "per se". JUA JUA JUA. Es que son tan hipermegaplay que caen facilito cuando abren la boca o teclean.

"Per se", lo voy a comenzar a usar en mis escritos, o sea, "per si acaso". LOL LOL LOL.

Y 10000 atembados ya le dieron like.

<https://twitter.com/ZuluagaCamila/status/1194694010411134981?s=20&fbclid=IwAR2pzJY8Xn0Ggzv480eSjvzlrTZyMAk0AzT8Vz9bDzILNGejkDOI57tKo>

129*



La angelita de luz de la que hablamos hace unos días.

La angelita "per se". LOL

POBRE COLOMBIA. Pero si ustedes no hacen nada, pues no hay nada que hacer.

130*



La izquierda colombiana que DESEA EL PODER CON TODA SU ALMA los llama paramilitares. Acá en Canadá, que no es un país violento, se llaman NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH. El barrio donde vivía y el que vivo los tienen.

Y dicen los paracos canadienses, LOL:

"Start a Neighbourhood Watch program

Neighbourhood Watch is a program to help neighbours watch out for neighbours. The program thrives on cooperation. By simply getting to know the neighbours around you, you'll be well positioned to recognize someone or something that's suspicious. It aims to get citizens involved in discouraging and preventing crime at the local level. The ultimate success of Neighbourhood Watch depends largely on a commitment to cooperate between area residents and the police – and more importantly, between residents themselves.

Your neighbours know who you are, what type of car you drive, and may be the first to notice a suspicious person at your door or window. A police officer patrolling your community may not recognize a stranger in your yard – but your neighbour will.

To find out if a Neighbourhood Watch exists in your neighbourhood or to start a new one, contact your local Community Police Centre. They can provide you with more detailed information, basic start-up assistance and resources."

COLOMBIA A AÑOS LUZ DE CANADÁ. Y no será la izquierda ni el centro izquierda que los llevará más cerca.

131*

Uno podría decir que lo de Suramérica es un poco como lo de Mao Zedong y Chain Kai-shek.

Y la solución NO FUE la ONU.

Y hoy hay China y hay Taiwan.

Ojalá estemos equivocados.

O bueno, es que a veces a ciertos pueblos LA GRANDEZA a nivel mundial les es indiferente.

132*



Lea esto y entenderá porque los niños y niñas de Colombia tienen poco futuro.

EL PROBLEMA FUNDAMENTAL ES CÓMO HABLAN DE LAS SITUACIONES. SON TODOS TECNÓCRATAS Y FORMALISTAS EN SU ESENCIA. Y deben hacerlo porque tienen miedo de ir más allá. Incluyendo SOBRETUDO a los periodistas con su soberbia que hace todo PEOR. Para no decir cosas aún más graves, como que los *kaloskagathos* prefieren la INFELICIDAD de sus hijos a CAMBIAR su ser y su corazón. Para ni hablar de lo OBVIO, la guerrilla y su USO de menores para la guerra.

O sino escuche esta respuesta hablando de niños y niñas:

“La Alta Consejería para los Derechos Humanos formuló una nueva línea de política para la Prevención, uso, utilización, reclutamiento y violencia sexual contra NNA. Su implementación será coordinada desde la Comisión Intersectorial para la Prevención del Reclutamiento, que reúne a 23 entidades del Estado. La línea deberá responder a las nuevas dinámicas de orden público del país, en particular de surgimiento de los Grupos Armados Organizados (GAO). Se priorizarán las zonas donde se concentran estos grupos, todos aquellos municipios de los denominados corredores estratégicos para las rutas del narcotráfico”.

HIJUE Y YO QUE DE INGENUO PENSABA QUE EL PROBLEMA DE LOS NIÑOS Y NIÑAS ERA UN PROBLEMA DE AMOR, de recomponer la sociedad en sus familias para generar las condiciones de amor..

PERO, uno si que es muy "gue...", perdón, pendejo.

Y para que me crean, la investigación crucial es ver cómo se VE EL AMOR desde la perspectiva de la izquierda radical y de la perspectiva republicana. SON DOS muy diferentes de ver lo que es el amor y lo erótico. Para la izquierda el AMOR se da por una causa política que INCLUSO PUEDE ser violenta, y sin presencia de dios. POR ESO SE LOS PUEDEN QUITAR A SUS FAMILIAS SIN PROBLEMA, SIN ARREPENTIMIENTO CREYENDO QUE LE ESTÁN DANDO LA POSIBILIDAD DE AMAR UNA IDEA ETÉREA.

En otras palabras, la izquierda ama lo político POR SOBRE TODO, por eso su ansia de poder. Por el amor al poder TODO. Por eso sus EXCESOS una vez llegan al poder. Es un amor inmoderado, e inmoderable. Por eso dicen con toda seriedad "Tomé las armas contra Colombia POR AMOR". Pero una vez en el poder, el amor por los que puedan usar las armas contra ellos mismos SE LES ACABA.

En cambio, para el republicanismo el amor más allá de lo político MODERA lo político. Más allá, como en el saber en el caso de Aristóteles, más allá con Dios en la religión. Lo político está sujeto a algo transcendental o superior. Por eso, si bien puede ser inmoderado, TIENE EN SU NATURALEZA Las bases para la moderación. Por eso uno escucha lo de "defender la patria con y por amor." La patria es, en cierta medida, la que POSIBILITA el amor.

Para el republicanismo el amor se da como base de la familia y como escalera hacia un cierto tipo de transcendencia, incluso hacia lo divino. Para el republicanismo los lazos de amor filial y de amor hacia el bien SON LA BASE DE UNA SOCIEDAD SANA Y FUERTE. Mucho más se podría decir, ojalá algún día.

Para ni mencionar la conexión con el modelo de amor cristiano que se mueve entre uno y otro en Colombia como si fuera una gelatina de amor cambiante como las mareas. (!)

Finalmente, es Platón en su "Simposio" y en su "Fedro" QUIEN NOS DA LAS CLAVES. Pero va uno a las Universidades carentes de todo erotismo y jamás ve el tema de lo erótico y del amor como temas CENTRALES del saber. Nosotros escribimos estos para contrarrestar semejante ignorancia teórica y práctica:

<https://andresmelocousineau.com/1996/03/11/reflections-aristophanes-speech-in-platos-symposium/>

<https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/no-podemos-responsabilizar-a-los-ninos-directora-del-icbf-sobre-bombardeo-en-caqueta-EN11943632>

133*



Otro ejemplo de la separación de la que hablamos anteriormente. Contraste lo que representa el himno y la bandera para Estados Unidos, y si usted es "progre" y no le gusta el Imperio, entonces vea a CHINA. Vea videos de su "National Day". 国庆节

134*



Despolarizador? No exactamente. Mera ilusión del escritor.

https://twitter.com/hassnassar/status/1061673875958833155?s=12&fbclid=IwAR3OXDfgV99wDSKURSkWLJ2a6L-ek4W5-y6csO_YxyIWuctEAJ_tBJKOESeC

135*



Otro ejemplo de lo que hemos dicho hoy y antes y mañana.

El Republicanismo pidiendo explicaciones DONDE JAMÁS SE LAS VAN A DAR porque El Tiempo cree en la separación fundamental de “Estado” vs “Sociedad Civil.”

Hay dos modelos. Hay que ESCOGER.

135*



Gracias Hassan.

En el Cauca:

"Es que dónde están el ejército y el Estado"

En Bogotá:

"Y por qué está el ejército y el Estado".

SON DE UN Hipócrita, como dice uno en Colombia, SUBIDO!!! MEJOR DICHO SON VIVOS, mas no inteligentes.

(Los del "sí".)

136*

Bien Peñalosa. Pero cuando los que cogen las armas contra el Estado dicen “que lo hacen por amor”, pues así complicado. Y lo hacen CONTRA QUIENES LEGALMENTE poseen el derecho de las armas constitucionalmente, las Fuerzas Armadas. Por eso es que todo es confusión.

137*



Bien Peñalosa. Pa n hablar del deprimido de la 94.

138*



Bukele la tiene clara. Bien Bukele OTRA VEZ!

En el caso de Colombia. MARCHAR es creer que MIS derechos están POR ENCIMA de mis deberes. Eso es puro liberalismo radical moderno, EN CAMBIO, en el republicanismo MIS DEBERES están por encima de todo derecho. Es decir, UNA Y OTRA VEZ los dos paradigmas se enfrentan y el liberalismo radical DEBE en la práctica y en la teoría destruir el republicanismo para que su modo de pensar que grita "diferencia, diferencia", SEA EL ÚNICO que exista.

Igual lo dijo JFK, que no era ningún derechista: "ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country." Pero en América Latina: "Me pregunto cuándo usted , Estado, HARÁ TODO POR MI".

Pero el debate sobre deberes y derechos es MUY PERO MUY importante. Tal vez escanee un artículo que indica la problemática de los "derechos humanos" que surgieron junto con el historicismo en el siglo XVII Y NO HAN SIDO PARTE DE NINGUNA OTRA POSTURA POLÍTICA ANTERIOR A LA MODERNIDAD.

Y resulta casi IMPOSIBLE cuestionarlos, e irónicamente, los mismos que los defienden SE CREE LOS MÁS ABIERTOS EN SU MENTE!!!

139*

NO JODA, BUKELE, ¿Cómo me hago salvadoreño? No joda!!!

140*



Bien Bukele.

141*

El dictador Maduro y su amigo íntimo, la ONU, harán PAGAR a Bukele. Hasta el Dios de la Iglesia Católica!
BUKELE PREPÁRESE.

142*



ROGERS 7:56 AM 47%

Thread

Hassan Nassar and 5 others liked

 **Nayib Bukele** 
@nayibbukele

A esta hora, todos los representantes del régimen de Maduro han abandonado nuestro país.


Me informan que sus maletas iban llenas de pasta de dientes, jabón, desodorante y otras "delicias" que se encuentran por doquier en este país gobernado democráticamente por un "pelele" 😊



[Translate Tweet](#)

10:59 PM · 2019-11-04 · [Twitter for iPhone](#)

Bukele power. Gracias Bukele. Y pues ... no decir más.

143*





 **Nayib Bukele** 
@nayibbukele

Más respeto Sr. @NicolasMaduro, habla de un Presidente electo democráticamente, a diferencia suya.

Contrario a usted, 9 de cada 10 personas aprueban mi Gobierno.

Y En El Salvador, sin estar sobre mares de petróleo, un rollo de papel higiénico no nos cuesta el salario de un mes.

[Translate Tweet](#)

 **VTV CANAL 8**  @VTVcanal8 · Nov 3

#VIDEO 📺 | Pdte. @NicolasMaduro: Da vergüenza ver como se derrite frente a imperialismo una persona que llegó a la presidencia de la república con alguna esperanza para el pueblo salvadoreño, pero de la historia no te salvas Bukele como traidor del pueblo

Bien Bukele.

144*



Dos expertos analizando el resultado electoral en Colombia. POR FAVOR LEA, Y SI ENTIENDE ME AVISA.

Y yo que pensé que entendía un poco de lo político. LOL.

"Estructuras políticas que ratifican su dominio, otras que lo aumentan y las emergentes. Este es el resultado de las elecciones regionales, del domingo, en la disputa de poder por el Área Metropolitana. En La Estrella, Copacabana, Itagüí y Envigado las casas tradicionales sostienen sus fortines.

De esta forma, para el analista político y politólogo de la Universidad Nacional, Guillermo Henao, "la fortaleza de la estructura se genera desde la posibilidad de sostener un proceso en el territorio y los resultados reflejan que la continuidad es una elección".

En el mismo sentido, el director del programa de Ciencia Política de la Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, Carlos Builes, señaló que el Área Metropolitana funciona distinto a Medellín, "por eso todavía se mantienen las lógicas tradicionales y guardan la figura del partido político (dominado por una facción), en la que aún cumplen la función de ser el articulador entre la ciudadanía y el Estado".

HIJUE!!!!!! LOL

https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/politica/el-poder-local-tras-resultados-electorales-FA11889480?fbclid=IwAR2sRhiVB0UQkZ4tnj1ReLBN1nAoU8Baa7uVYc1vJ50KSkcnKYJ_4rfxXEM

145*

Chile, en llamas por aumento de pasaje del metro



El icónico edificio de Enel en llamas por las protestas. FOTO: AFP

Y de lo anterior,

Pero no me haga caso a mi QUE YO SOY MUY BURRO. No más lea sus periódicos. QUEMARON A SANTIAGO PORQUE SUBIERON EL PRECIO; NO POR LO QUE LEEN EN LAS UNIVERSIDADES.

Uno sí que es muy burro, no? Esos de El Colombiano et al. SON UNOS SABIOS, unos magos del saber.

<https://www.elcolombiano.com/internacional/america-latina/presidente-de-chile-pinera-declara-estado-de-emergencia-por-protestas-IP11787780>

EN VERDAD UNOS BURROS, Y PELIGROSOS!

146*



Muy bien Uribe. Saber perder. No como Petro Peligro Perdedor y los del “sí”.

147*

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.

Sun Tzu

Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and you know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and you know Earth, you may make your victory complete.

Sun Tzu

Be extremely subtle, even to the point of formlessness. Be extremely mysterious, even to the point of soundlessness. Thereby you can be the director of the opponent's fate.

Sun Tzu

Centro Democrático, como TODOS LOS DEMÁS, requiere urgente clases de liderazgo. Hijue si son burros. Pero publicar esas llamadas!! Y que tal las foticos (ONU). Y que tal las candidatas (Bogotá)!

Y nos referimos al liderazgo tipo Sun-Tzu.

Pa que estudie:

<https://www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/masters-of-war-history-s-greatest-strategic-thinkers.html>

COLOMBIA CERO FUTURO.

148*

FENOMENAL EL CARITA DE YO NO FUI. Dios LEJOS DE AMÉRICA LATINA. Y si no me cree, mire por la ventana. Y mire a los caritas de "yo no fui" que se creen instauradores de Dios.

149*



En paz pero con violencia. Cual bebés los medios diciendo que sí pero no pero sí pero no, blanco es negro, negro es blanco, etc.

DROGADOS SIN TOMAR COCAÍNA.

LA MALA “PAZ”, LA PEOR DROGA.

https://twitter.com/noticiasaracol/status/1197626251764207616?s=12&fbclid=IwAR3vi2Mud7pJEBu9gO9JNqyg_ArlXD2gN1wai6pMp28e1YSEYWVBsm3SJtQ

150*



Yo sí me equivoque cuando dije: “La mala “paz”, la peor droga”. Debí haber escrito en vez de “mala”, la palabra pésima.

Pero en lo de colombianos ATEMBADOS, ahí sí no me equivoque en NADA.

Buenas noches.

151*

Y que dizque defender su casa y familia es ser “paraco”.

Progres desvergonzados.

LA MALA “PAZ”, LA PEOR DROGA.

152*

General Mora. Otro libro sobre la supuesta "paz".

Zzzzzzz. ZZZZZzzzzzzzzzz.

General Mora. Pa eso se volvió General de la Nación? Para eso?

La mala "paz", LA PEOR DROGA:

153*



El Centro de Memoria Histórica publica ORGULLOSO esta memoria de soldados como para mostrar que su narrativa es completa.

PERO NO LO ES. Dice que va a hablar del honor militar pero EN REALIDAD NO LO HACE. Para ni mencionar que comienza con una cita de WALTER BENJAMIN QUE ES UN MARXISTA DE LA ESCUELA DE FRANKFURT y amigo de BRECHT!!!!!!

"No decía nada. El filósofo alemán Walter Benjamin escribió en su ensayo, "Para una crítica de la violencia", que los soldados regresan mudos del frente de batalla"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Benjamin

FALTA DE HONESTIDAD POLÍTICA DE PARTE DE LOS INVESTIGADORES!

<http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/detras-del-uniforme/>

<http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/detras-del-uniforme/?fbclid=IwAR2zHr1yaP6Z4bPpDBEXkioUhpVJJuDpcVnexam8DtWkjZ1UdXkX8DgiNiHs>

154*



Y EL QUE SIGUE PA SACAR, luego del MINISTRO DE DEFENSA!

Y déjense.

<https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/paz-y-derechos-humanos/director-del-centro-de-memoria-historica-a-responder-por-supuestas-irregularidades-FL11926838?fbclid=IwAR11-pBBZtG2KkpMdGf-bFTnB5fzxapP24ObI8BS7tIR2tcyA-bsNZN-uTE>

155*



Y que ojalá logren TUMBAR al eterno de Bolivia.

156*



CON TODO CONTRA LA IZQUIERDA LATINA Y SU CENTRO DISFRAZADO.

157*

Ofensiva de la extrema izquierda contra el Centro de Memoria Histórica
Por Eduardo Mackenzie
@eduardomackenz1
4 de noviembre de 2019

Por nada en el mundo Iván Cepeda quiere que el Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica sea dirigido por alguien que no sea comunista.

La odiosa campaña difamatoria que el polémico senador dirige contra el nuevo director del CNMH, el historiador antioqueño Darío Acevedo Carmona, revela una intención diabólica: que esa entidad oficial, creada por el gobierno colombiano en 2011 para garantizar "el derecho a la verdad del que son titulares las víctimas del conflicto armado y toda la sociedad en su conjunto", se convierta definitivamente en un instrumento para glorificar a las FARC.

La infame operación comenzó antes de que el presidente Iván Duque pusiera a Darío Acevedo, en febrero de 2019, al frente de ese organismo, en reemplazo del sociólogo Gonzalo Sánchez, quien dirigió esa entidad durante ocho años --desde su fundación en 2011--, con el respaldo del gobierno de JM Santos y de la izquierda política.

Como el nombramiento recayó sobre un historiador independiente, la cliqué leninista trató de arruinar ese nombramiento. Alegaron que Darío Acevedo era un "negacionista", término ultra injurioso que designa a quienes niegan el Holocausto judío. Después, lo acusaron de "alterar archivos" del Centro, pues querían levantar un muro de desconfianza entre él y las organizaciones de víctimas. Hasta el mismo Ernesto Samper fue llamado para que aportara su grano de arena. El expresidente aportó lo de siempre: una mentira. Dijo que 27 organizaciones habían retirado sus archivos del CNMH por no creer en la objetividad del profesor Acevedo.

Las intrigas no acabaron allí. Criticaron la decisión del nuevo director de entrar en contacto con la entidad oficial rectora de la investigación social del país, Colciencias. Otra acertada decisión de Acevedo los llevó a una crisis de nervios: el hecho de abrir la puerta del Centro a los testimonios y documentos de los

HIJUE!!!

CON TODO CONTRA LA IZQUIERDA Y EL CENTRO IZQUIERDA DISFRAZADO DE AMÉRICA LATINA.

158*

ROGERS LTE 4:41 PM 87%

< Tweet

Daniel Raisbeck Retweeted

 Emmanuel
@Emma_acosta_

🇺🇸 | 18 muertos en 5 días. 2000 detenidos.
-La izquierda: "Malditos fachos!
Derecha represora, dejen manifestarse a la gente!
Revolución!!"

🇺🇸 | 330.000 muertos en 20 años por el régimen Chavista. 4 millones de refugiados.
-La izquierda: "no bueno, pero el bloqueo americano..."

Tweet your reply

CON TODO CONTRA LA IZQUIERDA Y EL CENTRO IZQUIERDA DISFRAZADO DE AMÉRICA LATINA.

159*

El confuso y repentino triunfo de Evo en los comicios de Bolivia



El presidente de Bolivia, Evo Morales, ganó por cuarta vez unas elecciones. Se prepara para estar 20 años en el poder. FOTO REUTERS

CON TODO CONTRA LA IZQUIERDA Y CENTRO IZQUIERDA DISFRAZADO LATINOS. CON TODO.

160*

Evo SIN Morales. LOL

161*

El tramposo "Evo SIN Morales" hace trampa para ganar, y cuando lo cogen, pide nuevas elecciones. Estos manes de izquierda son de una trampa y de un deseo por el poder y de una adicción al narcisismo que ni la cocaína, mi hermano.

162*

RENUNCIÓ EVO SIN MORALES.

Que América Latina se encamine al éxito.

163*

Ya arrancó Evo SIN Morales para CUBA, VENEZUELA o NICARAGUA o RUSIA? No, prefiere Argentina pero no lo reciben.

SON DE UNA HIPOCRESÍA. Y luego le preguntaron en México que por qué no Venezuela. Y calladito.

164*

¿Cómo estará Sachs con la salida de Evo SIN Morales? !!!!

165*

Qué hará Evo Sin Morales esta noche de la mano de AMLO?

MAQUINAR CÓMO VA A VOLVER A BOLIVIA A SER PRESIDENTE.

El rencor eterno de la izquierda. O sino mire a Cuba: “es que nos embargaron en 1516”.

166*



Y el 21 la marcha es por Evo SIN morales! LOL.

NO MARCHO. EVO SIN MORALES, están acompañado por los progres corruptos! LOL

<https://twitter.com/hollmanmorris/status/1196186352343298048?s=12&fbclid=IwAR2mJfuvHvZtUR7-doa9pEA0vmiYgFSESpiWTDav7gyStM8186RPGQfiFdA>

167



Y siguiendo con los anteriores, para los que no creen que HAY DOS MODELOS. La defensa de un tramposo como Evo Sin Morales.

168*



Y lo dice la Córdoba con una tranquilidad. Hijue. El tramposo Morales el EJEMPLO para perpetuarse en el poder! Hijue!!!

169*



Y por si no me creen lo de la destrucción del republicanismo ecuatoriano.

https://www.elcolombiano.com/internacional/america-latina/protestas-en-ecuador-enfrentamientos-con-la-policia-cercan-el-centro-de-quito-HE11735992?fbclid=IwAR0oJOS4IIIIno5R6Mh5tVOTdaMdav1LREwD6Md_AKkDH2n-63SoCQeIwWY

170*

#EleccionesUruguay

Translate Tweet



6:35 PM · Nov 24, 2019 · Twitter for Android

Y hoy elecciones en Uruguay. Y después de lo escrito hoy acá, MIRE LOS PORCENTAJES!!!! 49.5 vs 46.5
Cómo puede haber diálogo entre DOS POSTURAS TAN FUNDAMENTALMENTE OPUESTAS?

171*



Y más de lo mismo. Vía Hassan.

Pa que vean mis palabras en la realidad. Por si no me creen.

1372*



Gracias Hassan. Mandan ... lo que dicen en la Costa.

https://twitter.com/hassnassar/status/1195052578461175808?s=12&fbclid=IwAR2KZzk4Jws4Z-3OeR2CB1bvIN4jHyhe1SopWor0-cK_P9IQjZmiD44YME

173*



13 años de Presidente para terminar con estas palabras.

QUÉ VERGÜENZA de pseudo-líder. Así habla sólo UN SER PROFUNDAMENTE ACOMPLEJADO.

Vía Hassan y Gracias Hassan.

174*

Vía Hassan.



https://www.elmundo.es/opinion/2019/11/12/5dcaee2dfdddf5d7f8b45f2.html?fbclid=IwAR25Fze6307KX1-YweuamOb2jg30QnETVWE_df9Yh-9Gp46nv9aBeVJE018


175*



Gracias Hassan.

Este que dizque es un "Sócrates" de la izquierda. Lo que es es un CAMARADA populista corrupto.

176*



Al contrario Hassan. Es Hiperrealismo. Pa un lado, o pal otro. Republicanismo serio y legal, o socialismo anárquico y dictatorial.

177*

En marcha hacia la dictadura de izquierda y centro izquierda.

← **Tweet**

Franciscolombia liked

 **Freddy Gamboa Orellana** @gamboa_freddi

- 60 años Castro
- 20 años Chavez
- 13 años Evo
- 12 años Kirchner
- 10 años Correa
- 8 años Lula
- 4 años Dilma

Pero según la Izquierda, los males de la región se debe a:

- 4 años d Macri
- 2 años de Moreno
- 1 año de Piñera
- 1 año de Duque
- 1 año de Bolsonaro
- 3 semanas de Jeanine Añez

[Translate Tweet](#)
6:41 PM · Nov 26, 2019 from Bolivia · Twitter for Android

178*

 Home Explore Notifications Messages Bookmarks Lists Profile More

← **Tweet**

 **Hassan Nassar** @HassNassar

Porque son unos hipócritas. Con esa misma constitución gobernaron todos los gobiernos de centro izquierda de la Concertación en Chile. Desde 1990 con Aylwin, Frei, Lagos y Bachelet. Ahora con Piñera (de centro derecha) no les sirve.

[Translate Tweet](#)

 **FRANCISCO RIVEROL V** @FRANRIVEROLV · 1h

No entiendo lo de Chile con su constitución, tanto Lagos como Bachelet fueron presidentes y gobernaron con esa constitución ¿Por qué ahora descubrieron que no era buena?

11:41 AM · Nov 9, 2019 · Twitter for Android


Gracias Hassan.

Izquierda hipócrita aquí y allá, ahora, antes y siempre.

179*

ROGERS 7:49 AM 81%

← **Tweet**

 **Hassan Nassar** @HassNassar

El país se dio cuenta anoche que los grupos armados ilegales reclutan niños para la guerra y mueren en bombardeos, que el Cauca no es Suiza, y que los criminales de lesa humanidad, que no han pasado por la justicia y reparado a sus víctimas, hacen control político en el congreso.

[Translate Tweet](#)
7:24 AM · 2019-11-06 · Twitter for Android

Gracias Hassan.

Confirmando los anteriores escritos.

180*



No hay que ser un genio para saber QUE SIEMPRE SE VAN A PARAR. Por lo que dijimos en días pasados. Los indígenas del Cauca NO se consideran primariamente como colombianos.

Y para ponerlo de manera dramática y real. Cuando pasa algo MALO, ELLOS son colombianos y COLOMBIA no les cumple PERO cuando logran algo bueno, SON ELLOS COMO INDÍGENAS independientes, y SOBRETUDO INDEPENDIENTES DE COLOMBIA.

Así, pues nadie va solucionar NADA.

Y para ponerlo de manera más dramática aún: ESO EN COLOMBIA SE LLAMA SER CONCHUDO.

Pero dígame eso a uno de los "amantes de la diferencia" y lo llamaran "fascista".

COLOMBIA. CERO FUTURO. Y CAUCA. MENOS TREINTA FUTURO. Y LOS INDÍGENAS, MENOS CUARENTA FUTURO.

https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/organizaciones-sociales-sindicales-e-indigenas-se-levantan-de-mesa-de-trabajo-en-el-cauca-LJ11907682?fbclid=IwAR1O5eGBEP4jTtVw4OOvS6JEXv3EjWo_-C0B6M_NO7bJ56i7veooBNa1Rc

181*

La muerte de los indígenas del Cauca es, de cierta manera, fácil de entender.

SE DEBE A DESTRUIR LA UNIDAD Y CONFRATERNIDAD EN NOMBRE DE LA DIVERSIDAD Y LA DIFERENCIA.

En ese sentido la Academia liberal radical es casi igual de culpable que los asesinos.

De seguro nos dirán loco, sobretodo que ahora una de esas académicas es la que gobernará a Bogotá.

No importa. Si no tuviésemos la razón NO LOS MATARÍAN de manera continua y sin defensa.

Por ESO MISMO sacan al ejército colombiano de SUS tierras. PERO CUANDO LOS MATAN, esa misma ACADEMIA SALTA a exigir que aparezca el ejército COLOMBIANO! Confundidos como Confucio!

Por la unidad y confraternidad republicana. La mala "paz", la peor droga.

182*



Cali. El Cauca está cerquita. Buenaventura está cerquita. El arzobispo de izquierda radical está cerquita. La historia Rodríguez Orejuela está cerquita.

Cali, UNA VERGÜENZA.

https://twitter.com/cgurisattintn24/status/1197634247709929477?s=12&fbclid=IwAR1rFg-LU8dSX1U3jZ0BXC4MPks84crPtFCDOULzGZD_xdL6qUPn0wd2nSM

183*

Bogotá no es Santiago, PERO CASI.

Cali, ahh ese sí es Santiago, Santiago de Cali. Con razón.

184*

Toque de queda en Cali.

Y que no acepto ayuda de Duque el alcalde desde el principio? Es verdad?

ES QUE ASÍ NO SE PUEDE.

Otra razón para celebrar.

Bostezo. Felicitaciones progres.

185*



Y en Cali, como decimos en Colombia,

MÁS PIOR. Y ano es a patada limpia sino con los taches de los guayos. Es que son de un entrenamiento como animales.

<https://twitter.com/elpaiscali/status/1197508246598299649?s=20&fbclid=IwAR1vU01dRsBoLeFxpP0jW6ANdliCXcA4rVBGYqDZKwcYg6iOApBwCo8h8Ck>

186*

Prefiero 80 millones de veces a la monja de hoy que al Obispo o Arzobispo o requireteArzobispo de Cali. 80 Millones de veces, más uno.

187*

JEP COLOMBIA

'Estado debe garantizar la protesta pacífica, sin señalamientos'

Para el padre Francisco de Roux, presidente de la Comisión de la Verdad, el paro es una oportunidad.



Francisco de Roux, presidente de la Comisión de la Verdad.

Foto: Rodrigo Sepúlveda. EL TIEMPO

VER MÁS NOTICIAS →

FENOMENAL EL CARITA DE YO NO FUI. DIOS LEJOS DE AMÉRICA LATINA. Y si no me cree, mire por la ventana. Y mire a los caritas de yo no fui que se creen instauradores de Dios.

188*

¿Cómo será estar en Bogotá hoy?

Lo siento por los bogotanos y su ciudad.

189*

Tweet

 **Catherine Juvinao C.** @CathyJuvinao

¿Militarizar a Bogotá por una marcha?

Translate Tweet

10:15 AM · 2019-11-16 · Twitter for iPhone

289 Retweets 1,027 Likes

 **Jose Reyes P** @majagual · 4h
Replying to @CathyJuvinao
¡¡Fijate, fijate, fijate!!!

 **Javier Hohenheim** @van_hohen... · 8h
Replying to @CathyJuvinao

Tweet your reply

Tan tierna. Pero tan tonta. Ayy, o es que toca decir tan inteligente, así sea tonta. Esta es la de la primavera de Santiago que destruyó Santiago.

Bogotá no será Santiago, mi vida. Así tu ames las primaveras que lo destruyen todo.

190*



Bogotá no será Santiago. Y no exactamente por los ángeles marchantes.

191*

Por ahí se lee: “Bogotá no será Santiago. SEGURO QUE NO.”

(Soldado avisado no muere en guerra.)

192*



La izquierda y centro izquierda disfrazada YA QUEMARON en su mente el metro de Bogotá que aún no existe.

193*



Gente como Lozano, sobretodo en su párrafo final, PARECE indicar el camino a soluciones.

Pero, tememos que ese relativismo radical que él DOGMÁTICAMENTE defiende como la base del "diálogo", es precisamente lo que no permite encaminar un país hacia ningún lado. COMO SI TODAS LAS POSTURAS POLÍTICAS FUERAN IGUAL DE VÁLIDAS Y PUES NO HAY CÓMO SABER CUÁL ES MEJOR QUE OTRA.

Peligrosísimo. Más si se añade al relativismo histórico.

Por ejemplo, No sabemos qué quiere decir Lozano con "FIRMEZA".

(Teóricamente este debate se da, por ejemplo, entre defender una postura como la de Charles Taylor y otra como la de los Straussianos, como Thomas Pangle. Para nosotros, realmente no hay competencia. Pangle por KO mental.)

https://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/columnistas/juan-lozano/entre-vandalos-y-cacerolas-columna-de-juan-lozano-436892?fbclid=IwAR2DfBU5XFVIs_T8x6b2Q1JVEK4FvigOpBQmoL1x8CcQEyh6oDzLv7hcFg

194*

OIGA. ¿SERÁ QUE ES QUE NO HAY PROFESORES Y CIUDADANOS REPUBLICANOS EN COLOMBIA que vayan a liderar de manera conjunta este llamado a la conversación nacional?

DE LOS SEIS TEMAS, 1) EDUCACIÓN, 2) LUCHA CONTRA LA CORRUPCIÓN Y 3) PAZ CON LEGALIDAD SON imprescindibles.

¿Será que uno es de los muy pocos? IMPOSIBLE! Y a qué horas uno, sabiendo lo que se puede venir?

Y lo digo porque sólo cuando estudié en la Universidad de Toronto, pude ver estos temas que comparto acá. Y ya era mayor, y ya había pasado por la Universidad de Los Andes.

Mire, es que JAMÁS, NI UNA SOLA VEZ, en todos mis años de estudio en Colombia escuche UNA SOLA


PALABRA sobre este punto de vista. Entonces, ¿cómo vamos a hacer?

Mire, el profesor Meléndez es un gran profesor PERO NUNCA pudo ni acercarse a una interpretación adecuado de Aristóteles. Para ni mencionar al profesor Gutiérrez, y TODOS LOS DEMÁS PROFESORES colombianos. Y la Javeriana. Por Dios, el acceso a Aristóteles es sólo desde el cristianismo!!!! Virgen Santísima, como dicen en Colombia !!! LOL

ESTÁN ENCEGUECIDOS! Es más, cuando comencé a comprender esa otra perspectiva ME TOMÓ AÑOS DE ESTUDIO PARA PODER ZAFARME DEL paradigma que reina en Colombia A TODO NIVEL.

Y, entonces? NO van a tener una conversación, LO QUE VAN A TENER ES UN MONÓLOGO!!!

195*



Y para quienes DE VERDAD quieren entender la problemático de lo divino en la modernidad, y no LAS vacuas interpretativas de Petro Peligro Perdedor, leer:

1) https://www.amazon.com/Political-Philosophy-Abraham-Thomas-Pangle/dp/0801873282/ref=sr_1_4?keywords=thomas+pangle&qid=1573857893&sr=8-4

y,

2) https://www.amazon.com/Theological-Liberal-Modernity-Montesquieu-Spirit-ebook/dp/B003P2V9SC/ref=sr_1_5?keywords=thomas+pangle&qid=1573857893&sr=8-5

(Nota: Para ver lo cerrado que es el paradigma educacional, lea acerca de la “Yale Tenure controversy”, en la que no querían que el profesor Pangle obtuviera su “tenure”:

“during which a senior colleague explained, in a pronouncement (which became the theme of a protest panel at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association): "academic freedom is one thing, but there are two types who will never be permitted tenure at Yale: Leninists and Straussians."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Pangle)

196*



Soros, uno de los defensores del internacionalismo QUE TANTO DAÑO ---PERO TANTO DAÑO----- le está haciendo y hará a la República de Colombia, escribe aquí sobre el nacionalismo. Escribió esto para Project Syndicate, que es ultra liberal y radical hacia la izquierda.

No comentaré mucho, pero luego proveeré el contraste con lo que dice Aristóteles.

Pero algo que impacta es que el mentor de Soros es Popper QUE ES UN FILÓSOFO DE LA CIENCIA y para nada un pensador de la filosofía política propiamente hablando!!!! Para ni hablar de los problemas internos a Popper, que también es el héroe de personas como Wasserman en Colombia!

Con eso le digo todo!! Según él:

"Thirty years later, the situation is very different. International cooperation has hit serious roadblocks, and nationalism became the dominant creed. So far, nationalism has turned out to be much more powerful and disruptive than internationalism."

Para ni mencionar que lo que lo impulsó a su postura contra el totalitarismo se ha convertido en un cierto totalitarismo internacionista!!

Más tarde escanearé la respuesta bajo la interpretación de Pangle de Aristóteles.

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/open-societies-new-enemies-by-george-soros-2019-11?utm_source=Project+Syndicate+Newsletter&utm_campaign=25dcd38-sunday_newsletter_10_11_2019&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_73bad5b7d8-25dcd38-93465925&mc_cid=25dcd38&mc_eid=2a30508680&fbclid=IwAR3D4XLLRigi4loEgee7xAf5P37ldEjOAG0XzWpPAsIxU-CvsOI-FqrJNkY

197*

Respuesta aristotélica al internacionalismo intolerante de Soros ---puesto anteriormente---- y organizaciones como la ONU a las que corren ciertos colombianos para desestabilizar el país. Aristóteles también habla de CIERTO TIPO DE TRASCENDENCIA, pero esa no le gustaría ni a Soros y a la ONU NI CINCO!!!

Porque no se cansa uno de ver gente inteligente COMIENDO TANTO CUENTO!

Sacado del ya compartido "Justice Among Nations" de Pangle y Ahrens Dorf.

49). Finally, Thucydides quietly but unmistakably presents us his own example: that of a man who describes the harshness of political life with an austere humanity, who combines the clearest vision and the soberest judgment with the most genuine compassion, and who thereby bears witness to the possibility of a somber but humane realism.⁴⁶

2

Classical Idealism

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

We have seen that Thucydides' *History* unobtrusively points to the conclusion that it is the humanizing life of the mind, as epitomized in Thucydides' own outlook and activity, that is the truly coherent object of the aspirations that characterize political life at its noblest. The writings of the most important Socratic political philosophers—Plato (427?–347 B.C.), Xenophon (434?–355? B.C.), Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), and Cicero (106–43 B.C.)—may best be understood as providing a more thematic elaboration, and a more explicit vindication, of this momentous contention. Compared to Thucydides, the Socratic philosophers are more explicit in their argument that the nature of politics, and especially the nature of political ethics—of justice and nobility—becomes clear only when analyzed from the perspective of a suprapolitical way of life devoted not to ruling or to changing the world, but simply to understanding it.

At the same time, the Socratics share or continue Thucydides' determination to show how the case for the supremacy of the theoretical life emerges from the deepest moral concerns of civic life, when those concerns are thought through in all seriousness. The political philosophizing initiated by Socrates and foreshadowed by Thucydides demonstrates, in conversational argument with and on the basis of traditional views, the necessity of an ascent from tradition to the life according to nature. But this ascent never leaves behind civic responsibility. Indeed, the greater openness with which Socratic philosophy undertakes and justifies the ascent entails new public and private responsibilities. The Socratics evince a keen awareness of the possibly demoralizing or even subversive consequences that might flow from the misunderstanding or the abuse of their arguments showing the incomplete nobility of prephilosophic political life. The disciples of Socrates assume the task of drawing from their critical theory of politics, and their consequent knowledge of human nature, a constructive moral and civic teaching that they promulgate in order to give some substantial guidance to political life as well as to bring out its highest aspirations. But the closer one

33

looks at the most striking and famous of their edifying doctrines—for example, the various elaborations of the “best regime” and of its civil theology, or Socrates’ thesis that “virtue is knowledge,” or Aristotle’s teaching on “moral virtue,” or Cicero’s presentation of Stoic “natural law”—the more thought-provoking or puzzling these doctrines appear. Even when speaking in their most didactic voice, the classical political philosophers stimulate us to reflect on, and to begin to understand the necessary reasons for, the limitations that are discernible in all political life. The Socratic philosophers thus try to teach, among other things, the virtue of political moderation: that is, they try to induce a rational tempering of the hopes and demands with which we approach political reality, and whose disappointment so often drives us to the vices of cynicism or despair or misology.

But we are naturally inclined to resist this lesson in sobriety. And as we look back to the classical political philosophers from the perspective of modern, progressive thought, we may well wonder whether in some key respects the ancients do not remain too resigned to the apparent moral limitations of the initially given political world. This question certainly arises when we consider the classical philosophers’ reflections on the moral basis of foreign policy. For the Socratics tend on the whole to teach not only the impracticality, but even the undesirability, of any radical transformation of the patriotic, prephilosophic citizen’s attitude toward foreign policy. The classics do not fail to observe that every decent citizen will demand a moral justification for his city’s foreign policy and above all for its resort to war.¹ But they equally recognize that every such citizen will also consider it a duty to care for fellow citizens more than for outsiders and will hold it just to accord foreign nationals and nations only the much more limited rights due to aliens or even potential enemies. Positive and limited treaties of alliance or cooperation may modify, but will not fundamentally alter, this basic moral distinction between citizens and noncitizens: “It is necessary not to forget that what is being sought is the just simply and the politically just. This obtains among those who share a life together with a view to self-sufficiency, who are free and equal either proportionately or arithmetically. So that for those for whom this does not obtain, there is not among them, in relation to one another, the politically just, but something just by way of resemblance” (Aristotle *N. Ethics* 1134a24–30).

Yet this statement (and other kindred statements or suggestions, in Plato as well as Aristotle) leaves us wondering precisely what is the character of the justice that obtains between nations or aliens; and in what way this justice can or does “resemble” political justice—or even justice simply; and

what it is about political or simple justice that makes *only* a “resemblance” possible among those who are not fellow-citizens; and, above all, whether this limitation does not cast a shadow of doubt over the claim to consistency of political justice itself. In other words, we are provoked to ask for the reasons or reasoning that led these philosophers to ratify the prephilosophic civic posture toward the justice that obtains in international politics; and we are led to wonder whether, once these reasons are elicited, the philosophic version of the ordinary outlook will not have a dimension or depth that makes it qualitatively different from the version held by the prephilosophic citizen. We need to begin by briefly reminding ourselves of crucial aspects of the philosophers’ understanding of the highest goals of internal or domestic policy.

The Human Being as a Political Animal

A good starting point is Aristotle’s prominent and famous contention that “the human being is a political animal by nature.”² Aristotle makes it clear that he does not mean by this merely that humans are gregarious or social, in the manner of the other “political” animals like the bees; he means something much more. Humans, he argues, have an observable natural directedness to live together in a society where they participate meaningfully in the collective, rational determination of their lives, ruling and being ruled, with responsibilities distributed among individuals in accordance with their varying abilities. Human life remains immature or truncated, and therefore unhappy and restive, unless it finds the opportunity to develop and to exercise the dignifying capacities for self-control, for care, for dedication, for recognition, and, above all, for rational thought or consciousness, that are evoked in active republican life. It is the satisfaction of this natural aim or need to share in such a community that is the most massive constituent of the supreme political common good, and that thus serves as the standard of “natural justice” or “natural right” by which each society must be judged.³

This standard is made vivid and concrete through the detailed laying out “in speech,” or in the mind’s eye, of a “best regime,” conceived as a community of friends whose principal activity is the liberating education of themselves and their children. The “best regime,” whose elaboration might be called a kind of thought experiment, must of course be distinguished from regimes actualizable in almost any practical circumstances. But the

thought experiment is essential in order to clarify the *ultimate* goals toward which politics ought to look, the goals in terms of which each set of circumstances, with its unique opportunities and limits, must be assessed.

The excellences at which the "best regime's" education aims are the civic and moral virtues more than any technical skills. It is true that the virtues are deployed largely in responding to problems and needs rooted in the body (defense and public safety, public health, economic welfare, poor relief, and so forth); yet the capacities and activities of self-control, generosity, and practical wisdom are cherished not solely or even mainly for their beneficial outcomes, but even more for their own sakes. And an authentically "liberal" public education aims beyond even the civic and moral virtues, to the cultivation of genuine "leisure," or of a cultural and religious life that reflects, in the medium of a particular people's heritage, something of the more independent and unbounded spiritual awakening enjoyed by the philosopher. In the best regime, citizens are educated and equipped to devote their leisure to the "love of the beautiful," as expressed in bodily grace, dance, music, poetry, theater, the fine arts, theology, perhaps even mathematics and astronomy, and reflective private conversation as well as public speech.⁴

The ancient thinkers were not slow to point out the enormous effort and considerable sacrifice entailed in dedication to such high domestic goals, even when qualified by prudent recognition of the usually drastic limitations imposed by almost every particular set of circumstances. If citizens are really to care for one another, to respect and to judge one another accurately, and to cultivate each other's best capacities, then they must come to know and to cherish one another. The human capacity for familiarity and attachment is by nature restricted; the natural restrictions set boundaries within which the size of a society ought to be confined. A healthy society can extend only to the size of a small city, a polis.⁵ The community that inhabits the polis must promote honesty and candor among its members; it must therefore discourage the trappings of luxury and vanity that hide human character. Moreover, citizens need to live similar lives, so that they may sympathize with and understand one another's concerns; and the concerns citizens share ought to be spiritual rather than merely or predominantly material. A true civic community will then prevent large and unequal accumulations of wealth, especially through the commercial and industrial growth that foment obsession with monetary goods. Most human beings, especially when they are young, are awakened to seriousness, to a striving to live up to high standards, by a sense of rootedness in a distinguished and distin-

guishing tradition. Such a tradition gains a sense of permanence when it is sanctioned and graced by providential divinity that promises just recognition for deserving achievement. A spiritually healthy society will therefore provide its citizens with a strict moral education through which all grow up imbibing a common sense of noble distinctiveness, sharing similar delights and sorrows, acquiring the same tastes, becoming steeped in common memories, revering the same heroes and holy men, and, above all, worshipping the same gods.⁶

All of this entails the direct as well as an indirect cultivation of a sense of distance or even alienation from the rest of the world. Devotion to one's own city and people will necessarily be diluted if the citizens do not resist the seductive temptations of foreign trade, mixing, travel, and innovation. A healthy city, as the classics understand it, cannot and should not simply cut itself off. But in looking to the outside world, the good citizenry will emphasize the proud display of the excellence of its own ways as a model to others and will be hesitant to admire, let alone adopt, the ways of others. A sound citizen body will open itself to outside influences only from others who appear to excel in the virtues the citizenry already honors. Thus, although in Plato's *Laws* (949e-51a) the philosophic spokesman encourages a few selected men over fifty years of age to travel in order to investigate foreign regimes with a view to discovering and bringing back improvements, for the generality of citizens he suggests a law which reads that "It shall not be permissible for a man younger than forty to go abroad anywhere in any way; moreover, no one is to go abroad in a private capacity, but heralds, ambassadors, and certain observation missions may do so in a public capacity." In particular, there should be persons sent to "take part in the sacrifices and contests dedicated to the gods"; the city is to try to "send the most numerous, beautiful, and best men possible, who will give the city a good reputation in the sacred and peaceful gatherings, and provide a supply of reputation that is the counterpart to what is gained in war." "When they return home," the Platonic lawgiver adds, "they will teach the young that the legal customs, pertaining to the regimes, of the others are in second place." Justifying this legislation, the Athenian Stranger observes that for citizens "not to receive others, or to go abroad elsewhere themselves, is at once not entirely possible and in addition, would appear savage and hard to the other human beings." "And one ought never," he says, "belittle the reputation one has among others for being good or not. For the many happen not to be as deficient in their judgment of who among the rest are wicked and good, as they are deficient in the essence of virtue." "That

is why," he concludes, "the exhortation to give preeminence in honor to one's good reputation among the many is a noble exhortation for the many cities."

Defence Policy and the Inevitability of International Conflict

The reference here to the need for a strong military reputation calls to our attention the harsh truth that since the healthy political society is a small one, it is necessarily endangered. The city needs to devote considerable attention to military defense, and its citizens must develop a spirited waspishness that will discourage enemy aggression and attempts at subversion. In the *Republic* (375e), Socrates calls for a citizen army that resembles "the philosophic dogs" who are "as gentle as can be with their familiars and those they know and the opposite with those they don't know." Aristotle criticizes as excessive the harshness of this characterization; but in this very criticism, he is as insistent as is Plato that the psychological core of citizenship is a tamed version of what Plato calls "spiritedness" (*thumos*)—that part of the soul that generates a passionate, often indignant, sense of honor, together with a fiercely proud and stubbornly loyal love for one's own people (*Politics* 1328a8-12). It is as true for Aristotle as it is for Plato, Xenophon, and Cicero that sound republican citizenship ought to be centered on militia service and on the cultivation of militia virtues.

Unfortunately, training in the art of war involves learning to do many things that, however necessary, are not altogether noble. The communitarian republic that so strives to teach friendship, honesty, and justice among its citizens must make those same citizens adept, with regard to enemies, not only at manly self-defense but also at deceit, theft, and aggressive violence. The Greek theorists are by no means unaware of the potentially dangerous paradox involved in such an education.⁷ The desire to dampen the possibility that citizens might turn their military expertise—their suspicious watchfulness and anticipatory preparation for conflict—against one another intensifies the healthy society's insistence on the distinction between what is owed to citizens and what is owed to strangers.

Where circumstances permit, a foreign policy inclining toward disengagement or even isolation is the preference of classical republican teaching.⁸ But the classical philosophers are aware that the possibility or choiceworthiness of acting on such a preference depends on rare and often temporary geographical luck. In book 4 of the *Republic* (422e-423a), Plato compels his Socrates to submit to cross-examination by the young

Adeimantus, who demands to know what is to be the foreign policy of the just city if it is faced with a potentially hostile, wealthy, and hence powerful neighbor.⁹ Socrates responds: "You are in happy ignorance, if you suppose it is fit to give the name 'city' to one other than such as we have been equipping." The other cities, Socrates explains, are "each many cities, not one." "Each is two at least, making war on one another—the city of the poor and the city of the rich. And within each of these there are very many. If you approach them as though they were one, you will make a great mistake; but if you deal with them as many, offering the property or the power or the persons of either side to the other, you will always have the use of many allies and few enemies."

This grim and troubling reply Socrates qualifies in the next book, where he advocates treating fellow Greek cities as kin, even or especially when war against them cannot be avoided. Bearing in mind the threat to all Greek cities from the Persian and other foreign empires, Socrates insists that war against Greeks be limited by treating as "enemies" only those "few" who are "responsible" for the quarrel and who thus alone ought to "pay the just penalty." In wars with fellow Greeks, the populace is not to be enslaved, the dead are to be treated honorably, houses are not to be burned, and the countryside is not to be laid waste. In the *Laws*, where a more practicable "best regime" is under discussion, the Athenian Stranger calls for a populace large enough both to defend itself and to assist neighboring cities when they are wronged. There, the Athenian gives serious consideration to the idea of a small federation of kindred and neighboring republics, such as is exemplified by the quasi-historical league established in the distant past among Sparta, Argos, and Messene. The primary purpose of this federation was to mutually police and thus to make more secure the constitutional balance of the limited monarchy within each of the partner cities. But a leading secondary aim was defense not only of themselves but of all Greece against foreign and especially Assyrian imperialist aggression. Unfortunately, the Athenian stresses, the federation proved a failure—precisely because of its initial strength in foreign and military policy: the resulting power eventually tempted the leaders of at least two of the three federated powers to seek hegemony. When Sparta successfully resisted the reach for empire by its partners, they ceased to look upon Sparta in a fraternal spirit and proved unwilling, in the pinch of crisis, to make good on the promised assistance to Sparta and to the Greeks generally. Sparta found a reliable ally only in the independent Athenians, who had never been members of the federation. Federalism, the Athenian seems to teach, is at best a fragile, and ultimately an unreliable, solution to the security needs of a small and sound republic.

Either the federation is too weak, or, if it is strong enough to predominate in the region, then the temptations to consolidation, the resulting internal corruption of member cities, and competition for predominance within the league are too likely to grow apace.¹⁰

But let us return to the troubling passage we quoted from book 4 of the *Republic*, where Socrates is willing to make plain, if only for a shocking moment, a crux of civic justice. In order to maintain its own security, the best city (and therefore, in principle, any city, or the city as such) may actively have to undermine the security and independence of its neighbors and do so without necessarily being justified by the neighbors' acts or plans of aggression.¹¹ That the fundamental problem is not confined to extreme or rare circumstances becomes clear if we consider another facet of it, to which the *Republic* directs our attention. The way of life of a good city requires a great deal of leisure for its citizens; leisure is possible only on a strong economic base; and, especially if the economy is not to depend too much on commerce and commercialism, the city must be established in a fertile, preferably self-sufficient land.¹² Now it is highly unlikely that such land will be found unclaimed or isolated; indeed, it will probably be the scene of age-old struggles for possession. It is therefore likely that in order to have the land it needs, the good city, at some time in the past, must have conquered it; and the city must be prepared to defend that land, often, against new invaders or even the earlier possessors, either of whose right to possession may at times seem to the objective observer as strong as that of the present tenants.¹³ If one goes back very far in the history of even the most just of peoples, one will probably find that they have but a tenuous claim to ownership, a claim that is open to armed attack legitimated by deprivation and scarcity and perhaps original ownership. If this is so, then one must not expect easily to find a situation with no economic scarcity or past conflicts to provide at times, on both sides, plausibly legitimate claims for waging war.¹⁴ It is not sufficient to speak of avoidable wickedness or correctable misunderstanding; the harshly competitive economic circumstances of human existence on this limited earth cast doubt on the possibility and hence the naturalness of a stable common good among neighboring cities and peoples.

Plato points to these melancholy facts in a most striking way. In the *Republic*, soon after the origin of what is to become the just city in speech, Socrates himself proposes, and with Glaucon carries out, an unprovoked aggressive war for the conquest of a neighboring people's land. Never is it suggested that this land be returned or even that reparation be made. On the contrary, Socrates later promulgates a "noble lie," part of which is

intended to convince all the citizens that they and their forefathers sprang up from the mother-land they now possess, to which they have a divinely sanctioned claim and to which they owe divinely commanded allegiance. It is on the basis of this noble lie that Socrates can later assume that all wars against neighboring cities will be just, that is, punitive.¹⁵

The fact that the best regime must rest on such a noble lie may be taken as an indication of the necessity that every city is under, according to Plato, to avoid dwelling on the shaky legitimacy of its place in the sun in relation to that of other cities or peoples. The morale of the citizen depends on his leaving in obscurity a profound tension—between his claim to be a respecter of what is right (e.g., other peoples' property and independence) and his pursuit of security. Both antitheses of this contradiction must be given their due if the problem of international justice, as Plato conceives it, is to be fully grasped. Were the citizen to be compelled and enabled to confront squarely the tension, his resolution of it would confirm, even in his opinion and not only in deed, the primacy of the good—as is demonstrated or indicated by several crucial Socratic refutations.¹⁶ And yet the citizen's need to obscure the tension is evidence that human nature's quest for the good cannot be adequately explained in terms of the pursuit of collectively self-interested security. On the one hand, the city makes security its priority; but on the other hand, the city cannot live with itself unless it believes that it deserves to be secure, because its quest for security is limited by and indeed even sometimes risked for justice. As Socrates and the young Alcibiades agree, Athens never goes to war except when she claims she has suffered and seeks to punish what she regards as unjust deception, violence, or theft; and the qualifying adjective "unjust" makes "all the difference." "Even if one thought that war ought to be waged against the just, one would not confess" the thought, for that would be "unlawful" and even "dishonorable" (*Alcibiades I* 109a-c; but cf. 113d). If we follow the evidence Socrates provides, we may surmise that, through their self-denial and their demonstration of respect for divinely sanctioned justice and honor, the citizens seek a good that is more perfect than mundane security.

The Problem of Civic Virtue

But the practice of civic virtue, in and of itself, fails to provide an altogether coherent answer to this search. The difficulty is not only that the civic virtues are so much engaged in, and defined by, the satisfaction of physical needs. The civic virtues become problematic even or especially

insofar as their practice reaches beyond material needs toward spiritual fulfillment. The classics compel us to recognize that it is not only the competitive quest for security and power, it is also the devotion to moral grandeur (and not only in its obviously distorted or crude versions) that, paradoxically, puts a question mark after international justice.¹⁷ Civic virtue itself offers a powerful inducement to expansion, to more or less benevolent hegemony, and even to conquest. Implicit in the healthy citizenry's love of politics, at the very heart of the statesman's devotion to the challenges and responsibilities and honors of rule, is the longing for a continuing, and ever greater, authority—as a field for action and as a deserved recognition of merit.¹⁸ To try to interpret this higher reach of political life merely in terms of a "struggle for power" is to simplify grossly, and thus to falsify gravely, the empirical reality of man as the political animal. Human nature, once awakened to its deep inner impulse toward a life of noble political action, seeks out expanding opportunities for heroism, for energetic and generous caring for others, for the display of strategic and administrative genius. It is often in and through war or international competition that civic solidarity is cemented, noble ambition aroused, and a sense of responsibility expanded.¹⁹ A powerful vector of moral forces points toward ever more intense rivalry among honorable individuals over the scarce lofty offices and honors in the city; the same constellation of forces naturally and necessarily generates noble contention among republics for international hegemony and even empire. In this generous race, justice is by no means forgotten: each champion claims to deserve preeminence, or aims to prove such desert, and sooner or later, in some degree, accuses his adversaries of unjust refusal to acknowledge the superior claim of desert.²⁰ The rigorously competitive realm of foreign policy comes to sight as a magnificent field for the display and exercise and testing of the moral and intellectual excellence of individual leaders and of the city as a whole; and paternalistic empire is by no means incompatible with considerable delegation of power to subjects, so long as the sovereign decisions remain in the hands of the imperial city and its supreme rulers.²¹ But are there ever a sufficient number of high or even challenging offices, and when vacancies occur, can they ever be fully and equally opened to all who deserve them? Will the vast majority accept, without fearful coercion, the fact of their exclusion, like well-supervised youngsters, from the truly sovereign deliberations? Is the vast majority's natural restiveness solely a manifestation of vain refusal to recognize its proper place, or is that indolence not in some measure a moral expression of a natural and noble ambition, of humanity's turbulent political nature? Will not the need to use intimidation and violence in order to prevent ma-

ritarian rebellion, whatever its motive, brutalize and corrupt even rulers originally animated by a gentle and pure ambition?

To put it another way, this paradoxical question arises: whether, on the most searching scrutiny, the virtuous fulfillment and dignity attainable in the civic life of action can truly be a common good. In the first place, can full participation be a good common to both the few, in whom the civic virtues flower (like Pericles, within Athens, and like Athens as a whole, within the Greek world), and to the vast majority, of individuals or of cities possessing more average political capacities? Second, can civic participation even be a good unproblematically common among the few best?²² Simultaneously, the question is mooted whether it is possible to practice strict distributive justice, allocating office and honor on the basis of merit, and hence aristocratically, without in effect disenfranchising the majority, arousing their rebellious resentment, and thereby threatening the destruction of the city, whose preservation is the most basic aspect of the common good.²³

If one tries to circumvent these grave difficulties by asserting that the highest manifestation of civic virtue for an individual or a whole society is stepping down from, or voluntarily curtailing, the doing of noble deeds in order to turn the life of virtue over to others, one faces enormous paradoxes. Can the engrossing joy and satisfaction of a life of action be understood as culminating in the cessation of action, or in the drastic abridgment of action? Or, alternatively, is such voluntary self-restraint precisely *not* fulfilling and thus a form of noble self-sacrifice? But then can that sacrifice, that abandonment of challenging engagement, be understood as the end simply, or must it not be for something else if it is to be intelligible? So then, for what? Do the virtuous and capable abort their flourishing so that others, often less virtuous and less capable, may flourish? But ought not those others also abort and sacrifice their flourishing, if they are to act nobly? So, are no humans, no individuals or societies, to seek simple or unqualified fulfillment? How can the aim of human life and excellence be thought to be the abridgment of everyone's fulfillment? But if *someone's* fulfillment is the goal, why not the fulfillment of the virtuous?²⁴ Are virtuous persons or societies to understand themselves as means to the imperfect and less deserving happiness of others? Or do they not rightfully feel that they too, they above all, are ends, and that they, precisely by virtue of their great sacrifice, deserve and are entitled to hope for some condign compensation or consolation that will give them the fulfillment and happiness they merit?

But what is this compensation, and from whom does it come? Is it not here that we discern the essential role of divine providence? Does not civic virtue culminate in an obscure but powerful hope for a salvation beyond

anything directly attainable by human action? Yet if, or insofar as, compensation can be expected to accrue to the virtuous, then is virtue (or the virtuous abdication from virtuous action) really their goal after all? Or is their true goal not the fulfilling compensation—and insofar as they become self-conscious of this, how can they be said to sacrifice, when the apparent sacrifice is in fact a relinquishing of a lesser good for a far greater benefit? But if they do not sacrifice, in the true sense, how do they become deserving of, and on what basis can they hope for, a reward for sacrifice? In short, are we not compelled to recognize that the self-limitation of political ambition that we divine to be morally required is intelligible only if it is indeed good for the virtuous person, because abdication from political rule liberates such a person for a superior pursuit, in the light of which public office assumes the character of a burden that ought to be set aside when possible?²³

The problem and the imperfect solution are indicated in the crucial and remarkable passage in the *Politics* (1324a25–25b31) where Aristotle confronts the fundamental question of the best way of life. In the final analysis, he observes, there are only two truly serious contenders: the active or political life, on the one hand, and the theoretical or philosophic life, on the other. Aristotle frames the issue between the two in remarkable terms: on the side of those speaking for the philosophic life, we find “those who hold that the rule over neighbors, if despotic, is accompanied by a certain very great injustice, and, if political, does not involve injustice, but is still a hindrance to one’s own well-being.” On the opposing side, we find “an opinion the very contrary, as it were, to that of these former: that the active life—that is, the political life—is the only way of life for a real man. And some of these,” Aristotle adds, “declare that the despotic and tyrannical mode of rule is the only happy one; indeed, among some peoples, this is the standard for the laws and regime—mastery over neighbors.”

Aristotle at once takes issue with those who uphold the superiority of the political life, conceived as a life aimed at imperial expansion: “It would seem too strange, perhaps, for those willing to reflect, if *this* is the accomplishment of a statesman—to be able to theorize in order to rule and exercise mastery over neighbors, whether willing or unwilling.” Aristotle invokes the possibility that “there might well be a single city happy by itself, clearly carrying on a noble political life—if, that is, it is possible (as we may presume) for a city to manage by itself using morally serious laws; and the ordering of such a city’s regime will not be toward war or toward mastery over enemies.”

Yet having stated this ideal of autarky, Aristotle objects—in the name of the active and political life: “Happiness is activity, and moreover the actions

of those who are just and moderate encompass the completion of many and noble things.” “But,” he immediately adds, “someone would perhaps conclude on the basis of these determinations that the best is to be sovereign over everything; for thus one would be sovereign over the most and the noblest actions. So that it follows that one who has the capacity ought not to leave rule to his neighbor, but ought rather to take it away. . . . For the best is most choiceworthy, and acting well is best.” Aristotle concedes great force to this argument but remarks that it must include the premise that “the most choiceworthy of the beings may pertain to those who plunder and use violence.” “But maybe,” he remarks, “it cannot, and what they maintain is false.” Yet why? The argument Aristotle proceeds to give is the following strangely conditional one: “The deeds can no longer be noble if they are not done by someone who differs as much as a husband does from his wife or a father from his children or a master from his slaves. . . . For among similar persons what is noble and just is taking turns, for this is equal and similar.” Aristotle concludes with an astonishing pirouette: “Therefore, if someone should be stronger in virtue and in power to accomplish what is best, this person it is noble to follow and this person it is just to obey. But he ought to have not only virtue but power, through which he will be active.” What then is the clinching argument, if any, against virtuous or noble imperialism? Having compelled his reader to see this very grave moral doubt and difficulty, Aristotle brings his discussion to a close with a decisive denouement:

Yet the active life need not be in relation to others, as some suppose, nor are only those thoughts active which arise in activity for the sake of the results, but much more those thoughts that are complete in themselves and those theoretical speculations and reflections that are for their own sake. . . . Nor is it necessary that those cities which are situated by themselves and which choose to live thus be inactive. . . . And this is true similarly for any single human being. For otherwise the god and the whole cosmos could not be in a fine condition, since they have no external affairs beyond their own domestic affairs. It is therefore evident that the same way of life is necessarily the best for each of the human beings and also in common for the cities and for the human beings.

Aristotle here in effect suggests that the virtuous ambition of the individual and of the city to rule can find coherent limit only when the active civic virtues are correctly understood to be somehow parallel to the leisured and self-sufficient theoretical life, both of which take as their model the purely theoretical activity, life, and virtue of the god who heads the entire cosmos conceived as a quasi-organic unity. Without incorporating some

such theological understanding, civic life will find itself drawn toward the unwittingly base misinterpretation of its virtues as ultimately serving either material prosperity or imperial dominion or both. The responsible promotion and protection of the theoretical life is therefore a good common to the philosophers and to the city, despite the inevitable tensions and difficulties. The healthy city will and must seek to transcend itself; and it is the proper sort of civil religion, the classics teach, that can most reliably elicit and sustain a community’s treasuring of a leisure that opens citizens to appreciative meditation on the whole and on the special place of humanity in the whole—thereby putting a salutary ceiling over political ambition. Accordingly, classical political philosophy understands its highest civic duty to be the elaboration of a civil theology rooted in the study of nature and intended to influence—that is, to supplement or to reinterpret, to refine or to elevate, and to make more reasonable—the ancestral myths and traditions. Plato addresses this task especially in his *Laws*, *Epinomis*, and *Timaeus*; Aristotle in major portions of his “metaphysical” writings as well as in key passages of his political works; and Cicero through his adoption of the Stoic teaching on “natural law.”

The Transcendence of Nationalism and Patriotism

To the extent that a society were to become imbued with the kind of piety Plato and Aristotle recommend, that society would look up to a universal deity (although because civil society can never become simply philosophic, it might well also worship subordinate, local, providential deities).²⁶ Its citizens would therefore conceive of themselves as sharing with all humans in a single cosmic community. The polis would necessarily retain a strong sense of its own distinctive community but would interpret its particularism in the light of, and as an avenue toward, a higher cosmopolitanism.²⁷ Citizens would not be permitted to forget that all humans share a common nature and, what is more, a common good that cannot be simply reduced to or derived from collective selfish calculation and that is not eclipsed by the natural sources of antagonism. The natural sense of species-community is evident in the spontaneous pleasure humans take in one another’s company and prosperity and in the spontaneous compassion they exhibit toward one another’s suffering, as well as in their shared “conscience” or awareness of a universal and primordial justice that limits and guides their dealings with one another.²⁸ The common good of the species

ranges from a most basic shared concern, the survival of the race, to a most exalted concern, the fostering of human greatness.

Regarding this greatness, the properly enlightened city would have some awareness that humanity culminates in philosophy; that the genuine philosophers thrive in liberation from many or most of the objects of ambition and appetite that induce competition and antagonism among ordinary humans; and that they are naturally drawn to one another, and to the “puppies” of their race, by powerful mutual admiration and a strong sense of spiritual kinship as well as by the desire to help and be helped by one another, above all in the common pursuit of the truth. This means of course that the philosophers’ mutual attachments vary in intensity, in proportion to the degree to which they can live in proximity and enjoy congress with one another. But the philosophers’ hearts leap across familial, national, cultural, and temporal boundaries: “Socrates judged himself to be a native and citizen of the entire world.”²⁹ The “Socratic city’s” posture toward foreigners would be illuminated, then, by some awareness that the collective rational and political capacities whose fulfillment is the most elevated goal of the city are not capacities peculiar to the citizens of any particular nation but are natural to men as men. The very rare individuals who embody the fullest or most divine development of those powers may spring up in any civilized location. Plato’s Athenian Stranger goes so far as to say, “Divine human beings do not by nature grow any more frequently in cities with good laws than in cities without good laws.”³⁰ The highest in man transcends his city, even though it be the best city. This culminating or most natural fact about mankind would be reflected, however dimly, in the moral attitude of enlightened patriots toward outsiders. The enlightened citizens’ demeanor toward foreigners would echo in some degree their attitude toward one another (see especially Aristotle *Politics* 1328a8–12), the more so as they became more theologically self-conscious and refined.

What are the implications of this kind of civic perspective for foreign policy, or for relations with other political communities? In the best case, we can reasonably imagine that the “Socratic city” would aspire to a benevolent autarky that would approximate, on a human level and within human limits, the life of Aristotle’s god, who “has no external affairs.” Such a city would exhibit a readiness not only to engage in trade with but to teach and to learn from foreign cities and individuals. It would open its doors to a few deserving refugees. Morally, it would feel a sense of obligation to come to the active assistance of neighbors, and, if need be, to take over and manage their affairs—where such intervention would achieve

substantial good without endangering the fragile conditions of domestic community.³¹ Of course, much would depend on the specific international environment or neighborhood in which such a city found itself. Empire, even benevolently despotic empire, is by no means excluded as a possible necessity and duty.³² Nor can we forget that the city as the classics conceive it rests on slavery. Accordingly, Aristotle lays down a threefold set of criteria for the goals that reasonably justify military preparation in the best regime:

Moreover, it is not on account of this that a city should be held to be happy and a lawgiver should be praised, that he trained it to be superior so as to rule over its neighbors. . . . The same things are best in private and in public life, and the lawgiver ought to instill these in the souls of the human beings. And military training ought to be a matter of concern, not for the sake of enslaving those who are not deserving of such treatment, but in order that, first, they themselves might not be enslaved to others; and then, so that they might seek hegemony for the benefit of those they rule over, but not despotism over everyone; and thirdly, so that they might exercise despotism over those who deserve to be enslaved [cf. 1327b23-38]. But that the lawgiver ought to bend his serious efforts to ordering for the sake of leisure and peace what pertains to matters of war, as well as the rest of his legislation, is borne out by the evidence of events as well as by the arguments. For most of such cities [as were just referred to] are preserved as long as they are at war, but are destroyed once they acquire rule. And the fault is the lawgiver's, who failed to educate in the capacity to enjoy leisure. (*Politics* 1333b29-34a10)

Yet all of this implies that the city remains primarily concerned with its own welfare and only secondarily with the welfare of other cities and of the virtuous foreigners scattered among those cities. To be a citizen is still to be a citizen of this or that particular city and hence not to be a citizen of any other city; only in a paradoxical or metaphorical sense can one be a "citizen of the world."³³ The city, even or especially the best city, remains more a closed than an open society. For even a city ruled by the most rational conceivable rulers—philosopher-kings or their moral reflection—would have to maintain the austerity, the exclusivity, the rootedness, the intimacy, the military spirit, that we have seen to be essential or inescapable attributes of a healthy civic order. Even or precisely the best conceivable city would find itself in a world of more powerful, hostile or potentially hostile, powers and therefore in need of constant vigilance. The best regime would recognize the duty to evaluate all human beings on an equal basis, regardless of nationality, and to respect or to condemn persons strictly in accordance with their virtue. But a sensible statesman, attentive to the safety and honor of his own people, must aim his city's policy almost entirely at other govern-

ments. He can rarely make the direct goal of his policy the welfare of decent or noble individuals who happen to be living under foreign, and especially under hostile, governments, or who happen to be serving (perhaps against their will) in enemy armies. The reason why the welfare of noble and even deserving individuals must be subordinated is not that it is so difficult to locate, and communicate or deal with, select individuals abroad (for purposes of espionage, not to mention again other more painful exigencies, even a just city may have to locate and deal with discrete foreign individuals much if not all the time and in such a manner as neglects, if it does not damage, the interests of the most respectable foreigners). Rather, it is because of the costs and risks to national security. By the same token, the city must restrain or prohibit by law its own citizens from entering into individualistic "foreign relations" (consider Plato *Laus* 955b-c). Moreover, every city must grant enormous preferences to claims based on heredity and ethnicity in defining its qualifications for citizenship or inclusion and in setting the limits of its sense of fraternity with other cities. In book 5 of the *Republic*, as we have previously noted, Socrates must invoke ethnicity as a basis for his argument in order to persuade his militaristic young Athenian interlocutor, Glaucon, that war should be limited (fellow Greeks are to be treated as kin, even when war against them is necessary, and unrestricted warfare is to be waged only against non-Greeks). Plato would thus seem to indicate that even the best or most rational regime, bowing to all-too-natural prejudice, would have to continue to make ethnic loyalty a major consideration in its foreign policy. If it is true that in general humans are moved by kinship with, and feel some sense of obligation to, one another simply as humans, it is even more certain that the very nature of kinship implies a much more intense concern for and obligation to one's close kin, generally defined by blood. No responsible statesman can regularly allow obligations to meritorious strangers to take precedence over the pressing needs of his own people and their kin. The city is a city of families and is in some sense itself a large family, or indeed part of a larger transcivic ethnic family; and when it comes to the basic questions of who belongs and who does not, and of whose welfare takes priority in cases of conflict, natural human feeling dictates that blood trump fairness and merit.³⁴ Last but by no means least, the classical philosophers point in a quiet but incisive fashion to the question raised about the city's justice by the institution of conventional or legal slavery.³⁵

The more one ponders the severe restrictions on international community indicated by the Greek thinkers, the more one wonders to what extent they hope through their influence to bring about a relaxation of those

restrictions, and to what extent their brief but pregnant reflections on foreign and war policy are meant to indicate some of the sharpest limits on and questions about the justice of which cities are capable. This would mean to say that their teaching is intended chiefly as a liberation for select wise, or potentially wise, individuals. No doubt, the Socratics can reasonably hope that those few may have some appreciable influence upon their respective cities, mitigating patriotic xenophobia, imperialism, cruelty, and punitive moral fanaticism. But it would seem that in the original Socratic perspective, a truly cosmopolitan spirit is likely to flourish only among a few noble souls dispersed through the various cities and nations. The friendship or generous goodwill of these authentic cosmopolites toward one another will go together with a serene if circumspect benevolence toward mankind. They will manifest a concern to promote gentleness and reasonableness wherever possible and an affectionate desire to seek out, to communicate with, and to help liberate the few others—especially among the young—who might be capable of joining and contributing to the scattered world-fraternity of the wise.

3


Classical Cosmopolitanism

THE STOICS AND CICERO

The Roman Platonist Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.), the last great republican statesman of antiquity, has left us in his philosophic writings the fullest doctrinal elaboration of Socratic political theory in its implications for international affairs. Through his modification of Stoicism, Cicero erected the basic conceptual framework of the "law of nations" within which, or against which, all subsequent international law and normative international relations theory has defined itself.

By Cicero's time, the need for a universal natural theology and an international code of political and military ethics had become pressing. The Roman conquest had largely extinguished independent civic life and had sapped the vitality of civil religion, melting the cities into a polyglot empire whose elite was suffused with the popularized philosophy or theology of a wide variety of Greek sects (Epicureans, Stoics, Skeptics, Peripatetics, Old and New Academics, and so forth). Could Socratic political philosophy provide some qualified legitimation of Roman imperialism, thereby placing some moral limits on that imperialism? Could Socratic political philosophy shed light on perhaps the most baffling feature of the new imperial political universe—the obscuring of the distinction between domestic and foreign policy? How were Romans to understand their moral relations to the vast and diverse nonslave populations that they ruled? These subjects were not fellow citizens in the strong or traditional sense, sharing in the common good of the "city"; yet neither were they simply foreigners or the conquered any more. Decent Romans were serious in their wish not to treat their subject peoples like the downtrodden slaves of despotism (see, e.g., *Republic* 3.41). Cicero confronted a challenge that statesmen and theorists were to face time and again down through the ages: the possibility of genuine Socratic philosophy has to be kept alive, and the norms discovered and promulgated by Plato and Aristotle have to be applied, in conditions that are unmistakably decadent (*On Duties* 3.69, 3.74)—in circumstances for which the Greek philosophers' writings provide insufficient direct guidance.

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Y conectado a lo anterior. De dónde será que la gente no tiene ni idea de cómo cuestionar el paradigma totalitario de los “derechos humanos”? Lol. Fecode, por los derechos del mismísimo universo, y un poquito más!

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Conectado al anterior.

Thomas Pangle sobre "Derechos Humanos", pal que esté preocupado por Colombia y SABE QUE COLOMBIA ES MÁS IMPORTANTE QUE SUS DERECHOS. Pal que quiere saber cómo hacer de Colombia un país de GRANDEZA.

No coman cuento que los hace ver como medio "tontos". LOL

Human Rights in Our Time

Essays in Memory of Victor Baras

edited by Marc F. Plattner

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1

The Philosophical Foundation of Human Rights

Clifford Orwin and Thomas Pangle

Only in the West and in lands that it has touched, and only since the seventeenth century, has politics been understood as grounded upon rights enjoyed equally by all human beings simply because they are human beings. What once represented a novel transformation of the traditional Western understanding has become a Western imposition upon traditional understandings everywhere. One must at least wonder, however, whether in the course of conquering the world, "human rights" has not lost its soul. There is not a regime in the world today that does not profess to respect human rights. Yet there is hardly any political leader, sensible or otherwise, who can still articulate with confidence just what "human rights" means.

Part of the confusion over human rights stems from the very vogue the conception enjoys. Anything so prated about through all the nations of the earth is bound to lose much of its pristine core of meaning. It is also the case that regimes accused of violating human rights have a penchant for redefining those rights so as to bring themselves into compliance. The Soviet Union affirms human rights to those things that the Soviet Union already provides—like nominally universal access to free bad dental care. A great many Muhammads have taken this tempting shortcut to the mountain, and the clarity, as well as the reputation, of human rights has suffered as a result.

But political inconsistency and hypocrisy account for only a part of the confusion over human rights. Looming behind them is a problem of a more theoretical sort. In order to say what we mean by human rights, we must know what we mean by "human." By human, in turn, we must mean more than "born of human parents." Even if this last

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definition were not tautological and did not presume a prior understanding of the term to be defined, it would still do no more than identify that class of beings that enjoys human rights. It can cast no light on the character of those rights. If we as human beings enjoy certain rights that other classes of beings do not, that is because human beings are beings of a certain kind. A human being understood one way, as our Founding Fathers did, for example, will appear to possess different human rights than would a human being understood differently—as Plato, or the Stoics, did. As it is not overwhelmingly obvious in precisely what humanity consists, so it must be at least provisionally problematic in what human rights consist. In our century this problem has been vastly enlarged by the impact of modes of thought—especially Marxism, Existentialism, and certain types of scientism or behavioralism—that deny the possibility of speaking meaningfully of human nature at all. If man as a subject of rights is merely the product of ever-changing historical and cultural conditions, if he is nothing more than the malleable matter of an endless process of transformation, then there is nothing in him that can serve as the needed fixed star for “human rights.” There can be no rational or permanent standard by which to guide our growing power for self-transformation and self-destruction and nothing in us that can claim exemption from social engineering and manipulation. The dramatic loss of clear focus in contemporary discourse about human rights is thus a fact of far more than academic interest. The malaise it engenders has spread to every battleground of the struggle for human rights. It helps explain why the West can be so vacillating in demanding or defending the rights that it has lived by these several centuries.

In what follows we try to contribute to a recovery of the lucidity and precision with which liberals once spoke of the “rights of man.” With an outline of the authentic human rights tradition in view, we shall then briefly consider some of the current dilemmas we confront as heirs to this once young and vigorous tradition.

The notion of human rights, the appeal to the rights of man, stems from a specific tradition of political philosophy that began with Spinoza and Hobbes and matured in the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Kant. These men were the first to teach that all legitimate government derives its authority solely from the consent of the governed; that each sane adult, as an independent individual, must be understood to possess certain claims or rights that cannot be taken away, and for which he is beholden to no human authority; that far from being indebted to government or political society for these rights, the individual has joined with other individuals in creating, transforming, or maintaining government as an instrument whose major purpose is to protect and foster preexisting rights.

To grasp the significance of this point of departure, one must recall that prior to Thomas Hobbes, discussion of the legitimacy of government,

or appeals to standards of good government, made almost no reference to rights that were not derivative from a person's duties as a citizen. An individual's political dignity was thought to be grounded in his belonging to larger social and political wholes of which he was necessarily a part. Titles to rule depended only partially on consent, and that consent did not create but merely recognized and ratified political authority grounded in other sources, such as divine revelation, age and experience, moral virtue, superior birth, wisdom, wealth, and parenthood. The purpose of authority so understood was to guide men to fulfillment through participation in a particular way of life that the community encouraged at the expense of other ways of life.

The commitment to human rights, however, does not entail an endorsement of any particular conception of human perfection or of man's destiny. On the contrary, to lay stress on the rights of man is to allow controversy about the ultimate meaning of life to recede into the background of politics. Government is certainly supposed to protect the “pursuit of happiness,” but it should hesitate in giving direction to that pursuit; without becoming altogether neutral, or limitlessly tolerant, political life at its best is to foster a much greater diversity than was hitherto believed prudent or desirable. This wide shift in perspective follows from the insight that every human being, apart from and prior to any other ties and obligations he or she may have, possesses as an individual certain desires that are uniquely human and that cannot be chosen or rejected but are simply given. These desires are observably less alterable than any others and can therefore be said to be a part of man's natural constitution. The drive to satisfy them appears to be the only generally shared goal of human societies, and one may reasonably conclude that this drive is the fundamental and the only indisputable reason why men come together in political societies. It thus provides an objective political standard, a ground upon which all government, whatever its other aims, must stand—and which gives every citizen a set of claims against his government and his fellow citizens.

The Original Understanding

What are the desires that have such a status? The first and strongest, wrought into the very principles of human nature, is self-preservation. Nature teaches all creatures the general rule of self-preservation, but only in human beings does this rule operate through a potentially rational mind that produces knowledge of death and its causes, as well as a personality that seeks to sustain and continue to express itself. The mind's knowledge necessarily leads to anxiety and to an overwhelming urge to improve one's physical condition so as to postpone death and minimize the suffering that brings death nearer. Hence the root *human* need is, in Locke's phrase, “comfortable preservation,”¹ or what Montesquieu more expansively calls “that tranquility of mind which arises from an individual's opinion of his security.”² The basic *raison d'être* and re-

sponsibility of government is then not only to provide immediate physical security but also to give each individual the opportunity to make his own future more secure.

This means in the first place that individuals have a right to stable government that preserves order, outlaws violence on the part of private persons, and uses its own monopoly of coercion to protect citizens from assault on life or limb.

But it is not enough that citizens be kept merely alive and uninjured. Human beings have in the second place a right to liberty of action and movement that fosters their preservation by allowing them the expectation that the safety and comfort of their being and the continued exercise of their faculties do not depend on the arbitrary will of any other individual.

The action that is the most sensible response to the anxiety inherent in the human condition is productive labor, by which men transform the raw materials of nature into commodities of life. A crucial human freedom is therefore the freedom of labor and the freedom to enjoy the fruits of one's labor. But to provide much real security these fruits must be accumulable. It follows that men have, in the third place, a right to accumulate and use—even to destroy by using—outward things such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like. Without this, individuals in all stations of life lack firm trust that their own hard work will improve their condition; they lose the capacity to create tangible private barriers against ill fortune and the inevitable wearing down of all human conveniences; and it becomes much less likely that they can secure for themselves a permanent, private home—a sphere of their own within which to do as they please. The right to accumulate private property is hence at the heart of the original notion of human rights:

Property being an inviolable and sacred right, no one may be deprived of it, except when the public necessity, legally established, evidently demands it, and under the condition of a just and prior indemnification.³

Given the incomprehension that so often attends contemporary discussion of the human right to property, it is perhaps prudent to pause and draw attention to what is distinctive about the understanding of property in this human rights tradition. For the idea of an inalienable right to acquire property stands in profound contrast to classical and medieval Christian or feudal conceptions. No longer is private property viewed as an uneasy, temporary compromise with human sinfulness or as the dangerous if necessary consequence of man's departure from the Age of Kronos, the Golden Age. Private property is now seen as an institution that gives reasonable expression to the need every man has to labor and coordinate his labor with that of others in order to ameliorate a natural situation of want and scarcity. The right of acquiring, and of enlarging one's acquisitions, may foster avarice and selfishness and may lead (especially when unregulated) to unfairness; but with all its failings, the system of private property can be at once an efficient incentive to

the ever-increasing production that benefits all and a just recompense for differing degrees of mental and physical effort. Property so conceived is dynamic, not static, and its ownership and acquisition are to be diffused as widely as possible. There ceases to be any moral justification for restricting the ultimate control over land and material goods to a hierarchic minority purportedly endowed with superior virtue or wisdom, whether that wisdom has its source in nature, divine revelation, or insight into the “historical process.”

Yet, as the famous pronouncement we have cited above indicates, the obligation of civil society to protect property by no means deprives government of the right and responsibility of regulating it. To quote John Locke, “In governments the laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions”; men “enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property.”⁴ Appropriate regulation of property ought to vary to suit the variety of geographic, historic, and economic circumstances. The regulation itself is a matter for prudence rather than strict rule or theoretical principle; in the words of Montesquieu, “There is nothing which is more in need of being guided by wisdom and prudence than the question of how much should be taken away and how much should be left in the hands of subjects.”⁵ It is thus altogether possible that a certain degree of socialism or government ownership may be compatible with the upholding of the right to private property.

Still, this “inviolable and sacred” right must never be lost sight of and must be viewed in the light of the differing and unequal laboring capacities of individuals. For the authors of *The Federalist Papers*, “the first object of government” is the “protection of these different and unequal faculties of acquiring property.”⁶ Or as Montesquieu puts it, “Let us then make it a maxim that when it comes to the public goods, the public good demands that one never deprive an individual of his goods, or rather that one take away from him the least possible.”⁷ The property right is obviously abridged whenever government ceases to maintain some opportunity for acquiring clear legal title, for saving and investment, for choice among investments, for moving about in quest of more lucrative, comfortable, or suitable work, for entering freely into enforceable contracts, and for organizing collective bargaining within the labor force.

The natural rights to life, liberty, and property gain an additional dimension from the fact that they flow not only from the desire for self-preservation but also from a second and different, though closely related, desire. Next to the desire for self-preservation there is planted in men by nature a strong desire of propagating their kind and continuing themselves in their posterity. We note that this human desire again represents a transformation of a drive that pervades all of life. All other creatures, one may say, have as their strongest desire the urge to propagate and continue their several *species*; but only human individuals can strive

to continue their own selves in their offspring and come to love their offspring as an extension of themselves. This distinctively human relation to offspring, partly grounded in the equally distinctive human desire for self-preservation, is the universal—although not the sole—foundation of the human family, in all its varied manifestations. It is thus evident that the rights we are discussing inhere in human beings not only as individuals but as parents or potential parents concerned with protecting their children and spouses as well as themselves. To be sure, since the human family is permeated by convention and manifests itself in such manifold forms, many aspects of family life (including some of the most important ones) cannot be specified by the imperatives of human rights. Whether, for example, polygamy should be encouraged or forbidden; how contracts, divorce, and property between spouses should be regulated; the allowable sorts of population control: These are all affairs left to political prudence, religion, and moral tradition. What dedication to human rights does require is that legal authorities support the privacy and sanctity of the marital bond, the responsibility and authority of parents, and the honor and obedience owed by children. In particular, the rights of bequest and inheritance, as part of the fundamental property right, must be secured. For through bequeathal, parents may contribute personally to their children's future welfare while helping to insure that old age will find helpers eager to reciprocate the care and attention lavished upon them in their infancy.⁸

Political and Civil Rights

The principles outlined constitute the basic stratum of the human rights doctrine, but they are by themselves insufficient. In order to implement them, certain other rights must be established—rights that come into being through government or civil society and that are therefore called the "civil" and the "political" rights or liberties. It is useful to divide these into five levels, arranged in descending order of urgency.

On the first and most essential level are two rights without which it is impossible to envisage even a minimum of legitimacy in government, or any reliable safety for life and property: the right to emigrate and the right to the rule of law. Remove the former, and there is left no supposition that government is based on consent; accordingly, there can be left no great expectation that government heeds or respects the needs of the governed. In the absence of the latter—administration by standing, promulgated rules that apply generally and are enforced by known authorities who impose known penalties—citizens have no way of being sure what if any behavior will leave them free of menace from their governors and one another. Even foolish or brutal laws provide more protection than lawless authority.⁹

At the second level is the right to guarantees that the law, whatever it may be, will be enforced in an equitable manner, and that both public prosecutions and civil suits between private persons will be guided by

fair and reasonable procedures. What this requires above all is a neutral and independent judiciary. The practices of such a judiciary may vary widely from one nation to another, but a small core of sacrosanct procedures can be specified—those minimally necessary to insure that both sides in a trial get a full and fair hearing. These include public and speedy trials that do not presume the guilt of the accused and that provide power of subpoena; access on the part of the accused to the charges, the witnesses, and the evidence against him or her, as well as access to counsel; and the prohibition of torture, coercion of witnesses, forced self-incrimination, and violation of marital confidentiality.

The third level of rights comprises the freedom to express one's opinions in speech and published writing. The primary justification for such freedom is the need men have to keep abreast of events within and without their societies in order to inform themselves and their rulers of threats to their security. Beyond this, economic growth (implicit in the property right) calls for a flow of information regarding trade, as well as the encouragement of technological research. But something more is at stake. Man's natural longings obviously are not circumscribed by the desire for comfortable self-preservation; one may also characterize man's right to liberty more broadly, as a right to the "pursuit of Happiness."¹⁰ If the doctrine of the rights of men deduces universal rights principally from desires whose objects are universally agreed upon, it does not intend to deny other more spiritual longings the goals of which are doubtful or even highly controversial. We are not truly human without religious, artistic, and philosophic—as well as economic, political, and familial—expression. It follows that men have a right to a freedom of inquiry that goes beyond what may be required to promote domestic peace, economic growth, and national defense; men may demand, and given human nature, cannot but demand, that any legal restriction on speech be shown to be necessary for the maintenance of security and the prerequisites of a continuing exchange of ideas:

No one should be disturbed because of his opinions, even religious, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.

The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man; every citizen, therefore, may freely speak, write, and print, subject to responsibility for the abuse of that liberty in cases determined by law.¹¹

The civil liberties enumerated thus far may persist in political systems that do not permit any further political role to the vast majority of the citizens; but even where these civil rights are well entrenched, men are quite reasonably uneasy about the future if they lack meaningful participation in the choice of the rulers who have the power to enforce or alter custom. At the fourth level, then, are the political rights of active

citizenship in a government that is to some degree republican. The least this requires is that citizens have a right to representation in the legislative process, through delegates chosen in open and contested elections. As goes without saying, freedom of political speech, including protest and argument with government officials, is essential to this kind of political process. Furthermore, given the power of taxation to shape public policy and its potential threat to the property of the citizenry, representation will be genuinely significant only where the people's elected representatives have a decisive voice in the levying of taxes.

The foregoing remarks about republican government are of course highly abstract. If one attempts to move to more specific political prescriptions while still speaking the language of universal rights, one runs the risk of imposing a spurious homogeneity, and perhaps a dangerous straitjacket, on political prudence and cultural heterogeneity. Nevertheless, it is possible, proceeding with caution, to discern a fifth level of rights. Men have a right to a government that secures them against potential abuses of political power by distributing that power among distinct and balanced institutions or groups. The form this division of power takes may vary enormously, from the mixed regime of antiquity, through limited monarchy, to federalism and the bicameral legislature combined with separation of the legislative and executive functions. What is universal and simply human is only the right to protection through some such constitutional order.

The Kantian Transformation

It was in the name of this doctrine of human rights, elaborated by the giants of the Enlightenment, that glorious revolutions were fought and won in both England and America. But a long and important chapter in the philosophic understanding of human rights remained to be written, a chapter begun by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and completed by his successor Immanuel Kant. Although Kant adopted much of the human rights teaching of his great liberal predecessors, he was determined to place the teaching on a nobler footing. Inspired by Rousseau, Kant argued that man's assertion of his liberty cannot be convincingly accounted for wholly on the basis of the calculating desire for security; that may explain the genesis, but it cannot encompass the full power and meaning of the struggle for human rights. What is required in addition is some reflection on the historical unfolding of that struggle.¹² For in the course of history, as men have groped their way toward a deeper comprehension of freedom and of the institutions that best secure it, they have witnessed the awakening within mankind of a distinct and irreducible experience of reverence for the individual, as an autonomous, and not merely secure or comfortable, being. Men may begin by fighting for their rights largely in order to guarantee their safety; but in the process they discover that the rights are more precious than the safety the rights help secure. What is more, each person's attachment

to his own rights is transformed by becoming subordinate to an attachment to the rights of men at large. Self-preservation comes to be seen as in the service of freedom, while freedom, and thereby life itself, takes on real dignity only when it is an expression of universal principles that can define the independence of all men as men. Paradoxically, by becoming partisans of the human rights, most if not all of whose content is dictated by the requirements of mundane security, men may discover the only genuine expression of a cosmopolitan humanity transcending mere security.

As men become self-conscious about this more sublime dimension of their commitment to the cause of human rights, they naturally seek opportunities to advance that cause throughout the world. In other words, when the human rights are seen from the perspective Kant identifies and promotes, the question of their international bearing comes increasingly to the fore. This question had always been present in discussions of the rights of man, but Kant tried to change both its formulation and the answer it received.

Initially, theorists of international relations who were influenced by the notion of natural rights tended to ascribe to the community of nations a much looser moral tie, and a weaker set of mutual policing duties, than had been advocated by the Christian natural law tradition. This last, with its doctrine of the "just war," its subordination of political concerns to theological ones, and its insistence on the unity of Christendom, had refused to acknowledge the moral self-sufficiency and hence the ultimate autonomy of any particular political community. Insofar, however, as government derives its purpose from the idea of human rights, it does not look to some cosmopolitan religious aim or to the promotion of some particular virtuous way of life in the world. Instead, it understands itself as dedicated to the protection of those citizens who consented to and created it and whose interests alone it "represents." With regard to other individuals or groups outside it, including other societies, each society remains in a "state of nature." It remains, that is, an independent or "sovereign" entity bound only by such obligations as it takes upon itself, in the form of treaties and the like. Each state is related to other states and persons in the same way that individuals are related to one another prior to contracting to form a society or submit to laws and government. Individuals in such a situation are concerned with the protection of the rights of others partly out of compassionate humanity, but mainly because they think an assault on another implies a threat to their own security. Once men live under the protective roof of government, the latter reason for being concerned about the rights of others who are not fellow inhabitants of the structure greatly diminishes. Each government, it is true, retains a vital concern for the independence and security of other governments, because an aggressor who menaces one nation may menace others—but concern for a neighbor government's independence does not seem to entail concern for the rights of individual subjects ruled by that government.

Yet it was recognized that there is some connection between any government's respect for the rights of its citizens and its belligerent or pacific proclivities. On the whole, it was thought, the more government is dedicated to providing security for its citizenry the less prone it is to be carried away by the religious, nationalist, and vainglorious enthusiasms that lead to war. Hence it makes good sense to cultivate concern for human rights among one's neighbors. But the most effective governmental means for doing so appeared to be the encouragement of international commerce, especially when conducted by private individuals. The free market gives rise to a relatively peaceful form of acquisitiveness or ambition and fosters enlightened, if selfish, impulses to property protection, freedom of movement and choice, and the exchange of ideas—including up-to-date ideas about legitimate government. Of course, these salutary results are less likely where trade is managed by government monopolies in tightly restricted economies.

This general outlook, which relies more on rightly understood self-interest than on humanitarianism, remains a defensible interpretation of the implications of human rights for foreign policy. But in the political philosophy of Kant a new understanding of the need for international promotion of human rights emerges. According to Kant, a necessary consequence of the progressive historical awakening of man's awareness of his human dignity (as an individual dedicated to universal rights) is a movement to educate and mobilize a public opinion that keeps vigilant watch over the fate of human rights in all corners of the globe.¹³ Naturally, the question soon arises whether enlightened government should not be induced to lend its weight to such a movement. After all, government is a much more powerful advocate than any private individual or group; in addition, by publicly endorsing a more internationalist or cosmopolitan attitude toward human rights, government enhances the sanctity of these same rights within its own jurisdiction. The great difficulty, however, is this: The very same coercive strength that makes governmental suasion so compelling also poses a formidable threat to the self-determination of foreign peoples. If the commitment to human rights is intended to secure the conditions of autonomy, it ought not to risk depriving others of the challenge and the opportunity of deciding their own political destinies.

A League of Nations

What then ought to be done at the governmental level? The solution Kant proposes is international organization: the "League of Nations," for which he, more than any other philosopher, provided the theoretical grounding. Kant rejected the idea of a true world government, and not only because he thought it impractical. He feared much more that the concentration of military force in one sovereign government would lead to a "soulless despotism" and the stifling of all meaningful diversity. That for which a liberal government should strive is a federation of

nations, whose precise juridical status and powers Kant leaves tantalizingly ambiguous.¹⁴ The federation's meetings could provide a neutral forum in which liberal governments might rally world opinion against violators of human rights. Even more important, Kant believed, was the progress a league of nations might make toward the goal of "Perpetual Peace." For it is through acts of war that governments engage in the most massive assaults on the security of individuals, and it is by having to go to war that individuals are compelled to treat others in ways that affront human rights most brutally. A confederacy of the states dedicated to peace and human rights could mitigate competition among members while bringing the weight of collective sanctions, including in the final analysis military sanctions, to bear against aggressors and nonliberal nations whose violations of human rights were so gross as to render internal resistance impossible.

Kant was aware that his elevating transformation of the human rights doctrine might render that doctrine more controversial. It was in his hands that human rights began to lose their moorings in indisputably evident, universally observable human desires and threatened to float up into the mists of metaphysical claims about free will, God, and the historical process. The most striking symptom is a change in terminology: Whereas Kant's forerunners spoke emphatically of human rights as "natural" rights—rights deducible from factual evidence of human practice—Kant initiates the tendency to eschew "empirical" evidence when speaking of the "normative" realm. Yet no political theorist was more anxious than Kant to provide norms for political action that would win universal acceptance from reasonable men. Kant therefore strove to prove that in the long run there was no conflict, that there was in fact a coincidence, between the demands of moral commitment to a League of Nations and the requirements of a purely pragmatic statecraft.

Although acknowledging that the spread of commerce and economic interdependence had the potential to pacify international competition, Kant pointed out that it hardly eliminated competition and, what was worse, armed that competition with financial and technological resources that made war more protracted and destructive when it did occur. By the same token, although Kant was even more hopeful than his predecessors that the imperatives of domestic economy and the spread of popular enlightenment would undermine oppressive government, he feared that the next few generations would see as much in the way of violent upheaval as of peaceful reform. What he predicted, therefore, was a growth in the ferocity and incidence of war stimulating an increasing awareness of war's folly. Eventually, a League of Nations with the liberal societies in the ascendant would cease to appear a utopian dream and become an irresistible demand of both political realism and popular sentiment.¹⁵

Kant's political thought, and the brand of liberal internationalism he engendered, evinces a remarkable mixture of lucidity and naivete. On

the one hand, he was the first political philosopher to voice accurate, unmistakable warnings about the new dangers unleashed by weapons technology, economic centralization, and mass armies. On the other, his thought failed altogether to prepare men for an international situation riven by deep differences of principle or "ideology." Kant was under the illusion that such disputes were on the way to extinction along with religious warfare and "uncritical" metaphysics. The hopes he inspired for a League of Nations or a United Nations depended decisively on the emergence among the advanced or developed nations of a strong, unhyphenated consensus supporting human rights. That faith was sustainable so long as opposition seemed to come solely from the Right and could be labeled reactionary or atavistic. But the advent of a relentless left-wing totalitarianism claiming (with frightening plausibility) to represent the tide of history has shattered the Kantian dream. No sooner had "human rights" triumphed over the ancient regime—politically in the American and French Revolutions and spiritually in the minds of intellectuals almost everywhere in the West—than its pristine unity was rent, probably never to be restored.

For this outcome Kant himself must bear some of the responsibility. His understanding of human rights was at the same time moralistic and utopian: It held political life to moral standards of unprecedented rigor, while it preached—with qualifications that were almost sure to get lost in the shuffle—the imminence of an era of universal rationality and dignity. It thus aroused expectations that the older liberal understanding of human rights, and the societies grounded in it, could not and cannot hope to fulfill. Far from lending support to existing liberal regimes, the Kantian way of thinking about politics, especially in its Marxist and other left-wing transformations, has placed them permanently on the defensive.

At the same time it cannot be denied that Rousseau and Kant brought out the power of the moral appeal of human rights, an appeal that earlier theorists had exploited without sufficiently explaining. It is doubtful that the enthusiasm and even reverence commonly evoked by the doctrine of rights of man could ever have been due merely to enlightened self-interest. In particular, freedom of expression and the right to self-government shine with a dignity greater than that allowed for in the original version of the human rights teaching. Such freedoms must indeed be valued as means to securing each individual's pursuit of happiness defined primarily as safety and comfort, but at the same time they demand to be interpreted as expressions of humanity's spirituality. For this reason it is unlikely that any nation dedicated to human rights will permit its government to define "national interests" in purely expedient terms.

The Contemporary Crisis of Human Rights

Today we find ourselves in a situation for which the twofold philosophic tradition underlying human rights does not offer unambiguous guidance.

As a composite of different stages of Western thought, it is often at tension with itself, its two strands sustaining contradictory political conclusions. But far graver is the fact that the entire complex tradition has been superseded, in the predominant intellectual circles, by two newer understandings of politics that are hostile to the very notion of permanent, universal, and inalienable individual rights. On such understanding is Marxism, and the other is moral relativism.

If only for the sake of argument or because their opponents force them to it, Marxist and quasi-Marxist regimes have also taken to talking of human rights. For Marx himself, it must be noted, the rights of man offered a typically insidious example of "bourgeois formalism." They were the deceitful and self-deceiving veil behind which the bourgeois minority hid its exploitation of the proletarian majority. It is not only that these principles did not tend to the equal economic benefit of all—something, of course, that they had never pretended to do—but that they expressed, in their focus on the individual, an outmoded and perverted view of man. Self-concern, competitiveness, the family, and private property—all these must be dissolved in the cauldron of human "species-being" and by the abolition of the division of labor.

It is no wonder, then, that contemporary Marxist regimes greet criticism stated in terms of human rights with a collectivist reinterpretation of these that utterly transforms their original meaning. Sometimes, to be sure, they merely lie. Honoring the imposing example of Stalin's Constitution of 1935, they claim to extend to the individual a wide range of rights that they in fact deny him. Even in so lying, however, they assert that possession of such rights is contingent upon respect for collective interests. Insofar as Marxists will speak of sacrosanct human rights, they will vest them not in the individual but in the proletariat as a class, in the Marxist state, or the party—or, in the case of Third World pseudo-Marxists, in the popular or national will as divined by the nation's leaders. Rather than protecting the individual, "human rights" thus understood provide an unflinching excuse for ignoring and oppressing him. Hence that combination of surliness and aggrieved self-righteousness with which Marxist countries greet Western sallies in support of human rights.

The impact of moral (or historical or cultural) relativism on human rights is something to which we alluded in the first pages of this essay. Relativism makes human rights impossible in theory and so has confused and eroded commitment to them in practice. If there are no permanent, universal, and knowable standards of good or bad for human beings (whether founded, as Locke thought, in nature or, as Kant believed, in reason and history), there can be no authoritative enumeration of human rights. Like everything else in the moral realm, human rights become historically or culturally relative, or a matter of individual preference. No rational defense of human rights is possible, whether of the notion in general or of any particular version of it. This is a far cry from the "self-evident truths" that once presided over liberal democracy, as it is

also from a Kantian faith in a rational historical process of which liberal society is the culmination. It means that however deeply we may happen to cherish our Western heritage of human rights, we have no rational ground for complaint if somebody thumbs his nose at them or is pleased to insist on an alternative list. For such a person rejects them with neither more nor less right than we cherish them.

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?

All of these confusions, and the diffidence stemming from them, converge on the issue of "economic, social, and cultural" rights. These are rights that, as their names imply, know how to keep their distance from civil and political ones. They include such things as a right to health, to housing, to education, to employment, and to many other goods. Separate United Nations covenants deal with each of these two "baskets" of rights, political and nonpolitical. This implicit recognition of the parity of the two has rightly been viewed as a victory for the Soviet Union as the patriarch of every society that underwrites, widely if not well, many of the rights just listed while quashing civil and political ones. Because there are now so many such societies, however, actual or merely aspiring, the victory is not that of the Russians alone, and it is no accident that in recent decades it has been this newer set of human rights that has tended to dominate international public discourse. The argument is often heard, and most of the nations of the world act as though they accept it, that nations must crawl before they can walk and that "economic, social, and cultural" rights are both more basic than, and a prerequisite of, civil and political ones.

At least as far as certain fundamental economic and social rights are concerned, there is some sense to this position. Nobody would deny that some degree of safety, health, and prosperity comprise the most urgent requirements of human beings. Nor may we doubt that civil and political freedoms will not long survive, nor easily come into being, where the longings for these basic goods are frustrated. Precisely because nobody would deny these things, however—least of all the founders of the original human rights tradition, so insistent on civil and political rights—we must attend to what may be lurking behind the current stress on these obvious points.

The notion of subpolitical rights is not in itself novel; Locke, it will be remembered, argued for natural rights to life, liberty, and property. What he meant by the last of these, however, was not a claim against society for any fixed degree of property, but the freedom or opportunity for all, within reasonable limits of law, to endeavor to acquire property and, having acquired it, to dispose of it. This right he presented as a natural and necessary extension of the right to endeavor to preserve oneself. And he went on to argue that in order for an individual to enjoy it in security, civil and political rights are required as well. Hence that venerable Lockean slogan, "no taxation without representation,"

which also implies the gamut of liberties needed to insure that representation is more than merely nominal.

In urging economic freedom for all under law as the crucial economic right, and in insisting on civil and political rights as its indispensable handmaidens, Locke articulated two of the cardinal premises of modern liberal democracy. He was also the proponent of a third, the truth of which has now been established for Western and non-Western societies alike: the efficacy of the combination of economic, civil, and political freedoms in fostering economic growth. In all of these respects, however, "economic rights" à la the United Nations present a rather different picture.

The ultimate primacy of economic concerns over political ones—the point of agreement between Locke and today's proponents of economic rights—is rarely used today as he used it, to argue vigorously for political rights. Instead the assumption seems to be that the two are commonly in tension and that the less-urgent political rights must wait—or be expressed only "collectively"—pending the achievement of "development." Economic needs serve to explain away, minimize, or detract attention from the widespread denial of political rights.

But are these economic goals properly awarded the honorific title "rights"? The striking fact is that today's fashionable "economic rights" are not necessarily either economic freedoms or economic claims vested in each individual. They are instead universal claims to the satisfaction of aggregate societal needs (housing, sanitation, education, etc.); as demands on the economy rather than rules for the protection of individuals, they lend themselves to justifying the suppression of economic freedoms and individual rights in the name of meeting the demands (or demonstrating statistical progress in meeting them). Moreover, the list of economic demands posing as ultimate, universal human rights tends to multiply, for no clear standard informs them, and no great reflection produced them. They are merely things that most people want, and that the poorer countries wish they could persuade the richer ones to give them. They are open-ended and hence often unreasonable. There is no way, for example, that an underdeveloped country can provide adequate education or medical care for all of its citizens. By proclaiming these as universal human rights, however, such countries arm themselves with the most respectable of reasons for pressing for the global redistribution of wealth. No one can blame them for that; but we can question the status as "human rights" of what are, in a sense, letters to Santa Claus. Meanwhile, it is sobering to observe that neither the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights nor the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States so much as recognizes the individual's right to property or the state's duty to protect such a right.¹⁶

Right-wing regimes, to be sure, rarely succeed in dazzling the forums of international opinion by invoking collective and nonpolitical rights.

also from a Kantian faith in a rational historical process of which liberal society is the culmination. It means that however deeply we may happen to cherish our Western heritage of human rights, we have no rational ground for complaint if somebody thumbs his nose at them or is pleased to insist on an alternative list. For such a person rejects them with neither more nor less right than we cherish them.

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?

All of these confusions, and the diffidence stemming from them, converge on the issue of "economic, social, and cultural" rights. These are rights that, as their names imply, know how to keep their distance from civil and political ones. They include such things as a right to health, to housing, to education, to employment, and to many other goods. Separate United Nations covenants deal with each of these two "baskets" of rights, political and nonpolitical. This implicit recognition of the parity of the two has rightly been viewed as a victory for the Soviet Union as the patriarch of every society that underwrites, widely if not well, many of the rights just listed while quashing civil and political ones. Because there are now so many such societies, however, actual or merely aspiring, the victory is not that of the Russians alone, and it is no accident that in recent decades it has been this newer set of human rights that has tended to dominate international public discourse. The argument is often heard, and most of the nations of the world act as though they accept it, that nations must crawl before they can walk and that "economic, social, and cultural" rights are both more basic than, and a prerequisite of, civil and political ones.

At least as far as certain fundamental economic and social rights are concerned, there is some sense to this position. Nobody would deny that some degree of safety, health, and prosperity comprise the most urgent requirements of human beings. Nor may we doubt that civil and political freedoms will not long survive, nor easily come into being, where the longings for these basic goods are frustrated. Precisely because nobody would deny these things, however—least of all the founders of the original human rights tradition, so insistent on civil and political rights—we must attend to what may be lurking behind the current stress on these obvious points.

The notion of subpolitical rights is not in itself novel; Locke, it will be remembered, argued for natural rights to life, liberty, and property. What he meant by the last of these, however, was not a claim against society for any fixed degree of property, but the freedom or opportunity for all, within reasonable limits of law, to endeavor to acquire property and, having acquired it, to dispose of it. This right he presented as a natural and necessary extension of the right to endeavor to preserve oneself. And he went on to argue that in order for an individual to enjoy it in security, civil and political rights are required as well. Hence that venerable Lockean slogan, "no taxation without representation,"

which also implies the gamut of liberties needed to insure that representation is more than merely nominal.

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Right-wing collectivism is not much in demand. Besides, to liberals there is something transparent about citing economic freedom in defense of oligarchies that deliberately regulate property to prevent rather than to promote the diffusion of economic opportunity. But "progressive regimes"—one swallows hard at that term—by dint of their "progressiveness," do manage to fool a lot of the people a lot of the time, as they brandish many fine paper rights, primarily of the shiny, recently devised sort. It would be unpleasantly ironic if the rhetoric of human rights, having begun by staunchly propounding the freedoms of the individual, political and subpolitical, should come in the end to align itself against them.

The great practical achievement of the older human rights tradition, in establishing the "inalienable rights" of the individual, was precisely to deprive despotism of theoretical or philosophical respectability. There was no right, individual or collective, however derived, whether of a majority or minority, in the name of which any individual could be deprived of his rights unless he had voluntarily transferred or forfeited them. The newer tradition threatens to reverse this result. By transferring the focus of human rights away from the individual and his various freedoms, it takes the formerly inalienable and makes it hostage to other concerns. It has thus become easier to justify, harder to protect against, assaults upon the individual.

The Primacy of the Individual

We have already made it abundantly clear where we would turn to discover the theoretical foundation for a viable U.S. human rights policy. The place to begin is with the first and most basic—also by far the solidest—stratum of the modern human rights tradition. That is the one proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence and given its finest elaboration in the thoughtful rhetoric of Abraham Lincoln. More than any other, this aspect of the tradition is our own and remains embodied in the institutions of both our government and our society. It is the only version of human rights viable in the world today that focuses unequivocally on the individual and his basic freedoms. This is crucial in a world in which, as one careful surveyor of the state of human rights has concluded, "more and more the individual stands alone in the face of an all-pervading State."¹⁷ If this focus on the individual can no longer bear, as it once seemed to do, the stamp of theoretical certainty, its practical urgency—and so, one may hope, its moral appeal—remains, to put it mildly, undiminished. Finally, this stratum of the human rights tradition is the least dogmatic or parochial and the most politic one.

This point is worth emphasizing. We are all used to hearing how the attempt to apply U.S. notions of human rights in milieux unresponsive to them smacks of naivete or even "cultural imperialism." Complacency and high-handedness do exist, and Americans have displayed their share of them. But the better we understand our tradition, the more it will

impress us by its inherent resilience and adaptability. To further the principles of human rights that underlie U.S. institutions is not necessarily to strive to export the institutions themselves, let alone to demand of other nations that they swallow them whole or as a whole. For these institutions are merely the adaptation, to conditions peculiar to the United States, of an understanding that originated in Europe and has become the common heritage of the West. To renew this understanding on the level of human rights policy need amount to nothing more parochial than this: to champion the cause of the priority, dignity, and liberties of the individual human being.

We have already suggested the relatively undogmatic character of that stratum of the human rights tradition that inspired the founders of the United States of America: By presenting this understanding in the form of a structure resembling a pyramid, we tried to indicate the order and relative priority of the different human rights. All the human rights merit protection, but not all are strictly absolute: What is required is respect for the edifice of human rights as a whole. Some rights are more urgent than others because the others depend on them, and their violation entails more lasting and destructive consequences. Thus any government may in a moment of crisis suspend civil and political liberties in order to maintain the prepolitical rights to life, private liberty, and property—such being also the only way of preserving the prospects of the liberties suspended. (Witness, even within the rights-loving Anglo-Saxon tradition, wartime censorship of the press and suspension of habeas corpus.)

Thus, also, verdicts as to the relative legitimacy of regimes in terms of human rights must attend not just to the rank of the rights that may be neglected, but to the rank and scope of such as may be protected. In such cases (it may be conceded) respect for the rights that are acknowledged will almost always suffer because of the neglect of those that are not: The different levels of rights, when in place, mutually reinforce one another. It may nonetheless be stated that in practice the protection of human rights need not be a matter of all or nothing. In addition, the concrete political situation and the viable alternatives open to the ruling body must be taken into account; nor is it merely the degree of the violation that is pertinent, but also its duration and the prospects for redress.

It follows that a reasonable policy of advancing human rights involves complex and cautious, if ultimately stern, moral judgment. It hardly helps to draw up lengthy lists of rights without indication of their justification, derivation, and ranking. This is another reason to be leery of the elaborate pronouncements of the United Nations, which prove to be less declarations of human rights than enumerations of ultimately desirable goals to be achieved universally in some world more fortunate than our own. When the permanent core of human rights is thus gift-wrapped in gossamer, the basic rights are obfuscated, their urgency

diluted. Indeed the very disproportion between utopian goals, propounded as absolute rights, and the capacity or willingness of most regimes to meet them is a loud and clear invitation to cynicism and hypocrisy. Where standards are hopelessly out of line, reality cuts them down to size, and the very notion of human rights is liable to fall into contempt.

It thus becomes important to gain greater clarity about the limits of what can properly be demanded in the name of human rights, and here we would emphasize two points. First, there is no human right to an equality of conditions, results, or outcomes in life. The idea of human rights implies that men are equal in a very precise sense: They are equal inasmuch as they are all endowed with the inalienable rights described above, and not in any other way.¹⁸ What they make of life on the basis of these rights, together with their other distinct endowments (and what life makes of them), is not determined by the rights. The doctrine of human rights begins from awareness of, and strives to maintain respect for, human inequality and diversity; human rights are intended to foster the conditions within which individuality, creativity, and excellence can become manifest. None of this is to deny that a strong democratic bias is implicit in the political rights and the principle of government by consent. To quote Locke, there is to be "one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the Favourite at Court, and the Country Man at Plough"; for it is "the interest, as well as the intention of the People, to have a fair and equal Representative," by which means "every single person becomes subject, equally with other the meanest men, to those Laws, which he himself, as part of the Legislative has established."¹⁹ This means that according to Locke's teaching political authority rests finally with the majority; but the distinguished or unusual individual and minority has as much right to the protection of life, liberty, and property from the tyranny of the majority as from any other tyranny—and the most astute philosophic schemes for balancing governmental power keep this right squarely in view.

The second point is really another aspect of this concern for individuality: Human rights belong to all people as individuals, not as members of any economic class, religion, race, or nation. Groups, other than the family, have no rights as such. "Group rights" are at most the expression of the rights of the individuals who comprise the groups, and no group may pursue its rights at the expense of the rights of any individual or any other group. One generation may not be forced to forego its rights for the sake of later generations or be deprived of its rights because of the supposed crimes of its forefathers; one class may not have its rights protected at the expense of another class's rights; an individual's belonging to any race or religion cannot disqualify him from equal protection of his rights; and so on.

From Principles to Policy

An intelligent application of the principles that we have expressed as a pyramid of rights would take note of those facts of life that currently surface under the names of collective, economic, and social rights. The fact is, such attention to harsh political realities is implicit in the principles themselves. Where a regime can make a powerful case for suspending or deferring less urgent rights for the sake of maintaining more urgent ones, we should hear it out, although not by any means uncritically. We should, accordingly, give credit where it is due to regimes that, unable for convincing reasons to implement the full range of human rights, display the most thorough commitment to those feasible under the circumstances. This we should do even where the rights protected are only subpolitical ones. We would not be true to our own tradition if we undervalued such solid goods as peace, order, and prosperity; economic and religious freedoms and the right to emigrate; the existence of an independent judiciary. At the same time neither would we be true to it if we did not insist on the incompleteness and precariousness of such goods where the other civil and political freedoms are lacking.

Here indeed our metaphor of the pyramid requires some correction. For it is not only the case that the lower freedoms must be present if the loftier ones are to be secured. The reverse is substantially true as well. Political and civic freedoms thus resemble the keystone of the arch of human rights. Comprising its highest point, they at the same time cement the whole, which without them must always threaten to collapse.

But besides emphasizing self-government as a means to securing subpolitical rights, we must also stress its intrinsic dignity. In this we would ratify in theory what has been amply established in practice: the extraordinary moral power of the appeal to political freedom. This, in other words, is the place to acknowledge the thought of Rousseau and Kant, with its emphasis on political freedom as a crucial aspect of moral freedom. In order to be satisfying, whether to ourselves or others, any human rights policy must attend to political rights not only as instrumental but as the culmination of the whole edifice—as neither the most urgent nor the least difficult, as the rarest but at the same time the finest rights of which human beings are capable. A unified and integrated structure of individual rights, worth preserving even when unfinished but achieving completeness only in free self-government limited by nothing but these rights themselves—such is the vision that we would offer over against the current ones. In short, we Americans should do whatever is feasible to reestablish ourselves as the party of freedom in the world.

The principles that we suggest represent a kind of synthesis of two successive stages of the Western human rights tradition, and a foreign policy informed by them would combine elements of the policies cor-

responding to each. Because, however, our synthesis of principle is an unequal one, drawing more heavily upon the cautious and flexible principles of the earlier human rights tradition, so too will the synthesis of policies be unequal. Just as every government is primarily responsible for protecting the human rights of its own citizens, the chief and overriding U.S. policy objective must remain the security of the United States—and such security cannot be maintained primarily by talk of human rights. Yet within the limits imposed upon it by this overriding objective, the United States should do its best to further human rights elsewhere in the world, relentlessly bringing the civil and political rights to the foreground of public attention.

Such a policy is all the more defensible in that the United States and its closest allies—Canada, Western Europe, Israel, Japan—which its own interest bids it defend, are also almost the only places where human rights, culminating in free self-government, have come into their own. The defense of the existing liberal democracies—and who can doubt that they are on the defensive?—is the real cornerstone of any grand strategy for the support of human rights. We must be clear on this: This is the cake; everything else, however worthy, is frosting.

But beyond this realm of our alliances, interest and principle are certain to diverge frequently, presenting policymakers with dilemmas that they will have to resolve as best they can. Because the countries that respect the whole range of human rights are so few, their defense will necessarily involve arrangements with countries that do not. It is now unfashionable to speak of the totality of anti-Communist nations as the "Free World," and in truth the "Free World" always harbored regimes to which freedom was only a euphemism. But if not all of the countries that belonged to the Free World were free, all of the free countries belonged to the Free World. So did most of the less free ones that were on the way to becoming freer. At some point it becomes necessary to weigh the exigencies of preserving human rights where they exist against those of extending them to places they do not.

Of such dilemmas there can be no theoretical resolution. Again we recall that, according to the original human rights understanding, national interest is by no means divorced from principle. The connections are two, however, and they may tend in opposite directions. On the one hand, a state is in principle a sovereign unit, and the primary obligations of its governors are to their own citizens and to their state's treaty allies. On the other, a state founded on the principles of human rights has also a powerful interest in the dissemination of those principles: There has never been a war between two liberal democracies. What is more, there can be no doubt that success at furthering human rights elsewhere would greatly boost the morale and prestige of the Western alliance—as failure to maintain them in any place where they presently exist would deliver a shattering blow to it.

With these considerations in mind, we have proposed a modified version of the original American human rights tradition as the one most

appropriate to the current situation. In theory our policy combines a commitment to the dignity of the individual with an appreciation of the other solid if less sublime blessings of the human rights tradition. In practice it encourages attention to the rank order of the various rights and to the exigencies of particular situations—encourages, but cannot insure; and this final point is worth stressing. For the human rights policy has not been invented that can substitute for the good sense of those called upon to implement it.

Notes

1. John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (New York: New American Library, 1965; originally published 1698), First Treatise, section 87.
2. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Book 12, chapter 2, translated by the authors from *Oeuvres complètes de Montesquieu*, 2 vols., ed. Roger Cailliois (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1951; originally published 1748).
3. Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), Article 17; cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 17, section 1: "Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others," and section 2: "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
4. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, Second Treatise, sections 50 and 120 (emphasis added); cf. William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; originally published 1765–69), Book 1, chapter 1, section 3.
5. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Book 13, chapter 1.
6. *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961; originally published 1788), Paper 10.
7. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Book 26, chapter 15.
8. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, First Treatise, sections 56 and 86–97; Second Treatise, sections 35–83; Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, Book 1, chapters 15–16; Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Book 6, chapter 20; Book 15, chapter 12; Book 26, chapters 3–6 and 14.
9. Cf. Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, Book 1, chapter 1, section 2.
10. Cf. Declaration of Independence (1776); and John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Niddich (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979; originally published 1690), Book 2, chapter 31.
11. Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, Articles 10 and 11.
12. Compare Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (Paris: Editions Garnier Frères, 1960; originally published 1762), Book 1, chapter 8, and *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men*, ed. and trans. Roger Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), pp. 164–65, 178–79, with Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" and "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" in *Kant on History*, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). For a fuller discussion of the theoretical background, see Thomas L. Pangle, "The Moral Basis of National Security: Four Historical Perspectives," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 307–72.

200*

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Iván Cepeda Castro @IvanC... · 13h

#YoMarchoEste21 porque siguen asesinando a las líderes y los líderes sociales; continúa la matanza de indígenas en el Cauca; han vuelto lo...

Más sobre lo anterior.

Personajes fastidiosos y peligrosos como este, SE ESCUDAN EN LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, para desestabilizar el republicanismo. Y si no me cree, mire, los derechos humanos de Santrich ESTÁN POR ENCIMA DE COLOMBIA. Hágame el favor.

Por eso todos estos manes y manas (!), ponen en su perfil DDHH. Como si fuera un doctorado o algo así! Lol.

Y si quiere ver más mírase a la ONU. Y verá el trillón de “derechos humanos” que dice defender!!

201*



Muy lindo, pero IRRELEVANTE. Por no decir más.

GOBERNAR UNA CIUDAD NO ES DICTAR CLASE EN UNA UNIVERSIDAD.

O sino TODOS LOS HAMPONES estarían en la U.

Muy lindo, pero IRRELEVANTE

MEJOR JENOFONTE.

202*

La muerte de los indígenas del Cauca es, de cierta manera, fácil de entender.

SE DEBE A DESTRUIR LA UNIDAD Y CONFRATERNIDAD EN NOMBRE DE LA DIVERSIDAD Y LA DIFERENCIA.

En ese sentido la Academia liberal radical es casi igual de culpable que los asesinos.

De seguro nos dirán loco, sobretodo que ahora una de esas académicas es la que gobernará a Bogotá.

No importa. Si no tuviésemos la razón NO LOS MATARÍAN de manera continua y sin defensa.

Por ESO MISMO sacan al ejército colombiano de SUS tierras. PERO CUANDO LOS MATAN, esa misma ACADEMIA SALTA a exigir que aparezca el ejército COLOMBIANO! Confundidos como Confucio!

Por la unidad y confraternidad republicana. La mala "paz", la peor droga.

203*

Ahora resulta que el ejército colombiano debe dejarse matar por los niños y las niñas entrenados/as PARA MATAR SIN PIEDAD por los narcoguerrilleros corruptos y sanguinarios.

Así es como Colombia soluciona sus problemas. Y por eso es que es líder mundial.

Pero independiente. SOLDADO DEFIÉNDASE.

Y COLOMBIA DEFIÉNDASE.

204*

Ahora los sabios ya saben quien va a ser Presidente en el 2022!!!! Esta gente de dónde sale? Quién los educa? Cómo se vuelven tan sobrados y sabios y sabias!!!


Hijue. CERO FUTURO!!!

Gracias Sócrates por ser nuestro líder AHORA Y SIEMPRE!!

205*




206* (REPETIDO del Apéndice anterior por razones obvias)



Jenofonte es poco leído en la academia pero uno de sus libros se llama "Memorias de Sócrates". Jenofonte, era un general y líder reconocido, aparte de haber escrito libros diversos sobre los persas y los griegos. En un capítulo Jenofonte habla sobre Sócrates, la ley y la justicia. Esa lectura debe completarse con otras como la de Las Leyes de Platón y el ataque de Alcibíades al mismísimo Pericles en esta, la **Memorabilia** de Jenofonte.

No podemos entrar en detalle. Pero quienes viven en sociedades corruptas, harían bien en leer, preguntarse, y entender. Con razón la Academia moderna poco lee a Jenofonte, con la importante excepción de los Straussianos.



is where you are accustomed to ride horses,¹³ or will you try to conduct your practices on the sorts of terrain where the wars will take place?"

"That certainly would be better," he said.

[7] "What about this? Will you pay any attention to their hitting as many as possible from their horses?"

"This too certainly would be better," he said.

"Did you intend also to sharpen the souls of your horsemen and arouse their anger against the enemy, things that make them more stouthearted?"

"If not, at least now I shall try," he said.

[8] "Have you worried at all about how to get your horsemen to obey you? For without this neither horses nor good and stouthearted horsemen are any benefit."

"You speak truly," he said. "But how would someone most turn them in this direction, Socrates?"

[9] "This you surely know—that in every matter human beings most want to obey those they believe to be best. In fact, when sick they obey most whomever they believe to be most skilled as a physician, and on a ship those who sail obey most whomever they believe most skilled as a pilot, and in farming they obey most whomever they believe to be most skilled in farming."

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"It is plausible, then, also in horsemanship," he said, "that the rest will most want to obey whoever most visibly knows what should be done."

[10] "So, Socrates," he said, "if I am clearly the best among them, will this be enough for them to obey me?"

"If, at any rate, in addition to this," he said, "you teach them that obeying you is both more noble and more conducive to their safety."

"And how will I teach this?" he said.

"Far more easily, by Zeus," he said, "than if you had to teach them that bad things are better and more profitable than good things."

[11] "Are you saying," he said, "that, in addition to the rest, the cavalry commander must also attend to being able to speak?"

"Did you think," he said, "that you ought to command the cavalry by silence? Or haven't you pondered the fact that it is through

speech that we learned all the things that we have learned are most noble according to law, things by means of which we understand how to live; and that if someone learns any other noble thing, he learns it through speech; and that those best at teaching use speech the most; and that those who have the most understanding of the most serious things converse most nobly?

[12] "Or haven't you pondered the following fact, that whenever a single chorus comes from this city, like the one that is sent to Delos,¹⁴ not one from anywhere else is a match for it, nor is there an abundance of good men, similar to that here, gathered in any other city?"

[13] "You speak truly," he said.

"And yet, the Athenians do not surpass others in goodness of voice, nor in size and strength of body, as much as they surpass them in love of honor,¹⁵ the thing that especially spurs one toward what is noble and honored."

"This also is true," he said.

[14] "Do you think, accordingly," he said, "that if someone should attend also to the cavalry here, that it too would far surpass the others—in equipage of other arms and horses, in orderliness, and in readiness to take risks against the enemy—if the horsemen held that in doing these things they would obtain praise and honor?"

"It is plausible, at least," he said.

[15] "Then, don't hesitate," he said, "but try to turn your men toward the things from which both you yourself, and the other citizens through you, will benefit."


"But, by Zeus, I shall try," he said.

~ Chapter 4 ~

[1] Once when he saw Nicomachides¹⁶ departing from the elections for offices, he asked, "Who were the generals elected, Nicomachides?"

And he said, "Why Socrates, aren't the Athenians just the sort

207* (REPETIDO del Apéndice anterior por razones obvias)



Terminado de leer por segunda vez uno de los textos más importantes para comenzar a entender la situación política de la que muchos hablan hoy en día sin uno saber si en realidad saben de qué están hablando, la noción de tiranía.

Este es el MUY corto diálogo escrito por el poco leído Jenofonte, de quien ya hemos hablado anteriormente, titulado "Sobre la Tiranía". Es un diálogo imaginado por Jenofonte (qué brillante!) entre un sabio y un tirano.

A grandes rasgos, y de manera MUY POCO DESARROLLADA:

- 1) ¿Cómo se diferencian las tiranías modernas y las clásicas?
- 2) ¿En qué consiste lo aterrador de las tiranías modernas fundadas en la idea del estado como fin de la historia y el poder absoluto sobre la naturaleza a partir de la ciencia y la tecnología?

3) ¿Puede una tiranía mejorarse, o es necesario, eliminarla totalmente? ¿Qué implica cada una de las opciones?

Y obviamente para nosotros:

4) ¿Qué quiere decir que Maduro es un tirano? ¿Cómo es posible que un tirano este aún en el poder? ¿Cómo es que Castro estuvo 50 años en el poder y es ALABADO por muchos y NO CONSIDERADO un tirano!!!!? ¿Por qué la ciudadanía está confundida a tal punto que ahora Venezuela es líder de Derechos Humanos en la ONU? (Al respecto leer la paginita que añadí a este escrito)

5) Y conectado al anterior, ¿qué ha devenido de nuestra capacidad de análisis sobre lo político que ya ni siquiera podemos llamar tirano al tirano porque muchos defienden su quehacer desde la Academia misma?

y DE MANERA FUNDAMENTAL,

6)Cuál es la relación entre los mejores en una sociedad, en un régimen político, y su DESEO PARA GOBERNAR, con las tentaciones que lleva el deseo de GOBERNAR POR SOBRE TODO Y PARA SIEMPRE? ¿Qué rol juega la filosofía, y en especial el filósofo político como ser moderador de dichos deseos? ¿O será que en el filósofo político existen esos deseos pero de manera particular son TRANSFORMADOS para siempre por su amor al saber, es decir, al reconocimiento de que no siempre lo sabremos todo ni podremos transformarlo todo, Y MUCHO MENOS en los demás?

y sólo para filósofos:

7) ¿Cómo es posible que Heidegger, el filósofo más importante del siglo XX, no sólo defendió a los Nazis sino que JAMÁS se retractó de esa ayuda intelectual!!! NO en vano dice Strauss:

"when we were brought face to face with tyranny ---with a kind of tyranny that surpassed the boldest imagination of the most powerful thinkers of the past--- OUR POLITICAL SCIENCE FAILED TO RECOGNIZE IT" (!!!!, p. 23.)

No en vano ve Strauss el modelo que se limita, o es puramente motivado, por la pregunta por el Ser (Being) --- como es el proyecto de Heidegger--- como algo peligroso.

Y en el contexto colombiano, ese tipo de postura es la que defiende Petro. Indico esto porque el centro derecha y la derecha de Colombia DEBEN entender que SI NO LEEN, su república PUEDE TERMINAR, Y PRONTO, como la de Venezuela, es decir, HERIDA DE MUERTE.

La traducción del diálogo completo está en google Books:

https://books.google.ca/books/about/On_Tyranny.html?id=puxRXDxS5TMC&redir_esc=y

Pero es crucial leer las interpretaciones de Leo Strauss para poder ubicar los temas centrales y el por qué nos resulta tan extraña esa conversación de hace más de 2000 años, imaginada por el brillante Jenofonte, entre Simónides y Hiero. Igualmente para la gente de Centro y Centro derecha el DEBATE que hace Strauss con Kojeve que es un defensor de principios radicales de izquierda, no ajenos a los que uno escucha usados día a día por la izquierda colombiana y la tiranía venezolana. Si bien Kojeve, un gran pensador que aviva el debate con Strauss de manera excepcional.

Leo Strauss

On Tyranny

The habit of writing against the government had, of itself, an unfavorable effect on the character. For whoever was in the habit of writing against the government was in the habit of breaking the law; and the habit of breaking even an unreasonable law tends to make men altogether lawless. . . .

From the day on which the emancipation of our literature was accomplished, the purification of our literature began. . . . During a hundred and sixty years the liberty of our press has been constantly becoming more and more entire; and during those hundred and sixty years the restraint imposed on writers by the general feeling of readers has been constantly becoming more and more strict. . . . At this day foreigners, who dare not print a word reflecting on the government under which they live, are at a loss to understand how it happens that the freest press in Europe is the most prudish.

MACAULAY

INTRODUCTION

It is proper that I should indicate my reasons for submitting this detailed analysis of a forgotten dialogue on tyranny to the consideration of political scientists.

Tyranny is a danger coeval with political life. The analysis of tyranny is therefore as old as political science itself. The analysis of tyranny that was made by the first political scientists was so clear, so comprehensive, and so unforgettably expressed that it was remembered

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
and understood by generations which did not have any direct experience of actual tyranny. On the other hand, when we were brought face to face with tyranny—with a kind of tyranny that surpassed the boldest imagination of the most powerful thinkers of the past—our political science failed to recognize it. It is not surprising then that many of our contemporaries, disappointed or repelled by present-day analyses of present-day tyranny, were relieved when they rediscovered the pages in which Plato and other classical thinkers seemed to have interpreted for us the horrors of the twentieth century. What is surprising is that the renewed general interest in authentic interpretation of the phenomenon of tyranny did not lead to renewed interest, general or scholarly, in the only writing of the classical period which is explicitly devoted to the discussion of tyranny and its implications, and to nothing else, and which has never been subjected to comprehensive analysis: Xenophon's *Hiero*.

Not much observation and reflection is needed to realize that there is an essential difference between the tyranny analyzed by the classics and that of our age. In contradistinction to classical tyranny, present-day tyranny has at its disposal "technology" as well as "ideologies"; more generally expressed, it presupposes the existence of "science," i.e., of a particular interpretation, or kind, of science. Conversely, classical tyranny, unlike modern tyranny, was confronted, actually or potentially, by a science which was not meant to be applied to "the conquest of nature" or to be popularized and diffused. But in noting this one implicitly grants that one cannot understand modern tyranny in its specific character before one has understood the elementary and in a sense natural form of tyranny which is premodern tyranny. This basic stratum of modern tyranny remains, for all practical purposes, unintelligible to us if we do not have recourse to the political science of the classics.

It is no accident that present-day political science has failed to grasp tyranny as what it really is. Our political science is haunted by the belief that "value judgments" are inadmissible in scientific considerations, and to call a regime tyrannical clearly amounts to pronouncing a "value judgment." The political scientist who accepts this view of science will speak of the mass-state, of dictatorship, of totalitarianism, of authoritarianism, and so on, and as a citizen he may wholeheartedly condemn these things; but as a political scientist he is forced to reject the notion of tyranny as "mythical." One cannot overcome this limitation without reflecting on the basis, or the origin, of present-day political science. Present-day political science often traces its origin to

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Terminamos por segunda vez el texto de Jenofonte titulado "The Education of Cyrus". Ciro es el Rey Persa que crea el Imperio Persa. Jenofonte recrea su educación, empezando en su niñez y terminando con el colapso del Imperio persa.

En una época en la que todo es sobre "liderazgo", realmente impresiona que pocos lean verdaderos líderes como Jenofonte y Ciro. Todo ciudadano interesado en comprender las bases de un republicanismo fuerte y las razones para el colapso del republicanismo haría bien en leerlo.


Además, es TAN AJENO a nuestra educación occidental moderna que abre los ojos

La introducción del libro está gratis en Google Books:

Y para entender mejor la grandeza de Ciro el curo en línea sobre los Persas:

<https://www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/the-persian-empire.html>

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Jenofonte es poco leído en la academia pero uno de sus libros se llama "Memorias de Sócrates". Jenofonte, era un general y líder reconocido, aparte de haber escrito libros diversos sobre los persas y los griegos. En un capítulo Sócrates es enfrentado por Antifón, un sofista. Esta es la conversación. Quien la lea se dará cuenta de lo impresionante que era Sócrates.

·∞ Chapter 6 ∞·

[1] It is worthwhile in his regard also not to omit his conversations with Antiphon the sophist.¹¹⁷ For Antiphon, wishing to draw his close companions away from him, once approached Socrates when they were present and said the following.

[2] "Socrates, I, for my part, thought that those who philosophize should become happier. But you, in my opinion, have reaped from philosophy just the opposite. You live, at any rate, a way of life such as no slave would abide from a master. You eat and drink the poorest food and drink, you wear a cloak that is not only poor but the same one during summer and winter, and you are continuously without shoes or tunic.

[3] "Moreover, you do not take in wealth—a thing that both delights in its acquisition and makes those who possess it live more freely and pleasantly. If, accordingly, you too dispose your companions as do teachers of other work as well, who show their students to be their imitators, you should hold that you are a teacher of unhappiness." And Socrates replied to this:

[4] "In my opinion, Antiphon, you have supposed me to live so painfully that I am persuaded you would rather die than choose to live as I do. Come now, let us examine what you have perceived to be hard in my life.

[5] "Is it that those who accept money are under necessity to produce what they are paid for, but that by not receiving it I am under no necessity to converse with whomever I do not wish? Or do you deem my way of life poor in the belief that I eat less healthy things than you do, or things that provide less strength? Or is it that my regimen is harder to procure than yours because it is more rare and costly? Or that what you furnish yourself is more pleasant for you than what I furnish myself is for me? Don't you know that the one who eats most pleasantly has the least need of relish, and the one who drinks most pleasantly least desires drink that is not at hand?

[6] "Regarding cloaks, you know that those who change them do so for reasons of cold and heat, and that they put on shoes so that they will not be prevented from walking due to what pains their feet. Now then, have you ever perceived me more than another remaining inside because of the cold, fighting with someone over a spot in the shade because of heat, or not going wherever I wish because of pain in my feet?

[7] "Don't you know that when those whose bodies are naturally weakest practice they become stronger at what they practice and more easily bear it than the strongest who does not practice? And don't you think that, by always practicing patient endurance of the things that chance to befall my body, I bear all things more easily than you who does not practice?

[8] "Do you think that anything is more responsible for my not being enslaved to stomach or sleep or lust than that I have other things more pleasant than these that delight not only in their use but also by providing hopes that they will benefit always? More-

over, this at any rate you know: that those who do not think that they are doing well do not experience delight, but those who believe that they are nobly progressing, either in farming or seafaring or whatever else they chance to be working at, are delighted on the grounds that they are doing well.

[9] "Then, do you think that the pleasure from all these things is as great as that from believing that one is becoming better and acquiring better friends? I, for my part, spend my life holding these things. And if indeed it should be necessary to benefit friends or city, is there more leisure to attend to them in my present way of life or in the one that you deem blessed? And who would go on a campaign more easily, a person unable to live without a costly way of life, or one for whom what is at hand is enough? And who would surrender more quickly to a siege, the person needing what is hardest to find, or the one who has enough when he makes use of what is easiest to obtain?

[10] "You seem, Antiphon, like one who thinks that happiness is luxury and extravagance. But I, for my part, hold that to need nothing is divine (*theios*), that to need as little as possible is nearest to the divine, and that what is divine is best, and what is nearest to the divine is nearest to what is best."

[11] Again Antiphon once said to Socrates in a conversation:



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Da alegría haber escrito sobre Colombia. Y DA MÁS ALEGRÍA NO ESCRIBIR SOBRE COLOMBIA. Así es como se hacen la cosas, con el ojo puesto en el verdadero fin vital, "*eudaimonia*" (la palabra aristotélica para felicidad en griego antiguo).

